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The traditional nuclear family-where mom is married to dad and they are
raising their biological kids-is no longer the norm in America. Nowadays,
only one-fifth of America's households consist of a currently married husband
and wife raising children.' Only 51% of all adults were married in 2011, the
lowest figure in recorded American history and a striking contrast to the 72%
who were married fifty years ago.2 Almost one third of the households with
children are headed by single persons or unmarried couples.3 Over half a
million American households are headed by married or unmarried same-sex
couples, with nearly a quarter of those raising children.4 There is now a pluralist
array of families in the United States. A century ago, "family" was culturally
confined to persons related by marriage and blood; today, family is defined by
relations of affinity, love, and commitment.5 Large majorities of Americans
believe that "family" includes married couples raising children, single parents
1. Selected Social Characteristics in the United States: 2010 American Community Survey 1-Year
Estimates, U.S. CENsus BUREAU: AM. FAcT FINDER, http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/
pages/productview.xhtml?pid= ACS_ 10_1YRDPO2&prodType=table [hereinafter 2010 ACS] (last vis-
ited Apr. 13, 2012); see also Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Census Bureau Reports Men and
Women Wait Longer To Marry (Nov. 10, 2010), available at http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/
archives/families households/cb 10- 174.html.
2. See D'VERA COHN ET AL., PEw RESEARCH CTR., BARELY HALF OF U.S. ADULTS ARE MARRIED-A
RECORD Low 1 (2011), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/12/Marriage-Decline.
pdf. The percentage of adults who are married has likely dipped below fifty percent since the Pew
Report. See Cheryl Wetzstein, U.S. Marriage Rate Continues Decline; Men Tie Knot Later, WASH.
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.con/news/2012/feb/5/us-marriage-rate-continues-
decline-men-tie-knot-la/?page =all.
3. To extrapolate this data from several categories in the ACS tables, see 2010ACS, supra note 1.
4. According to the Williams Institute, the 2010 Census revealed 646,464 same-sex couples in the
United States, with 111,033 raising children. GARY J. GATEs & ABIGAIL M. COOKE, WI.LAMS INST.,
UNITED STATES CENSUS SNAPSHOT- 2010, at 1, 3 (2011), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edul
wp-content/uploads/Census20lOSnapshot-US-v2.pdf. For an early report of this trend, see K~x WESrON,
FAMILIES WE CHOOSE: LESBIANS, GAYS, KINsmP (1991).
5. For some useful surveys making this point, see generally JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO
PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAw (2000), and J. Herbie DiFonzo, How Marriage
Became Optional: Cohabitation, Gender and the Emerging Functional Norms, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB.
PoL'Y 521 (2011).
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raising children, lesbian and gay couples raising children, and married couples
who are not raising children.6
In the last century, American family law has accommodated this social
pluralism through a regulatory pluralism that has been accomplished by a
variety of liberalizations of traditional family law. Legal scholars such as
Margaret Brinig, Naomi Cahn, June Carbone, Herbie DiFonzo, and Jana Singer
have documented the contraction of family law to allow couples more opportu-
nities to form choice-based relationships that depart from traditional legal
baselines such as marriage-for-life.7 Other legal scholars, such as Randall
Kennedy, Nan Hunter, and I, have documented the expansion of family law to
include different-race couples and, more recently, same-sex couples in state
regulatory regimes.8 The expansion of family law has also entailed the creation
of new institutions, such as civil unions and reciprocal beneficiaries, to meet the
needs of unmarried lesbian, gay, and straight couples.' Jill Hasday has shown
how family law has increasingly been made or influenced at the federal level."o
The simultaneous contraction and expansion of family law have usually not
been treated in public discourse as related phenomena-until the great debates
over marriage equality for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)
persons. Traditionalist critics of marriage equality for these minorities, includ-
ing prominent conservatives such as former Senator Rick Santorum and former
Judge Robert Bork, maintain that traditional marriage has already been so
weakened by cohabitation trends and no-fault divorce (the contraction of family
law) that marriage for lesbian and gay couples (an expansion of family law)
would lead to the end of marriage." For these critics, family law properly
6. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW FAMILIES 40 (2010), available
at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/pew-social-trends-2010-families.pdf. Cohabiting couples
without children were considered families by only a minority of those responding to the survey. Id.
7. See MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT To COVENANT. BEYOND THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE
FAMILY (2000); NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILES: LEGAL POLARIZATION AND
THE CREATION OF CULTURE (2010); J. HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL
CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1997); Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, The
One-Size-Fits-All Family, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 137 (2009); June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig,
Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REv. 953
(1991); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1443, 1446-56; see also
MILToN C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 35-42 (1993) (documenting contraction
of family law).
8. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW ch. 6 (3d ed. 2011);
RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPHON 244-80 (2003).
9. ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 8, at ch. 3 § 2, ch. 8.
10. See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 871-87, 893-97 (2004)
[hereinafter Hasday, Canon] (categorizing social security and federal welfare as family law regulation);
see also Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297,
1370-86 (1998) (noting examples of modern federal provisions that can be classified as family law).
11. RICK SANTORUM, IT TAKES A FAMILY- CONSERVATISM AND THE COMMON GOOD 28-39 (2005);
Uncommon Knowledge with Peter Robinson: Robert's Rules of Order: A Conversation with Robert
Bork, HOOVER INST. (July 16, 2003), http://www.hoover.org/multimedia/uncommon-knowledge/
27065#nogo [hereinafter Uncommon Knowledge]; Lynn D. Wardle, The Boundaries of Belonging:
Allegiance, Purpose and the Definition of Marriage, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 287 (2011). A quasi-empirical
1884 [Vol. 100:1881
FAMILY LAW PLURALISM
focuses on ties of marriage, procreation, and blood; the "liberalization" of
family law has undermined marriage and loosened the biological connection
among marriage, procreation, and parenting; and further liberalization would be
fatal to the cherished institution of marriage and would destroy the proper
normative mission of family law. 2
Such end-of-marriage arguments have not been supported by the experience
of jurisdictions recognizing lesbian and gay unions and marriages.13 This is not
surprising, as the Bork-Santorum way of thinking reveals a fundamental confu-
sion: their association of liberalizations that are deregulatory in their thrust, like
legalized cohabitation and no-fault divorce, and liberalizations that are on-the-
whole regulatory, like extending the civil-marriage regime to lesbian and gay
couples. Progressive critics of same-sex marriage, such as Nancy Polikoff,
astutely recognize this contrast and provide a more useful analysis for that
reason.14 But there is a deeper point underlying the Bork-Santorum critique of
marriage equality: traditionalist critics believe that the optimal goal of family
law is to encourage everyone to get married and to raise her or his biological
children. This implicit commitment to marital and blood ties once dominated
American thinking about families but no longer holds such a predominant
position in this country.
The opposite mistake is made by supporters of marriage equality who argue
that the government should get out of the marriage business altogether and
should leave romantic relationships entirely to private contracting. 5 To be sure,
the proposal of the Cato Institute's David Boaz and others to privatize marriage
is making a deep and interesting point about the relationship of law to family.
Libertarian critics believe that the optimal goal of family law is to enforce the
version of this argument can be found in Stanley Kurtz, The End of Marriage in Scandinavia, WKLY.
STANDARD, Feb. 2, 2004, at 26, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/
000/003/660zypwj.asp.
12. See SANTORUM, supra note I1; Uncommon Knowledge, supra note 11.
13. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR FOR
WORSE? WHAr WE'VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE ch. 5 (2006) (demonstrating that marriage in
"liberal" Scandinavia actually revived a bit after lesbian and gay partnerships were recognized under
the law); Laura Langbein & Mark A. Yost, Jr., Same-Sex Marriage and Negative Externalities, 90 Soc.
Sci. Q. 292, 305-06 (2009) (demonstrating through sophisticated empirical analysis that no causal
relationship exists between gay-marriage recognition and adverse marriage or divorce rates).
14. See, e.g., NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES
UNDER THE LAW 83-88 (2008) (contrasting the prochoice regimes for family law that progressives
should be supporting with the marriage-equality movement, which would undermine effective choice
for many nontraditional couples). See also Wardle, supra note 11, which I think also avoids the
confusion introduced by Judge Bork and Senator Santorum.
15. See, e.g., David Boaz, Privatize Marriage: A Simple Solution to the Gay-Marriage Debate,
SLAfE (Apr. 25, 1997, 3:30 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2440/. For a more moderate take on the same
idea, see Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Privatizing Marriage, 91 MoNIsT 377, 379, 386 (2008)
(arguing for either abolishing civil marriage or giving all couples a choice between marriage and civil
unions).
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relationship preferences of mature adults, without governmental meddling.
Their implicit commitment to a prochoice approach has gained traction in the
last generation but, like the traditionalist commitment, does not reflect the
aspirations of American thinking about family law. Most romantic couples do
not reach agreement on a host of matters important to their lives, and when they
do reach agreement, it is often tainted by unfair treatment of one of the partners
or of children.16 The Cato Institute's proposal also rests upon confusion about
American contract law, which has never rested upon the premise that the law
does nothing but enforce contractual agreements. Indeed, contract law is often
highly regulatory, though its mode of regulation is distinctive in the way it
balances the autonomy and market values of prochoice deregulation with the
governmental interests in protecting against choices that are not entirely volun-
tary or that affect third parties (such as children).' 7
Mindful of the traditionalist notion that government has a normative role to
play in guiding and sometimes correcting today's plurality of family forms, this
Article borrows ideas and terminology from contract law to explore and,
ultimately, evaluate the history of American family law's accommodation of our
increasing pluralism of families. My primary thesis is that the normative
foundation of family law has changed in this period-away from natural law
norms and toward utilitarian ones-and that the new normative foundation
supports regulation through guided choice rather than the mandatory rules that
dominated the prior regime. Under utilitarian criteria, the most controversial
liberalization, namely, same-sex marriage, is an easy call, while the most
popular liberalization of the last century, namely, no-fault divorce, is not.
Part I is a sociology of American family law in the last one-hundred years.
This sociology traces the interconnected pluralism of American families and our
increasingly pluralist family law. Consistent with the libertarian account, family
law in the last century has abandoned many of its longstanding rules prohibiting
specified conduct and refusing to recognize many relationships. The dramatic
decline of these kinds of rules has opened up new legal choices for romantic
couples. Consistent with the traditionalist account, however, the state continues
to regulate those choices-but more gently, through off-the-rack baselines that
couples may modify according to rules that inform, guide, and sometimes
inhibit their decision making. To use Dan Kahan's felicitous terminology, the
16. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TwENTIETH
CENTURY TRAGEDIES 226-36 (1995) (arguing for the privatization of romantic relationships and the
abolition of civil marriage-yet also for more governmental support for and regulation of caregiving
relationships).
17. See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HoFsTRA L. REv. 495
(1992) (modern family law recognizes private choices but also channels them into socially productive
directions); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV.
1225, 1247 (1998) (arguing that contract law is often highly regulatory and is an appropriate model for
analyzing a regulatory family law).
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state has moved away from "hard shoves" in family law, toward a "gentle
nudges" approach to regulation. IS
This gentle nudges approach to family law reflects a larger normative shift in
this country-away from the natural law norm of procreative marriage and
strongly toward the utilitarian norm that emphasizes individual flourishing and
the value of family for both partners as well as children they are rearing.' 9 The
natural law approach to families emphasizes the virtues of a single institution-
procreative marriage-and encourages or pressures everyone to join this institu-
tion. The country long ago moved beyond this approach and has steadily moved
toward a utilitarian approach that seeks to maximize overall happiness of all the
participants. The utilitarian approach accommodates our social pluralism in
family formation, such that the state recognizes a variety of family institutions,
each tailored to different circumstances and preferences. As the marriage-
equality debate reveals, the natural law understanding has not disappeared-but
the triumph of the more modem perspective is revealed when natural law
enthusiasts such as Rick Santorum make their public appeals in largely utilitar-
ian terms.2 0
18. See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U.
CHI. L. REv. 607, 608 (2000) (introducing the "gentle nudges/hard shoves" approach and applying it in
other real-world contexts); Schneider, supra note 17, at 513 (family law operates through incentives
and nudges more than coercive rules); cf June Carbone, Out of the Channel and into the Swamp: How
Family Law Fails in a New Era of Class Division, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859 (2011) (questioning whether
the channeling function is possible in an era that lacks shared meanings).
19. See, e.g., ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-Go-ROUND: THE STATE OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY
IN AMERICA TODAY 29-32 (2009) (discussing how the high value Americans place on "expressive
individualism" reveals itself in a prochoice philosophy for family relations and has inspired a regula-
tory movement away from insistence on traditional marriage toward recognition of companionate
marriage focused on the happiness of both partners); JAMES Q. WILsON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM: How
OUR CULTURE HAS WEAKENED FAMILIES 84-88, 96 (2002) (arguing that Enlightenment-based individual-
flourishing culture has displaced traditional valorization of marriage as an institution and lamenting this
development); Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62
TUL. L. REv. 855 (1988) (linking changes in marriage and divorce to economic and social changes, with
a correspondingly greater emphasis on mutual affection and individual choice in American family law);
Janet L. Dolgin, Biological Evaluations: Blood, Genes, and Family, 41 AKRON L. REv. 347 (2008)
(similar); Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1847 (1985) (describing the transformation of family law in terms of abandonment
of morals-based reasoning and adoption of psychology-based reasoning); see CAHN & CARBONE, supra
note 7, at 1-15 (tracing a related development-the rise of "blue [state] families," focused on the
happiness of all members of the family and allowing more choices than permitted for "red [state]
families"); see generally ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART. INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMIT-
MENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1st California paperback ed. 1996) (tracing the decline of a communitarian
spirit in the United States, replaced by individual flourishing as the goal).
20. See SANIORUM, supra note 11, at 21 ("It is an open and shut case: the best place for kids to grow
up is with a happily married mom and dad, and the more of these families there are in the community,
the better it is for everyone."). Indeed, this is a general phenomenon: the staunchest defenders of
"traditional" marriage have overwhelmingly couched their public arguments in the language of
individual flourishing and social utility rather than in the now-outdated argot of sectarian natural law
motifs. See, e.g., W. BRADFORD WI.cox, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS, THIRD EDITION: THIRTY CONCLUSIONS
FROM THE SoCIAL SCIENCES (3d ed. 2011) (defense of traditional marriage based upon social science
arguments that marriage is better for people's well-being, good health, and economic success, as well as
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An important idea that has driven the transformation of family law toward
expanded choices for adult relationships has been an increasing social, political,
and constitutional recognition of sexual satisfaction as a human good and, for
most people, a necessary component of a flourishing life. As traditional taboos
against interracial and homosexual activities have eased, so has the notion that
everyone must get married in lifetime commitments. Law's response to this
phenomenon has been to abandon its exclusive focus on marriage and to
reconsider the legal parameters of that institution. Changes in the law have been
both deregulatory and regulatory. Legal reforms to marriage law have permitted
more choices by sexually active Americans, while at the same time creating new
nonmarital regulatory regimes for these Americans.
Recall the clash between the traditionalist and libertarian approaches to the
marriage-equality debate: the former insists on state-enforced norms to influ-
ence family choices, while the other emphasizes a prochoice contract law
approach. Part II of this Article shows how these different perspectives are not
entirely at odds. Specifically, I shall analyze family law's expanded-choice
revolution through the analytical prism of contract theory developed by Ian
Ayres and others. 21 The regulatory punch line is that American law has moved
toward a guided-choice approach to family formation: the state imposes few
rules absolutely barring a person from becoming involved in a romantic (that is,
sexual) relationship with the person of her choice, but the state does guide the
romantic decision makers. Guidance is provided by (1) background rules that
must be consciously overridden by the couple's affirmative choice, (2) rules and
procedures that require deliberation before the couple make particular choices,
and (3) state-provided incentives-as well as by rules that protect the interests
of vulnerable persons, especially children.
In the argot of contract theory, family law has always been a mixture of
mandatory rules and default rules. Mandatory rules are those that cannot be
contracted around by private persons and corporations. In 1911, for example,
states' mandatory rules criminalizing sexual activities outside of marriage (forni-
cation and sexual cohabitation) created a marriage monopoly for procreative
sexual activities. Default rules are those that romantic couples can contract
for society as a whole); Wardle, supra note 11, at 299-301 (leading his traditionalist defense of
marriage exclusions with utilitarian arguments and then mentioning natural law arguments in support of
the exclusion); Lynn D. Wardle, The Attack on Marriage as the Union of a Man and a Woman, 83
N.D. L. REV. 1365 (2007) (emphasizing a much more elaborate litany of utilitarian ills that would
accompany marriage equality, including the encouragement of AIDS and disastrous consequences for
children); Lynn D. Wardle, Children and the Future of Marriage, 17 REGENT U. L. REv. 279 (2005)
(arguing that traditional marriage is necessary for the utilitarian welfare of children and assembling
sources to that effect). For other traditional-family-values supporters emphasizing the same utilitarian
arguments, see also sources in infra notes 273-74.
21. See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J.
(forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Ayres, Altering Rules]; tan Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3,
3, 7-11 (2006) [hereinafter Ayres, Menus Matter]; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87, 127 (1989).
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around; starting in the mid-twentieth century, for example, some states decrimi-
nalized fornication and, to a lesser extent, adultery. The default in those states
was still no sexual activities, but that default was easily overridden if both
participants consented. Today, almost all states have repealed their laws criminal-
izing fornication and nonmarital sexual cohabitation. In effect, a mandatory rule
has been replaced by a default rule. In contrast, there are still mandatory rules
barring public sexual activities or sex with minors; consent of both persons who
engaged in sex does not override these mandatory rules.
Family law's default rules have been accompanied by what I call override
rules. Override rules, which are the same as what Professor Ayres calls "altering
rules,"2 2 are the legal steps or requirements that the parties must follow or meet
to override a legal default. After the state decriminalization of fornication and
sexual cohabitation, the override rule allowing sexual activities was very le-
nient. Unless one of the participants was a minor or mentally disabled, the
formal override rule was consent by both participants. In the last generation, the
override rule has become more stringent because of feminist complaints that the
traditional rule frequently allowed intercourse that a woman did not meaning-
fully agree to. So today, the default is often not overridden if one participant is
in a position of authority over the other, even though the other participant
formally agrees to sexual activities. This illustrates how override rules are often
the primary mode of regulation in the modern regulatory state.
Contract law offers another regulatory concept that helps us understand the
guided-choice approach and the evolution of family law in the last century:
menus.2 3 Just as the state offers contracting parties different menus of off-the-
rack rules that they can easily opt into, so the state might offer romantic couples
varying menus, each consisting of different mandatory, default, and override
rules. The concept of a menu is, in fact, the most powerful regulatory concept
for understanding the guided-choice approach and for seeing how it is both
strongly prochoice yet at the same time may be strongly regulatory.
To be specific, American family law in the last century has moved away from
a monopolistic regime where marriage-with its hundreds of legal entitlements,
requirements, and defaults-was the only item on the menu, and it has moved
toward a pluralist regime where each state offers a larger menu of options for
romantic couples, including those with children. Among the regimes offered by
the expanding menu, American family law in the last century has moved away
from regimes dominated by mandatory rules, such as rules against sex outside
22. Ayres, Altering Rules, supra note 21; Ayres, Menus Matter supra note 21, at 6.
23. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., EQUALTY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS
ch. 6 (2002) (introducing the concept of a "menu" of regulatory options into American family law
discourse); Ayres, Menus Matter supra note 21, at 3; Yair Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules
and Menus Do? An Empirical Examination 36-38, (John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ., and
Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 335, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=924578 (empirically
demonstrating that such a menu approach to corporate law has regulatory effects on corporate decision
making).
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of marriage, and it has moved toward regimes dominated by default rules with
override requirements, some of which are quite stringent.
The menu-default-override analysis of family law has the great virtue of
making sense of the legal revolution in the last generation and tying together in
a useful way the deregulatory and new regulatory features of family law. It also
provides a framework for the normative questions that will be important for the
future of family law: What relationships ought to be included in the topic of
"family law"? What regulatory menus should be offered to relationship part-
ners? In each menu, what ought to be the default rules and what ought to be the
override rules available to partners opting into those menus? Should there be
mandatory rules as well?
Although this analysis does not tell us exactly what the rules of family law
will be or ought to be, it provides a better way of accommodating the important
goals of family law: encouragement of committed relationships, lowering trans-
action costs for couples to achieve their own goals, and protecting vulnerable
persons.24 Specifically, Part Ill will explore the ways in which the menu-default-
override framework is a better regime for handling this complicated array of
public purposes and for advancing the ball in the acrimonious debate over
marriage equality for gay and lesbian couples. Indeed, Part III argues that both
traditional-family-values advocates, who tend to oppose gay marriage, and
progressives, who often oppose gay marriage, can learn a lot from this frame-
work, which suggests experiments that each ought to be propounding, rather
than simply opposing marriage equality.
The Article concludes with some overall thoughts on how the menu of
relationship regimes ought to be formalized in the next generation. To begin
with, the utilitarian perspective supports a baseline of nondiscrimination and
therefore tolerance of family pluralism: most human beings potentially flourish
in relationships, and American family law ought, presumptively, to provide a
supportive context for such relationships and for the rearing of children. This
baseline not only supports marriage equality for LGBT persons and their
partners but also for many partners already related to one another and, possibly,
for persons in polyamorous relationships. Additionally, the utilitarian perspec-
tive supports rules that open up choices for American adults, not only as to
whom they want to partner with but also as to the rules of their partnership. The
24. Compare the articulation of the "functions of family law" in CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F.
BRINIG, AN INVITATION To FAMILY LAW: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS, AND PERSPECrIVEs 211-21, 1386-96 (3d ed.
2006), namely, (1) the channeling and expressive function of family law to encourage and approve
committed relationships, id. at 215-21, 1389-96; (2) the "facilitative" function of family law, id. at
213-14, 1387-88; and (3) the "protective" and "arbitral" functions of family law to protect vulnerable
persons and provide them and other family members a neutral forum for grievances, id. at 212-15,
1386-89. See also David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal
Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447 (1996) (providing a similar analysis of
the variety of purposes served by family law). For an excellent and detailed treatment of the interplay
among the commitment-encouraging, facilitative, and protective features of family law, and how they
have been sacrificed by the expansion of partner choices, see BRINIG, supra note 7.
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utilitarian perspective does not necessarily favor unlimited choice; this perspec-
tive can support mandatory rules in many instances and guided-choice rules and
menus in most other cases. A critical role is played by override rules, which are
procedural mechanisms that facilitate or guide choice, but also may mediate the
stark substantive value clashes that are common in family law.
Modem family law's new centerpiece may be its evolving menu of relation-
ship regimes. For most states, the menu of relationship regimes has developed
haphazardly and without a systematic public debate about the effects of the
menu-and the various regimes of default and override rules--on society, civil
marriage, and children. Legislative study commissions should examine the state
hodgepodge of relationship regimes that have sprung up in response to cohabita-
tion patterns and the gay-marriage movement and figure out what mix of
institutions best meets the balanced needs of society and its citizens and what
mandatory, default, and override rules would work best for each regime. In
making that determination, the central regulatory questions are whether the state
should create a new civil institution to replace marriage, how much the state
wants to nudge its citizens toward marriage or these new civil unions, and what
mix of incentives, default-with-override rules, and mandatory rules the state
ought to impose on the different regimes in its emerging family law menu.25
The main prescriptions are as follows. The utilitarian framework demands a
pluralistic family law that accommodates the needs of a variety of "families,"
not just traditional (dad-mom-kids) families. The nondiscrimination baseline
will require ongoing expansion of family law's reach, not just to lesbian and gay
unions and (soon) marriages, but also to related persons, persons connected by
their relation to children, and even friends. Even more important for the lives of
partners and their families will be state decisions about what relationship
regimes will be included in the expanding menu of options and precisely what
default-with-override rules will be connected to each regime. The utilitarian
framework suggests that policy decisions along these lines ought to be made
through the legislative-administrative processes, for they can consider trade-offs
and compromises that might best advance the complicated hedonic goals of
family law. For example, as a way to accommodate both traditionalist procommit-
ment policies and pluralistic policies, legislatures ought to consider a grand
compromise, whereby the state would recognize marriage equality for LGBT
citizens while at the same time regularizing the jurisdiction's ad hoc cohabita-
tion rules and creating a new regime of covenant marriage, with generous state
incentives for couples with children.
25. Cf LAW COMM'N OF CAN., BEYOND CONJUGALITY- RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING CLOSE PERSONAL
ADULT RELATIONSHIPS (2001) (presenting an evidence-based description of the sociology of the family in
Canada and proposing a new regime for registration of partners that would better meet the needs of
these citizens and their families).
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I. A SOCIOLOGY OF THE GUIDED-CHOICE REGIME OF
FAMILY LAW PLURALISM, 1911-2011
American families and family law changed dramatically in the first century of
The Georgetown Law Journal, namely, the years between 1911 and 201 1.26 I
1911, almost all American families followed the traditional model of a man
married for life to a woman, rearing their biological children. The husband-wife
couple was almost always of the same race and usually of the same religion and
ethnicity. The husband controlled the family resources and participated in the
public spheres of economy and politics; the wife governed the domestic sphere
of the household and usually did not work outside the home.27
The family in 2011 looks a lot different than it did in 1911. Many Americans
have opted out of the "household family," as they live alone.28 Adults living
together in the same household are usually married, but at much lower levels,
and they include same-sex as well as different-race married or cohabiting
couples.29 Whether married or cohabiting, women have more control over
family resources and participate in the public sphere more than ever before in
American history. Fewer households are rearing children, and many of those
children are not the biological progeny of both parents. Specifically, one-sixth
of America's children are being raised in blended households (where one or
both parents are not biologically related to the child) and another quarter in
households headed by just one parent.30
During the same period in which the American family has changed dramati-
cally, American family law has changed as well. The overall transformation can
be described as creating a more pluralistic legal regime, which regulates
26. See, e.g., NANCY F. CoTT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000).
27. In the early twentieth century, married women rarely worked outside the home, and when they
did, they rarely earned a living wage. See, e.g., CHRISTINE E. BOSE, WOMEN IN 1900: GATEWAY TO THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 2(TH CENTURY 60 tbl.6 (2001) (showing that in 1900, just four percent of
wives were gainfully employed); LESLIE WOODCOCK TENTLER, WAGE-EARNING WOMEN: INDUSTRIAL WORK
AND FAMILY LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900-1930, at 9-10 (1982) (documenting women's low wages).
The domestic sphere of the household was considered the wife's sphere. TERESA AMoTr & JULIE
MATTHAEI, RACE, GENDER, AND WORK: A MULTI-CULTURAL ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED
STATES 302 (1991); TENTLER, supra, at 8-10.
28. See COHN ET AL., supra note 2.
29. See id.; PEw RESEARCH CTR., supra note 6, at 66-67; WENDY WANG, PEw RESEARCH CTR., THE RISE
OF INTERMARRIAGE: RATES, CHARACTERISTICS VARY BY RACE AND GENDER 5 (2012), available at http://
www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2012/02/SDT-Intermarriage-I.pdf. See generally Christopher Carpenter
& Gary J. Gates, Gay and Lesbian Partnership: Evidence from California, 45 DEMOGRAPHY 573 (2008)
(analyzing data on the cohabitation rates of self-identified gay and lesbian individuals).
30. See PEw RESEARCH CTR., supra note 6, at 17 (citing data from the U.S. Census showing that in
the United States in 2008, twenty-five percent of children under age fourteen were living in single-
parent households); OFFICE JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, Statistical Briefing Book (Apr. 22, 2011),
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/population/qa01201.asp?qaDate=2010 (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Liv-
ing Arrangements of Children Under 18 Years Old: 1960 to Present (Nov. 2010), http://www.census.gov/
population/socdemo/hh-fam/chl.xls) (showing that twenty-seven percent of children live in single-
parent homes); ROSE M. KREIDER, LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN: 2004, at 10 tbl.6 (2008),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p70-ll4.pdf.
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through the mechanism of guided choice for sexual couples in the United States.
Overall, American family law today is much more prochoice than it was in
1911: more Americans have the choice to marry the person they love; within
marriage, the spouses have more choices; and romantic couples have legal
options for a life together outside of marriage.
This Part starts with a brief overview of the family-law developments in the
last century, emphasizing both contractions of state regulation and the creation
of new modes and rules of state regulation (section A). I then explore the social
bases for these legal developments (section B) and the larger normative revolu-
tion that undergirds our modem family law's pluralist regime of guided choice
(section C). The next Part will offer a more detailed examination of these
developments, but using the contract-based terminology noted above.
A. THE EMERGENCE OF A GUIDED-CHOICE REGIME, 1911-2011
The legal regime of American family law in 1911 was highly regulatory,
forbidding and even criminalizing relationship choices that flourish today.
Although marriage was highly regulatory, it was much more restricted as well.
Family law in 2011 is a regime that is more pluralistic and inclusive than family
law a century earlier. It is also a regime where there is more individual choice,
but that choice is channeled, or guided, by governmental nudges rather than by
hard governmental shoves.
The movement from the 1911 regime dominated by governmental coercion
(hard shoves) to the 2011 regime dominated by guided choice (gentle nudges)
has involved both deregulatory moves by the state and new regulatory moves by
the state. The best-known features of the legal revolution are deregulatory and
pluralistic. In the last century, government in this country has revoked tradi-
tional prohibitions and opened up new options for romantic couples. Among the
deregulatory moves in family law are the following:
* Decriminalizing nonmarital sexual activities, through the repeal or nullifica-
tion of laws forbidding fornication and adultery; 32
* Decriminalizing nonprocreative sexual activities, through the repeal or
nullification of laws forbidding contraceptives, consensual sodomy, and oral
sex between consenting adults, as well as abortions desired by pregnant
women;33
31. The account in this Part is similar to that developed in broader strokes by other scholars. I am
particularly indebted to Corr, supra note 26, and Schneider, supra note 19.
32. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO AMERICA'S SEx LAWS 98-110
(1996) (documenting the declining number of states that still criminalized fornication and adultery as of
1996). For a more detailed account, see infra section H.C.
33. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA 1861-2003, at
387-407 app. (2008) (surveying the decline and fall of consensual sodomy and oral-sex prohibitions);
DAVID J. GARRow, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY- THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF RoE v WADE (1994)
(chronicling decriminalization of contraception and abortion); ANDREA TONE, DEVICES AND DESIRES: A
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* Allowing divorce and dissolution of legal unions without showings of fault
and, increasingly, at the behest of only one spouse;34
* Enforcing antenuptial agreements, thereby allowing married couples to
contract around many of the requirements of marriage and divorce law;3 5
* Sweeping away discriminations against nonmarital children;36 and
* Accommodating private nontraditional procreation, namely, surrogacy, arti-
ficial insemination, and adoption.
These changes have been deregulatory in the relative sense that American
government has revoked or narrowed most forms of previous regulation-but
the state has not eliminated all forms of regulation and, indeed, has created new
forms of regulation. For example, the repeal of antifornication laws has meant
that the state no longer criminalizes nonmarital penile-vaginal sex per se, but
the state still regulates penile-vaginal sex through increasingly detailed sexual-
assault laws.3 8 Overall, though, state criminal law regulates a narrower range of
private sexual conduct today than it did a century ago.
At the same time that American governmental units were backing away from
coercive laws imposing hard rules on romantic couples, they were offering
choices that entailed new forms of regulation. Couples who were literally
outlaws in 1911 because their unions were criminal are today within the
law-including various gentler forms of legal regulation. Thus, state regulation
of family choices remains pervasive, but its characteristic modalities have
changed. Regulation today is more likely to be through choice-friendly opt-in/opt-
out regimes that offer benefits to couples in return for state regulation or
HISTORY OF CoNTRAcEPnvEs IN AMERICA 238-39 (2001) (discussing the decriminalization of contracep-
tion for both married and unmarried individuals). For a more detailed account, see infra section II.C.
34. See ALLEN M. PARKMAN, GOOD INTENTIONS GONE AWRY- NO-FAULT DIVORCE AND THE AMERICAN
FAMILY (2000) (providing history of modem no-fault divorce laws); Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon L. Lohr,
Dissolving the Relationship Between Divorce Laws and Divorce Rates, 18 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 341,
347-48 tbl.1 (1998) (providing chart of state divorce reform with accompanying dates). For a more
detailed account, see infra section I.B.
35. See Developments in the Law-The Low of Marriage and Family, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1996,
2075-98 (2003) (discussing the future of antenuptial agreement law). For a more detailed account, see
infra section II.A.3.
36. The Supreme Court has invalidated many of the discriminations against nonmarital children. See
Christine H. Kellett, The Burger Decade: More Than Toothless Scrutiny for Laws Affecting Illegiti-
mates, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 791, 798-806 (1979) (deftly analyzing the Court's constitutional decisions
regarding illegitimate children from 1969-1979). For a more detailed account, see infra section II.C.
37. See, e.g., JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 98-100 (1994) (discussing in vitro fertilization); Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100
GEo. L.J. 367 (2012) (discussing the effect of new reproductive technologies on kinship and families);
Darra L. Hofman, "Mama's Baby, Daddy's Maybe": A State-by-State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and
Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 Wm. MITCHELL L. REV. 449, 460 (2009) (discussing surrogacy). For
a more detailed account, see infra section III.B.3.
38. See Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL.
L. REV. 777, 793-95 (1988) (detailing the expansion of sexual-assault laws as based on parties'
consent). For a more detailed account, see infra sections II.A.2.b and H.C. 1.b.
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guidance. Among the proregulatory moves American governments have made
in the last century are the following:
* Expanding the range of couples eligible to marry to include different-race
couples, many previously excluded persons with disabilities, and, increas-
ingly, same-sex couples, thereby extending the highly regulatory regime of
marriage rules to these sexual couples who had previously been family
outlaws;39
* Expanding state regulation, within marriage as well as within other relation-
ships, to protect the liberty and well-being of individual family members,
including rights of spouses to say no to sexual intercourse; 40
* Recognizing rights of children, not only to support, but also to nurturing
care from nonbiological parental figures;4 1
* Recognizing specific rights and duties of unmarried but cohabiting partners,
including rights to support under a broader range of circumstances, to be
free of domestic violence, and to have access to state mediation services for
domestic disputes;42
* Creating new institutional forms of relationship recognition, including domes-
tic partnerships, reciprocal beneficiaries, and civil unions; 43 and
* Providing benefits to families in need but with strings attached that have
afforded the state new opportunities for incentive-based regulation of fam-
ily formation."
39. See generally KENNEDY, supra note 8 (providing survey of the repeal and eventual national
nullification of state laws barring different-race marriages by 1967); ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 8,
at ch. 6 § 2 (providing survey of the repeal of state laws barring same-sex marriages circa 2011). For a
more detailed account, see infra sections II.A.1 and II.C. 1.
40. See generally Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88
CAUF. L. REv. 1373, 1380, 1484-85 (2000) (discussing the slow reform of state marital-rape exemp-
tions, albeit frequently replaced with partial "allowances" for conduct in marriage that would be
considered rape outside of marriage). For a more detailed account, see infra sections II.A.2.b and
I.C.I.a.
41. See generally Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood To
Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459
(1990) (arguing for the importance of caregivers for children and the utility of two-parent lesbian
households). For a more detailed account, see infra sections II.C. La and IH.B.2.
42. See generally Cynthia Grant Bowman, Legal Treatment of Cohabitation in the United States, 26
L. & POL'Y 119 (2004) (providing survey of cohabitation law as of 2004). For a more detailed account,
see infra section II.C. 1.
43. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 23 (providing survey of early civil-union, domestic-partnership,
reciprocal-beneficiary laws in North America and Europe circa 2002); ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note
8, at ch. 6 § 2 (providing more recent survey circa 2011). For a more detailed account, see infra section
H.C.2.
44. See Hasday, Canon, supra note 10, at 875-77 (analyzing federal social security as a form of
family law), 893-98 (analyzing federal welfare law as a more coercive form of family law). For a more
detailed account, see infra section II.A.
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Guided choice has been, in this manner, double-edged. Romantic couples now
have more choices they can make-whether to get married, whether to engage
in family-planning methods to limit the number of children, whether to end the
marriage or other relationship and on what terms-but some of the new choices
they can make entail acceptance of an expanded state regulatory regime.
B. THE SOCIOLOGY OF FAMILY PLURALISM DRIVING THE GUIDED-CHOICE REGIME
The sociology of the foregoing evolution-the social and cultural changes
that drove the changes in family formation and family law-is complicated,45
but some important strands bear emphasis. To begin with, the overriding fact of
family practice, custom, and law in the United States has been the fairly steady
decline in fertility and family size from the eighteenth century until the pres-
ent.46 That fact has opened up more opportunities for women in general and
helps explain the success of American feminism, a social movement that won
important legal victories in the nineteenth century, including the enactment of
laws vesting wives with economic rights to hold property, enter contracts, and
initiate lawsuits without their husbands' permission.47
Thus, scholars Carl Degler, Herma Hill Kay, and Katharine Bartlett are surely
right to say that changes in American family law have been driven in critically
important ways by women's assertions of their individuality and independence
in both public and private spheres of American life.48 Even in the nineteenth
century, our culture and law contemplated relationships as more companionate
than European law and culture considered them.49 In the twentieth century,
women's increasing opportunities outside the home and their growing economic
power have strongly contributed to the lower birth rates, lower marriage rates,
and higher divorce rates in the last generation, compared with those of the early
twentieth century.50
The women's movement is not the only social movement that has signifi-
cantly affected American family life and family law, however. Against the
45. For some leading explications, see CHERLIN, supra note 19; Corr, supra note 26; DiFonzo, supra
note 5; and Schneider, supra note 19.
46. See CAROLE SHAMMAS, A HISTORY OF HOUSEHOLD GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 186-87 app. (2002).
47. See NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAw: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY NEW YORK 162-66, 224-25 (1982); ELIZABETH BowLEs WARBASSE, THE CHANGING LEGAL
RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN 1800-1861, at 248-91 (1987).
48. CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
PRESENT (1980); Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women's
Rights and Family Lw in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 2017,
2019-20 (2000); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 475 (1999)
(providing an excellent account of the important role that feminist critiques and women's political
power have played in a variety of family law reform movements).
49. See Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Lw: 1800-1850, 71 GEo. L.J. 1359, 1397
(1983) (demonstrating that American law and culture more readily addressed changing family dynam-
ics, by increasing protections for women and removing impediments to property transfer, than did
English law and culture in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).
50. SHAMMAS, supra note 46.
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background of declining fertility and family size, other social movements have
advanced ideas inconsistent with the old Anglo-American common law of the
family. By challenging antimiscegenation social mores and laws, the civil rights
movement contributed decisively to the "de-raceing" of cohabitation and mar-
riage laws, an expansion of family law that has grown in social importance over
time." The disability rights movement has challenged, with some success,
exclusions of people with certain disabilities from civil marriage.52
Although representing fewer Americans than the women's, the civil rights, or
the disability rights movements, the rights movement propelled by gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons has been the most significant in
some symbolic respects. Today, the LGBT rights movement is accused of
unsettling American family law because of its demand for marriage equality, but
the importance of that social movement long precedes the recent attention to
gay marriage. Lesbian and gay couples have for some time been socially
important (well beyond their numbers) shock troops for the larger revolution in
American families and their legal regulation. Gertrude Stein and Alice B.
Toklas, for example, were among the earliest American role models for sexual
cohabitation; their well-publicized committed relationship flouted natural law
norms yet was a source of happiness for both partners and was a partnership
with larger cultural value as well.
The most important way in which the efflorescence of lesbian and gay
communities has contributed to changes in American family law has been the
new social reality presented by committed lesbian and gay couples who are
rearing children: these "families of choice" inherently disassociate the sexuality
that seals the couples' relationships from procreation of the children that those
couples are rearing. This intrinsic feature of lesbian and gay relationships helps
us understand why many traditionalists who believe that LGBT persons should
not be subject to state discrimination have also opposed gay marriage: what
those traditionalists consider most important about marriage-its wedding of
51. See Brief of the NAACP as Amicus Curiae at 1-6, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No.
395) (describing the campaign to repeal antimiscegenation laws and arguing that their invalidation was
essential to confirm the antiracism agenda of the Court's civil rights precedents).
52. See ALLISoN C. CAREY, ON THE MARGINS OF CITIZENSHIP: INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AND CIVIL
RIGHTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 157-59, 172-73, 188 (2009); JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No Prr
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVnL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 197-98 (1994). For an early account
of the disability rights movement and the constitutional issues arising from exclusions of individuals
with disabilities from marriage, see SARAH F. HAAVIK & KARL A. MENNINGER, II, SEXUALrnY LAW, AND
THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSON: LEGAL AND CLINICAL ASPECTS OF MARRIAGE, PARENTHOOD, AND
STERILIZATION 1-2, 33-41 (1981).
53. STEPHEN 0. MURRAY, AMERICAN GAY 167 (1996). For contemporary accounts of Gertrude Stein
and Alice B. Toklas's cohabitation and relationship see, for example, Fanny Butcher, The Literary
Spotlight, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 2, 1945, at D13 (describing how Stein and Toklas financed their
apartment and life together), and Leonard Lyons, Broadway Bulletin, WASH. PosT, Nov. 25, 1941, at 22
(reporting that Stein and Toklas lived together in a "secluded villa" in Aix-les-Bains during World War
II); see also David Edstrom, Why Gertrude Stein Is What, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 14, 1935, at K3 (describing
Toklas and Stein as "inseparable" and noting "Toklas's deep and ardent affection for [Stein]").
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commitment, sexuality, and procreation-is the one thing that gay marriage
cannot be.54
C. THE NORMATIVE (UTILITARIAN) FOUNDATION FOR THE
NEW GUIDED-CHOICE REGIME
What lesbian and gay couples best exemplify is what American couples of all
orientations have been doing and thinking increasingly in the last century:
separating sexuality from procreation. The big change in public attitudes driving
the evolution of American family law in the last century has been the decline of
the natural law understanding of romantic relationships and its substantial
displacement in public discourse by a utilitarian understanding.5 5
What I am calling the natural law understanding is a religious understanding
of human relationships, or a similar vision supported by secular natural law
philosophy. 5 6 Under such a natural law approach, sex is both a dangerous and a
generative force that must be strongly directed by society, religion, and the
state, working closely together. What morally justifies sex is the marital procre-
ation that creates families, undergirds society and the state, and propagates the
human race. Thus, according to this philosophy, penile-vaginal intercourse is
the proper form of sexual activity, and civilizing, domesticating marriage is the
forum in which that activity must take place.
Contrary to the natural law vision, the utilitarian understanding of romantic
relationships posits that pleasure, sociability, and collective advancement to be
moral justifications for sexual activities. Everyone's sexuality is distinctive
54. See, e.g., Wardle, supra note 11 (arguing that the essence of marriage, and the source of its
utilitarian benefits, is its "gender-integrative" feature). But cf. WILIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., THE CASE FOR
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY To CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 8, 104 (1996) (arguing that "gay
marriage" is instructive for both gays and straights, partly because it destabilizes traditional gender
roles).
55. For excellent treatments that anticipate my distinction, but at different levels of abstraction and
with different terminologies, compare CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 7 (tracing the contested ascendancy
of "blue [state] marriage" reflecting the individualist assumptions of my utilitarian model); Andrew
J. Cherlin, The De-institutionalization of American Marriage, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 848 (2004)
(tracing the decline of "institutional" marriage to "companionate" marriage, and then a further
movement toward "individualized" marriage); Schneider, supra note 19 (tracing the displacement of the
moralistic model by one that emphasizes individual flourishing).
56. Leading modem statements of the natural law understanding must start with GERMAIN G. GIusEz,
THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUs, VOLUME 2: LIVING A CHRISTIAN LIFE 633-56 (1993) (presenting a
theological perspective on marriage that the author, an eminent theologian, maintains can be general-
ized) and prominently include ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAw (1999), and John Finnis,
The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual Relations: Some Philosophical and Historical
Observations, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 97 (1997). An excellent law review treatment, with lessons for legal
policy, is Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO. L.J.
301 (1995).
57. Leading statements of the utilitarian understanding start with Jeremy Bentham, Essay on
Paederasty (1785), published in 3 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 389, 389-405 (1978), and 4 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 91,
91-107 (1978). For leading twentieth-century thinkers advancing the same point of view as Bentham to
a wide audience, see PAUL ROBINsON, THE MODERNIZATION OF SEX: HAVELOCK ELLIS, ALFRED KINSEY,
WILLIAM MASTERS AND VIRGINIA JoHNSoN (1989).
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and important to that person; most sexual variation is benign. Indeed, sexuality
without procreation is personally and socially productive, especially if chan-
neled in the right ways. In the twentieth century, Sigmund Freud influentially
articulated the notion that sexuality and relationships should be understood in
utilitarian rather than natural law terms." He maintained that sexuality is both a
positive and a dangerous force within us all; one's sexuality is distinctive to her
or his personhood, and a "repressed" sexuality is the source of neuroses and
other maladies-yet a healthy sexuality could be the source of great happi-
ness. 59 Freud spent much of his career trying to persuade people not to make
such a big deal out of sexual variety and to help people come to terms with their
sexual fantasies.60
In the United States, such a sex-positive utilitarian theory was popularized by
authors such as Margaret Sanger, who extolled marriage as a situs of sexual
pleasure and happiness. 6 1 Americans took to this theory like ducks to water. In
the course of the twentieth century, Americans gradually minimized sex for
marital procreation and increasingly admitted that they enjoy sex for reasons of
pleasure or sociability. Thus, the Kinsey reports of 1948 and 1953 documented
that Americans were no longer conforming their private behavior to the natural
law ideal reflected in the criminal law; that is, the law channeled sexual
activities into procreative marriage, but Americans derived much of their sexual
satisfaction from nonprocreative or nonmarital activities.6 2 In light of the
Kinsey data, it appears that the great "sexual revolution" of the 1960s was a
58. On Freud's thought and its reception in the United States, see NATHAN G. HALE, JR., FREUD AND
THE AMERICANS: THE BEGINNINGS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IN THE UNITED STArES, 1876-1917 (1971).
59. See SIGMUND FREUD, The Sexual Aberrations, in THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY 1,
16-19, 33-35 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1962) (radically arguing that so-called "perversions" such
as oral sex are interconnected with procreative intercourse valorized by the natural law tradition).
60. See, e.g., id. at 4-5 (arguing that homosexuality "cannot be regarded as degenerate" for several
reasons, including its presence in those with "no other serious deviations from the normal"); Letter
from Sigmund Freud to an American Mother (Apr. 9, 1935) (instructing the mother, who was con-
cerned about her son, that homosexuality is no "illness" and is nothing more than a "variation of the
sexual function") (photograph of original letter available at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/freud/images/
vc008481.jpg (page one) and http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/freud/images/vc008482.jpg (page two)) (copy
of text available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/pwh/freud1.asp).
61. See MARGARET SANGER, HAPPINESS IN MARRIAGE 6, 20-23, 137-146 (1926) (emphasizing sexual
pleasure as a feature of marriage); see also FLOYD DELL, LOVE IN THE MACHINE AGE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
STUDY OF THE TRANSITION FROM PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 6-7 (1930) (similar). On the increasing popularity
of a sex-for-pleasure (that is, utilitarian) approach in the course of the century, see generally BETH L.
BAILEY, FROM FRONT PORCH To BACK SEAT. COURTSHIP IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1988); ANDREW
J. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 38-39 (rev. ed. 1992); JOHN MODELL, INTO ONE'S OwN:
FROM YOUTH TO ADULTHOOD IN THE UNITED STATEs 1920-1975 (1989).
62. See ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 392 (1948) [hereinafter
KINSEY ET AL., MALE] (reporting that 85% of American white males had engaged in fornication, 30-45%
had committed adultery, 59% had engaged in oral sex, and 70% had illegally patronized sex workers, as
well as 17% of farm boys had engaged in illegal sex with animals); ALFRED C. KINSEY Er AL., SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 257-58, 280-81, 286, 416 (1953) [hereinafter KINSEY ET AL., FEMALE]
(reporting that nearly half of American women had engaged in fornication, more than one-quarter had
committed adultery by age forty, and more than one-third of sexually experienced women had engaged
in oral sex).
2012] 1899
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
continuation of behavioral trends that started much earlier-but was particularly
important insofar as that decade saw the utilitarian understanding "coming out
of the closet" and asserting its power openly among American youth. Today,
political conservatives join liberals in asserting that pleasure and sociability are
legitimate moral justifications for sexual activities.
The ascendancy of the utilitarian understanding of romantic relationships has
placed pressure on American family law to be more pluralistic, namely, to
tolerate more sexual interactions and relationships outside of traditional mar-
riage. Although the law has lagged behind social attitudes, it has responded:
family pluralism has generated pressure for family law pluralism. Thus, the
normative baseline of American family law has moved away from an exclusive
focus on civil marriage, restricted to "pure" couples and celebrated as a lifetime
status, and toward a more pluralist regime offering romantic couples more
choices-including whether to marry, what rights each spouse enjoys during the
marriage, when to end the marriage, and what relationship options are available
outside of marriage.
The triumph of the utilitarian perspective has eclipsed but not eliminated the
natural law perspective. Happiness or social utility has become the lingua franca
of public policy discourse, and the Supreme Court has all but ruled that natural
law morality alone cannot be the rational basis needed to justify laws discriminat-
ing against sexual minorities.6 5 This is a good development, for civil society
needs a common metric for evaluating arguments about what regulations and
goals our society should be adopting.66 But many Americans are still motivated
by natural law, especially religious, commitments-and their utilitarian argu-
ments inevitably reflect those underlying commitments. In short, the natural
63. Between 1963 and 1979, Americans, especially the young, openly accepted the legitimacy of sex
for pleasure, including nonprocreative sex and, increasingly, sex outside of marriage. See CATHERINE S.
CHILMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, PUB. No. 79-1426, ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY IN A
CHANGING AMERICAN SOCIETY. SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 67-90, 103-80 (1978); see also
DAVID ALLYN, MAKE LOVE, NOT WAR-THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION: AN UNFETTERED HISTORY 3-40 (2000)
(tracing the so-called "sexual revolution," as propelled by a changing society and culture, through the
1960s to mid-1970s).
64. See, e.g., MARK REGNERUS & JEREMY UECKER, PREMARTIAL SEX IN AMERICA: How YOUNG AMERI-
CANS MEET, MATE, AND THINK ABOUT MARRYING ch. 6 (2011) (positing that both "red state" and "blue
state" sexuality is understood by young people as centered on mutual pleasure for the partners; the main
difference is that red state sexuality considers marriage a more urgent priority for sexual partners);
RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 111-45 (1992) (announcing an economic theory of sexuality,
premised upon the assumption that the legitimate goals for sex include pleasure and sociability, as well
as procreation).
65. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633-36 (1996); see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifica-
tions for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. Rav. 1233, 1234-36 (2004)
(demonstrating that even before Romer and Lawrence, the Supreme Court had never justified a
discriminatory law as rational when it was based only on morality).
66. See JOHN RAwLs, POLTCAL LIBERALISM (1992) (making this point).
67. Thus, in It Takes a Family, then-Senator Santorum, who wears his fundamentalist religion on his
sleeve more than any other prominent politician, opposed gay marriage not because it contravenes
natural law and the Word of God (which appears to be Santorum's underlying belief), but instead
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law understanding survives, but it is usually expressed in utilitarian terms and has
acquiesced in many of the utilitarian policy innovations, such as decriminaliza-
tion of fornication and sexual cohabitation, as well as easier rules for divorce.
In the century witnessing the rise of a utilitarian understanding of familial
relationships, American family law has become decidedly more prochoice but
has hardly abandoned legal regulation of such relationships. As a theoretical
matter, the utilitarian understanding of family suggests a potentially active role
for government, which can and should (1) offer efficient off-the-rack rules,
namely, those that couples would probably have chosen but do not go to the
trouble of formalizing in the necessary legal documents like wills, powers of
attorney, and the like; (2) provide useful information and other guidance to
romantic couples making their choices; and (3) protect third parties, such as
children, whose interests might be harmed by choices that fail to consider their
legitimate interests.6 8 This last point is worth considerable emphasis: the utilitar-
ian perspective not only considers the interests (utilities) of children, but
provides a strong basis for legal protection because adult decision makers
(parents) sometimes sacrifice the interests of their children for their own
happiness, a sacrifice that often undermines the greatest good for the greatest
number. Thus, from a utilitarian as well as natural law perspective, family law
ought to be centrally concerned about the best interests of children as well as of
romantic partners who are their parents.
II. MENUS, DEFAULT RULES, AND OVERRIDE RULES-AND THREE REVOLUTIONARY
DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICA S INCREASINGLY PLURALIST FAMILY LAW, 1911-2011
Consider how the foregoing historical account of the modern guided-choice
regime can be conceptualized; this conceptualization, in turn, helps us under-
stand the nature of the guided-choice revolution in American family law during
the last century. Additionally, the conceptualization that follows will reveal the
deeper patterns of change that the gay-marriage debate has dramatically ex-
posed and is now accelerating.
Drawing from contract-theoretic terminology developed by Ian Ayres and
Robert Gertner," the following vocabulary is useful in conceptualizing the
because it will reduce the overall happiness and flourishing of straight couples and their children. See
Santorum, supra note 11. Likewise, Professor Wardle, a devout Mormon who speaks for many
Americans who support natural law baselines as a matter of religious faith, defends traditional marriage
in law review articles primarily along utilitarian lines. E.g., Wardle, supra note 11; Wardle, supra note 20.
68. Cf SCHNEIDER & BRINIG, supra note 24, at 211-21, 1386-96 (providing more elaborate but
similar articulation of the purposes served by family law). Moreover, regulation continues to reflect or
echo traditionalist baselines grounded upon the natural law understanding. E.g., Hasday, Canon, supra
note 10. That so many Americans accept the utilitarian values of sexual expression does not mean that
the natural law values have been completely eclipsed. The ongoing, and still intense, gay-marriage
debate is testimony to the continued robustness of the natural law understanding.
69. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 21 (leading article on default rules and consent-based
overrides); see also Ayres, Altering Rules, supra note 21 (focusing on "altering rules," which I think are
better termed override rules); Ayres, Menus Matter, supra note 21 (focusing on menus).
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regulatory changes in family law during the last hundred years:
* Mandatory rules, namely, rules or directives that parties (in this case, the
romantic couple or either individual) cannot change and must accept as
binding upon their decisions;
* Default rules, namely, rules or directives that parties (the couple) can
change, usually by contracting around the default; and
* Override rules, namely, the legal steps or requirements that the parties (the
couple) must follow or meet to contract around or otherwise override the
relevant legal default rules.
In the language of this terminology, American family law in 1911 was domi-
nated by mandatory rules-including rules defining strict roles within marriage
(section A), vesting civil marriage with monopoly authority over sexual activi-
ties (section B), and limiting divorce (section C)-and the last century has seen
most of those mandatory rules disappear and be replaced by default-with-
override rules (a process tracked in the three sections just noted).
Although mandatory rules have steadily declined, our pluralist family law
still does a lot of regulatory work, consistent with the efficiency, guidance, and
third-party-effect goals suggested by the utilitarian perspective. Following from
the contract theory explored here, the normative weight of American family law
is exercised in three ways. First, the norms that were once mandatory are now
usually defaults, but that means they are still binding until the partners have
overridden them. So the default norm has a regulatory effect-as does the
precise override rule. For example, a hard default, namely, a default that is
difficult to override, is not much different in practice than a soft mandatory rule,
namely, a mandatory rule that is easily evaded by romantic couples. Figure 1,
below, is a simple diagram of the range of regulatory options, all within the
standard menu for regulating contracts.
Figure 1. A Continuum of Regulatory Rules
MANDATORY HARD ORDINARY SoFr No
RULE DEFAULT DEFAULT DEFAULT RULE
Parties are Parties can Parties can override Parties can override Parties
bound. override, but by explicit by implicit or decide.
not easily. consent. explicit consent.
Defaults, even ordinary or soft defaults, can guide a couple's decision making,
and they may do so more efficiently than mandatory rules, because they provide
guidance but leave the decision to the parties (the couple) best able to balance
the advantages and disadvantages of the different relationship choices. Even
protection of third-party interests may be better served by default-with-override
rules, because they better balance the interests of the couple, their children, and
1902 [Vol. 100:1881
FAMILY LAW PLURALISM
other third parties than mandatory rules tend to do.
Second, the law's regulatory effect today is more often accomplished through
"carrots" than through "sticks." American family law still encourages marriage
and committed relationships but has substantially abandoned deterrence by
means of criminal sanctions-the harshest sounding mandatory rules that are
often ineffective in practice-and now encourages such relationships more
through positive incentives. The biggest incentive is an amalgam of legal and
business practices: since World War II, private and public employers have
offered workers health-insurance packages that cover their spouses and children
as well.7 0 For that reason, health insurance is a powerful reason to get married
or (nowadays) to become a domestic partner. Many important government
benefits, ranging from immigration preferences to social-insurance benefits, are
tied to marriage as well. The guidance function of law is often best served by
positive incentives rather than default-with-override rules.
Third, American family law has replaced its marriage-only regime with an
evolving menu of relationship options recognized and regulated by law (usually
default and override rules rather than mandatory rules). The menu itself has
regulatory effects. One set of effects is more efficient decision making: the
romantic couple disinclined to create legal documents can opt into entire
packages of rights and duties by signing onto a regime within the family law
menu; because most of the rules within each regime are defaults rather than
mandatory rules, the motivated couple can then opt out of most items within
each regime. Another set of effects involve guiding or channeling: romantic
couples now understand, to some extent, the legal effects not only of marriage
but also of cohabitation and of domestic partnership. The decision to cohabit or
marry is made in the shadow of the law, and the couple is sometimes guided by
the law's regulation when they decide the level of relational commitment in
which they want to engage. Another effect derives from the precise mix of
recognized institutions and the incentives and default/override rules each institu-
tion carries with it.
Consider now the history of American family law in the last hundred years.
This period has witnessed three doctrinal revolutions that have accommodated
the preferences of functioning families. The changes in legal regulation can be
fruitfully understood within the default-override-menu vocabulary of contract
law.
A. MARITAL CHOICE: REPLACING MANDATORY RULES WITH
DEFAULT RULES AND INCENTIVES
As the Supreme Court put it in a leading nineteenth-century case, when a
couple marries, "a [legal] relation between the parties is created which they
70. Between 1940 and 1950, the number of Americans covered by private health insurance increased
from 20 million to more than 140 million. David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in
the United States-Origins and Implications, 355 NEw ENG. J. MED. 82, 83 (2006).
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cannot change."' American family law in 1911 revolved around one institution-
marriage-and barricaded that institution with many mandatory rules that the
spouses could not contract around or that were so hard to override that they
were mandatory in practice for most Americans. The old common law of
marriage, a natural law regime that understood marriage as creating a union of
two individuals whose goal was to procreate and rear the couple's biological
children, was the source of most of these mandatory rules.72
Mandatory rules policed entry into the institution of marriage, effectively
constructing that civil institution as one limited to "pure" couples whose
progeny would contribute to a healthy body politick. Thus, most states at one
time barred different-race couples from marrying, 7  and almost all states in the
twentieth century added restrictions to prevent "mentally retarded" persons
from getting married and reproducing.74 These were mandatory rules, as stated
above, but in the course of the twentieth century, they became soft mandatory
rules that private parties could evade or get around as a matter of practice. Thus,
many different-race couples secured marriage licenses, contrary to the law of
their domicile, because one partner could pass as the same race as the other
partner, because marriage license officials would look the other way, or because
they could travel to another state and get legally married. Figure 2 maps a
typology of mandatory rules along these lines.
Figure 2. A Continuum of Mandatory Rules
HARD MANDATORY ORDINARY MANDATORY SoFr MANDATORY
RULES RULES RULES
State seriously enforces; State enforces episodically; State does not enforce;
parties pay careful party obedience uneven. parties ignore.
attention.
For the "pure" couples allowed to marry, the state imposed mandatory rules
of sexual fidelity and sexual privacy, mutual support, parentage and its responsi-
71. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).
72. On the common law of marriage, and its emphasis on "coverture" of the wife's legal personality
by that of the husband, see HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (2000). On the
perseverance of coverture-inspired family law rules or norms even in the present, see, for example,
Hasday, Canon, supra note 10, at 841-48.
73. See Brief of the NAACP as Amicus Curiae, supra note 51, at 1-3 & n.2.
74. Thus, as late as the 1960s, thirty-nine states broadly excluded persons with mental disabilities
from marrying. See AM. BAR FOUND., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 226-29, 240-43 (Samuel J.
Brakel & Ronald S. Rock eds., 1971); HARRY BEST, PUBLIC PROVISIONS FOR THE MENTALLY REARDED IN
THE UNITED STATES 121-22 (1965).
75. As Andy Koppelman has demonstrated, the courts of the domicile would sometimes recognize
these evasive marriages under certain circumstances. See ANDREw KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT
STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES CROSs STATE LINES 28-30, 36-50 (2006).
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bilities, and the like.7 There were some default rules as well, but they tended to
be hard default rules, that is, default rules that are more difficult if not
practically impossible to override. For example, state and federal courts recog-
nized a testimonial privilege barring a spouse from testifying against another
spouse; the spousal privilege could be waived if both spouses agreed, a tough
override rule because the nontestifying spouse usually had a strong interest in
vetoing testimony that would harm her or his interests. As this example
shows, soft mandatory rules were probably more accommodating in practice
than many of these hard default rules.
In the ensuing century, easier-to-override default rules replaced mandatory or
hard default rules as the baseline for American marriage law. The old mandatory
as well as hard default rules have been superseded by default rules that are
much easier to override. Although marriage law remains highly regulatory, its
regulatory punch derives more from positive incentives and default-with-
override rules, rather than from absolute state mandates.
1. Mandatory Rules Restricting Entry into Marriage
One of the biggest changes in American family law in the last century was
opening up civil marriage to more couples. This is the arena where the role of
social movements outside of women's rights has been most evident. A society
growing to understand marriage as grounded in mutual pleasure and friendship
finds it increasingly difficult to exclude interracial couples, disabled persons, or
lesbian and gay couples, once their associated social movements have docu-
mented these couples' capacity for love and commitment and their ability to
raise children within their families of choice. As social movements demanded
that outsider relationships be accorded the same legal treatment as relationships
the law traditionally privileged, the government has expanded the definition of
marriage to accommodate these couples. American family law grew steadily
more pluralist in the two generations following World War II, the period when
their social movements flourished.
a. Different-Race Couples. Thirty states barred different-race couples from
marrying in 1948," the year the California Supreme Court struck down its
76. These were inspired by the natural law/common law understanding of the married couple as a
unity.
77. See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77-78 (1958), overruled by Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980) (modifying the common law rule and allowing spouses to testify if they
choose in federal proceedings).
78. For an overview of the civil rights, disability rights, and gay rights movements after World War
H and the process by which those movements transformed American law, see William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001).
79. See Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 38 (Cal. 1948) (Shenk, J., dissenting). For the thirty-state
count, see FAY BoTHAM, ALMIGHTY GOD CREATED THE RAcEs: CHRIsTIANITY, INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE, &
AMERICAN LAW 156 (2009); and KENNEDY, supra note 8, at 258-59.
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antimiscegenation law.so A number of states also barred sexual cohabitation
between persons of different races. These racially discriminatory statutes were
grounded upon the natural law idea that the "white race" ought not to be
"diluted" through procreative marriages or cohabitation with persons of differ-
ent races.8 Against this politics of purity, the civil rights movement argued that
the state should not withhold marriage recognition for mutually committed
relationships and that the case for antimiscegenation laws rested upon race-
based prejudice that could not be credited in a modem polity.8 2
In the wake of the civil rights movement's triumph in the desegregation
cases, every state that still had an antimiscegenation law outside the South
repealed its exclusion in the decade following 1955.8 In 1964, the Supreme
Court struck down a Florida law criminalizing interracial cohabitation,8 4 and in
1967, the Court in Loving v. Virginia struck down the seventeen remaining state
laws that refused civil marriage to different-race couples.8 5 Accordingly, roman-
tic couples of different races saw their rights transformed between 1955 and
1967: the mandatory rule against state recognition of their marriages was
replaced by a default rule with an easy override, namely, such a couple could
change its default status from unmarried by securing the same marriage license
and having the same ceremony as same-race couples.
The Loving Court recognized a "fundamental" right to marry, which rested in
part on the natural law premise that everyone ought to procreate within mar-
riage. At the very point the Court was invoking the natural law understanding
of family to anchor important personal rights, the nation's public discourse
(influenced by the sexual revolution) was turning toward the utilitarian under-
standing of family. The Supreme Court applied that new understanding twenty
years after Loving in Turner v. Safley." A unanimous Court extended Loving's
fundamental right to marry to prisoners, some of them incarcerated for life and
therefore unable sexually to consummate marriages. Those prisoners could
never enjoy the natural law consummation of their marriages-hence, their
80. See Perez, 198 P.2d at 29.
81. E.g., Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955) (announcing natural law reasons for criminalizing
different-race marriages, in language that sounds incredibly racist today). On the religious/natural law
argumentation in favor of such statutes, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation
Before Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J. 624, as well as William N. Eskridge Jr., Noah's Curse: How Religion
Often Conflates Status, Belief and Conduct To Resist Antidiscrimination Norms, 45 Ga. L. Rev. 657
(2011).
82. Brief of the NAACP as Amicus Curiae, supra note 51, at 2-6 & app.
83. See id. at 2-3 & nn. 1-2 (listing the states with antimiscegenation laws in 1966 and the states that
had repealed their laws from 1955 to 1965).
84. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
85. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
86. Id. at 12 (relying on Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (striking down a state
sterilization law on the ground that it deprived men of their "fundamental" right to procreate and
marry)).
87. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
88. Id. at 94-97.
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marriages were like gay marriages in their intrinsic lack of connection between
marriage, sex, and procreation-yet the Court insisted that the state must allow
them to marry.89 Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court emphasized that the
utilitarian advantages of marriage, including social and legal benefits that
committed relationships offered romantic couples, justified invocation of mar-
riage rights by prison inmates.90
b. Persons with Mental Disabilities. Within the natural law understanding,
updated by the same eugenics-based science that justified antimiscegenation
laws, Americans in the early twentieth century believed that procreative mar-
riage ought not to be available to persons with mental disabilities because their
progeny (like that of mixed-race couples) would be adulterated. 9' The ascen-
dancy of the utilitarian understanding and of a more sophisticated science of
genetics discredited most of the early eugenics statutes, especially those requir-
ing the sterilization of so-called "retarded" persons.9 2 As a matter of political
morality, the utilitarian understanding required the state to offer life opportuni-
ties to mentally disabled citizens, but within that understanding the state might
also be concerned with marriages by persons incapable of making informed
choices. Hence, the large majority of states have narrowed their rules against
marriages by persons with mental disabilities, transforming mandatory rules
against such marriages into default rules that could be overridden for marriages
in the utilitarian interests of both partners.
For example, Minnesota prohibits "[d]evelopmentally disabled persons com-
mitted to the guardianship of the commissioner of human services" from
marrying unless the commissioner provides his/her signed consent to the regis-
trar issuing the marriage license. Thus, the default rule for developmentally
disabled persons, as a narrowly defined category of only those committed to the
commissioner's guardianship, is the same as for other unmarried persons. The
override rule for such developmentally disabled persons is somewhat higher,
but not that much higher, as the statute says that the commissioner "shall"
consent to the marriage unless he or she is persuaded that the marriage is not in
the best interests of the conservatee or the public.94
Nebraska still authorizes annulment if "[e]ither party was mentally ill or a
person with mental retardation at the time of marriage."95 Thus, the default rule
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding Virginia's law requiring the sterilization
of "feeble-minded" persons so that they could not reproduce).
92. See VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN RECKLEss HANDS: SKINNER V OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR TRIUMPH OF
AMERICAN EUGENIcS (2008) (providing historical context for the eugenics-based elaboration of natural
law baselines, and the discrediting of that elaboration during the 1930s).
93. MINN. STAT. § 517.03(2) (2010).
94. Id.
95. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-374(4) (2011) (allowing persons who are mentally ill or have mental
"retardation" to marry freely, but subjecting the marriage to potential annulment after the fact).
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for mentally ill persons in Nebraska is the same as the default rule for other
unmarried adults, and it is just as easy for a mentally ill person to override the
default through marriage license and ceremony. Interestingly, the divorce rule is
different for such persons-marriages with a mentally ill person can, in theory,
be annulled at any time. Reflecting the influence of the utilitarian understanding,
the Nebraska statute and others like it are almost never invoked.
c. Same-Sex Couples. Couples of the same sex were excluded from marriage
by mandatory rules in all states in 1961. The exclusion of same-sex couples
from civil marriage reflected the natural law understanding-closely linking
marriage, procreation, and the rearing of one's biological progeny. Because
lesbian and gay couples could not procreate between themselves, they naturally
did not fit within the institution of marriage. Indeed, the natural law perspective
considered "homosexual," and thus nonprocreative, intercourse itself a crime
against nature; every state and the District of Columbia considered consensual
sodomy a crime in 196 1.
In the 1950s, criminal law reformers rejected the natural law understanding
as the basis for sex-crime laws and developed the Model Penal Code, which
openly followed the utilitarian understanding and, therefore, proposed that
consensual fornication, adultery, and sodomy be decriminalized." Between
1961 and 1976, almost half of the states decriminalized consensual sodomy,99
and the LGBT rights movement became a modest but significant voice for
further reform-ultimately including demands that LGBT persons be afforded
equal marriage rights.'" The case for marriage equality was entirely utilitarian:
the state should be supporting the happiness of committed lesbian and gay
couples, as well as the thousands of children many of those couples were
rearing within their households.'o'
Since 2003, six states and the District of Columbia have extended marriage to
such couples.10 2 In those marriage-recognition states, the mandatory rule against
96. See MARTHA A. FIELD & VALERIE A. SANCHEz, EQuAL TREATMENT FOR PEOPLE wITH MENIAL
RETARDATION: HAVING AND RAISING CHILDREN 11 & n.24 (1999) (noting that while statutes such as
Nebraska's and a similar one in Minnesota are still "on the books," they are also unenforced).
97. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 33 (listing the sodomy law history for every state and the District of
Columbia, with every state criminalizing consensual sodomy in 1961, though Illinois adopted a
decriminalization law that would become effective in 1962).
98. See id. at 109-27 (documenting the utilitarian perspective of the Kinsey reports as the animating
philosophy of the Model Penal Code).
99. See id. at 387-407 app. (listing the sodomy law history for every state and the District of
Columbia).
100. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBEtrY TO
CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 44-62 (1996) (providing a history of LGBT demands for marriage equality).
101. See ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 13 (drawing from personal interviews of committed
lesbian and gay couples in the United States and Denmark, to support the idea that same-sex marriage
offered many benefits to those couples, as well as benefits and no costs to the larger societies).
102. The state supreme courts of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Iowa have recognized a right to
same-sex marriage. See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 481-82 (Conn. 2008)
(interpreting the state constitution "in accordance with firmly established equal protection principles" to
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recognition of same-sex marriages has been revoked; the default and override
rules for lesbian and gay couples are now the same as those for other couples. It
is highly likely that the number of marriage-recognition states will continue to
increase. Federal constitutional claims have been seriously pressed, most promi-
nently in Perry v. Brown, 0 3 a case arising out of a federal constitutional
challenge to voter override of a state supreme court decision extending marriage
equality. At some point in the future, the Supreme Court will apply Loving v.
Virginia and other right-to-marry precedents to overturn mandatory rules against
state recognition of lesbian and gay unions.
Romantic couples who are different race or same sex, or who include a
mentally disabled person, represent a growing percentage of married couples in
America. For them, American family law has moved from a mandatory rule of
exclusion to a default rule allowing the couples themselves, and not the state, to
make the decision whether they should marry. This prochoice regime is more
pluralist than the one in place a century ago, and this family law pluralism was a
consequence of and, to a lesser extent, fueled the ascendancy of the utilitarian
understanding of American family law.
This legal transition also illustrates the difference between a mandatory rule
and a default rule and the important mediating role of override rules. Under
"lead[ I inevitably to the conclusion that gay persons are entitled to marry the otherwise qualified same
sex partner of their choice"); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906-07 (Iowa 2009) (invalidating law
restricting marriage to heterosexual couples as a violation of equal protection under state constitution);
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (holding that denying "the
protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage" to same-sex couples violates equal protection
under the state constitution).
In the District of Columbia, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Washington,
same-sex marriage has been legalized through the legislative process. See D.C. Code § 46:01 (2011)
(defining marriage as the "legally recognized union of 2 persons ... regardless of gender"); Civil
Marriage Protection Act, 2012 Md. Laws ch. 2 (repealing and reenacting with amendment current law
to allow marriage between "two individuals who are not otherwise prohibited from marrying" including
members of the same sex, effective Jan. 1, 2013), available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2012rs/
chapters-noln/Ch_2_hb0438T.pdf; N.H. REV. STAr. ANN. § 457:1-a (2011) (recognizing marriage as
"union of 2 people ... regardless of gender"); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 10-a (McKinney 2011) (recogniz-
ing otherwise valid marriages as valid "regardless of whether the [marital] parties... are of the
same ... sex"); VT. STAr. ANN. Trr. 15, § 8 (West 2011) (defining marriage as a "legally recognized
union of two people"); Act of Feb. 13, 2012, 2012 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 3 (West) (redefining marriage
as "between two persons," effective June 7, 2012), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/
2011-12/Pdf/Bills/Session%2OLaw%202012/6239-S.sl.pdf. The most recent laws, from Maryland and
Washington, will likely be subject to popular referenda later in 2012 and might not go into effect if they
are negated.
California recognized same-sex marriages in 2008, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008),
but state voters overrode these recognitions later that year in a popular initiative (Proposition 8) to
amend the state constitution. See Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5 (adopted 2008). This voter override (and
amendment to the California Constitution) was subsequently declared unconstitutional in Perry v.
Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1064-95 (9th Cir. 2012). Maine also recognized same-sex marriages by statute
in 2009, but voters repealed the statute through voter referendum in the next general election. See Act
to End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom, 2009 Me. Laws ch. 82,
available at http://www.mainelegislature.org/ros/LOM/LOM124th/lI24R1/pdf/PUBLIC82.pdf (repealed
Nov. 3, 2009, by People's Veto).
103. 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
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both natural law and utilitarian regimes, the default rule is that the romantic
couple does not get married. The old regime, governed by several mandatory
rules, dictated that the couple could not override the default as a legal matter.
The new regime, governed mostly by default rules, dictates that the couple may
override the default rather easily and through the same process followed by all
other couples (namely, by securing a marriage license).
2. Unitive Rules in Marriage
Another set of mandatory rules traditionally followed in American marriage
law are unitive rules, those that enforce or reflect the assumption that a married
couple operate as a unit or a team, whose interdependence should be respected
by the government. The unitive rules reflected the natural law/common law
understanding that procreative marriage obliterated the separate personhood of
the individuals entering into it and created a family community headed by the
husband. In the early twentieth century, most unitive rules were mandatory,
while others were default rules with stringent override requirements. For ex-
ample, many states in 1911 (and some states as late as 1934) followed the
common law rule that wives could not enter into contracts without their
husband's agreement; thus, the default rule for the wife was an inability to
contract, but that default could be overridden by the husband's consent.'
Starting in the nineteenth century and gaining overwhelming support in the
twentieth century, American society and law re-imagined marriage as a relation-
ship between individuals, each of whom should lead a flourishing life-and
nowhere is this development more apparent than in the transformation of dozens
of unitive rules governing the rights of the marital partners. For an important
example, the rule barring wives from contracting or owning property without
the consent of their husbands gradually disappeared in the course of the
twentieth century; the old default rule, with a stringent override, was replaced
by a new default rule (wives could contract and own property in their own
names) in most states by 1920.105 Similarly, most of the mandatory rules were
softened into default rules, and overrides for hard default rules were relaxed
between 1911 and 2011. Finally, many current unitive rules are in the form of
104. See, e.g., GEORGE E. HARRIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS BY MARRIED WOMEN §§ 117,
321, 325, 414 (1887); 3 WILLIAM HERBERT PAGE, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1667 (2d ed. 1920); JAMES
SCHOULER & ARTHUR W. BLAKEMORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 229, at 245 (6th
ed. 1921) (explaining that in some states and cases, the "husband's consent is required ... to validate
the wife's contract").
105. Cf CHESTER G. VERNIER & JOHN B. HURLBUTr, 3 AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS: A COMPARATfVE STUDY
OF THE FAMILY LAW OF THE FORrY-EIGHT AMERICAN STATES, ALASKA, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, AND HAWAH
(ro JAN. 1, 1935) § 152, at 34-47 (1935) (noting that as late as 1934, a few jurisdictions prevented a
wife from entering into certain contracts without her husband's consent). For state-by-state examination
of women's property and contract laws, see the tables and maps in Rick Geddes & Dean Lueck, The
Gains from Self-Ownership and the Expansion of Women's Rights, 92 AM. ECON. REv. 1079 (2002), and
R. Richard Geddes, Dean Lueck & Sharon Tennyson, Human Capital Accumulation and the Expansion
of Women's Economic Rights (Apr. 24, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
cardon.web.arizona.edu/files/GeddesLueckTennysonO409.pdf.
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state-supplied benefits rather than state-imposed duties or burdens upon roman-
tic couples.
a. Unitive Marriage and Public Law. Most states in the early twentieth
century enforced marital unity by absolute bars to spouses testifying against one
another in public legal proceedings, but spouses could testify in support of one
another, both rules consistent with the natural law justification for unitive
rules.10 6 After World War H, most states and the U.S. Supreme Court replaced
the mandatory rule against hostile spousal testimony with a default rule with a
tough override: spouses could testify against one another only with the consent
of both spouses,'o a hard requirement to meet when one spouse would be
harmed by the testimony. Even in this period, some states replaced the old
mandatory rule with a default rule having an easier override, namely, the
consent of the testifying spouse. 0 8 In the next generation, more than half the
states adopted the new rule, and the U.S. Supreme Court followed the state
consensus in 1980.109 Interestingly, eight states in 1980 still followed the old
mandatory rule, and another sixteen still followed the tough override rule." 0 As
this example illustrates, the movement from mandatory rules to default-with-
override rules has typically been messy and uneven, given the different politics
and governance regimes in the fifty states.
Also messy and uneven was the twentieth-century movement in the states to
abolish mandatory rules barring one spouse from suing another. Once state
legislatures had repealed their laws preventing wives from owning property and
contracting in their own names, state judges were pressed to allow wives to sue
their own husbands for tort as well as contract and property law claims, a
prospect that was anathema to the natural law view of marriage as creating an
indissoluble unity. In Brown v. Brown,"' the Connecticut Supreme Court
overruled the common law immunity of spouses for utilitarian reasons.1"2
Although this decision was handed down in 1914, the process by which courts
have abrogated common law tort immunities has varied from state to state, with
106. See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381 (1933) (surveying state legislative and judicial
practice).
107. See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77-78 (1958) (surveying state and federal practice
circa 1958).
108. See id. at 81-82 & n.3 (Stewart, J., concurring).
109. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48-50 (1980) (providing detailed examination of
the evolution of state law from 1958 to 1980).
110. See id. at 48-50 n.9 (providing fifty-state survey).
111. 89 A. 889 (Conn. 1914). On the critical role of the married women's property statutes in
decisions like Brown, see Carl Tobias, The Imminent Demise of Interspousal Tort Liability, 60 Mor. L.
REv. 101, 102 (1999); Kathryn Walker Lyles, Note, Suit Your Spouse: Tort and Third Party Liability
Arising from Divorce Actions, 30 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 609, 609 (2007); Daniel M. Oyler, Note,
Interspousal Tort Liability for Infliction of a Sexually Transmitted Disease, 29 J. FAM. L. 519, 523-24
(1990/1991).
112. Brown, 89 A. at 892.
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most states not acting until after World War II.1" The result has been the
elimination of a mandatory rule central to the old natural law understanding of
family law, and its replacement with a default rule easily overridden by ag-
grieved spouses.
Not all of the legal changes in the twentieth century eased previously
entrenched mandatory rules. Indeed, some legal changes created new mandatory
rules based upon the more aggressively regulatory policies of the modern
administrative state. For example, public officials are prohibited from using
their offices to make governmental decisions from which they or their spouses
benefit, and they and their spouses are likewise barred from receiving gifts.' 1 4
Increasingly numerous and detailed, these are mandatory rules reflecting the
unitive nature presumed for married couples, and they have expanded as the
modern regulatory state has expanded. Most of these conflict-of-interest rules
do not apply to cohabiting or domestic partners." 5
b. Sexual Relations and Unitive Marriage. The natural law understanding of
marriage as a legal unity had its deepest expression in the rules of sexual
conduct: procreative sexuality outside of marriage was legally forbidden, but
inside marriage any such sexual interaction, including that involving force or
113. See generally Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REv. 359, 421-35
(1989) (discussing the varying treatment of interspousal tort immunity in the United States between
1914 and 1970). For leading state statutes and court decisions, see HAw. REv. STAr. § 572-28 (2006); 750
ILL. Comp. STAT. 65/1 (2010); N.H. REv. STAr. ANN. § 460:2 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-4-17 (2011); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-220.1 (2011); Penton v. Penton, 135 So. 481, 483 (Ala. 1931); Cramer v. Cramer, 379
P.2d 95, 97 (Alaska 1963); Fernandez v. Romo, 646 P.2d 878, 883 (Ariz. 1982); Leach v. Leach, 300
S.W.2d 15, 17 (Ark. 1957); Self v. Self, 376 P.2d 65, 66 (Cal. 1962); Rains v. Rains, 46 P.2d 740, 742
(Colo. 1935); Bushnell v. Bushnell, 131 A. 432, 433 (Conn. 1925); Beattie v. Beattie, 630 A.2d 1096,
1101 (Del. 1993); Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 539 P.2d 566, 571 (Idaho 1974); Brooks v.
Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794, 798 (Ind. 1972); Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Iowa 1979); Flagg
v. Loy, 734 P.2d 1183, 1190 (Kan. 1987); Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Ky. 1953); Henriksen
v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135, 1141 (Me. 1993); Bozman v. Bozman, 830 A.2d 450, 471 (Md. 2003);
Hosko v. Hosko, 187 N.W.2d 236, 238 (Mich. 1971) (per curiam); Beaudette v. Frana, 173 N.W.2d 416,
420 (Minn. 1969); Burns v. Bums, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1211 (Miss. 1988); Townsend v. Townsend, 708
S.W.2d 646, 650 (Mo. 1986); Noone v. Fink, 271 P.2d 1275, 1276 (Mont. 1986); Imig v. March, 279
N.W.2d 382, 386 (Neb. 1979); Merenoff v. Merenoff, 388 A.2d 951, 962 (N.J. 1978); Maestas v.
Overton, 531 P.2d 947, 948 (N.M. 1975); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Westlake, 324 N.E.2d 137,
139 (N.Y. 1974); Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 206, 211 (N.C. 1920); Shearer v. Shearer, 480 N.E.2d
388, 393 (Ohio 1985); Courtney v. Courtney, 87 P.2d 660, 661-62 (Okla. 1938); Heino v. Harper, 759
P.2d 253, 255 (Or. 1988); Hack v. Hack, 433 A.2d 859, 861 (Pa. 1981); Boone v. Boone, 546 S.E.2d
191, 194 (S.C. 2001); Scotvold v. Scotvold, 298 N.W. 266, 272 (S.D. 1941); Davis v. Davis, 657
S.W.2d 753, 759 (Tenn. 1983); Tywman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 624 (Tex. 1993); Ellis v. Estate of
Ellis, 169 P.3d 441, 443 (Utah 2007); Freehe v. Freehe, 500 P.2d 771, 777 (Wash. 1972), overruled on
other grounds by Brown v. Brown, 675 P.2d 1207 (Wash. 1984); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244
S.E.2d 338, 344 (W. Va. 1978); Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065, 1065 (Wyo. 1987).
114. See Letter from Barry Bedrick, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Gen. Accounting Office, to Representa-
tive Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary 8-9, 42-44 (Jan. 31, 1997), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/og97016.pdf (explaining and listing the many federal conflict-of-
interest rules that apply to officials' spouses as well as the officials themselves).
115. See id. (implying that the GAO list of federal conflict-of-interest rules is applicable only to
"spouses" and not domestic partners or similar relationships).
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coercion, was allowed. In the last hundred years, the utilitarian understanding
has opened up more sexual opportunities for unmarried couples, while narrow-
ing the sexual liberties permitted under the umbrella of marriage.
In 1911, spouses were barred by law from engaging in penile-vaginal sexual
relations outside of marriage, a norm that was enforced by mandatory rules
criminalizing adultery"' and by default rules imposing divorce penalties on
cheating spouses."' 7 Such laws were vigorously enforced early in the century,
but enforcement fell off dramatically in the period surrounding World War ."8
In the last half century, it has been a rare occurrence for enforcement to occur
without a spousal complaint-meaning that, in practice, the adultery bar was an
increasingly soft mandatory rule that, in effect, operated as a default rule.
Nonetheless, forty-four states and the District of Columbia retained criminal
adultery laws around 1961."9
116. Almost all states in 1911 criminalized adultery. Compare 11 CHARLES E. CHADMAN, CHADMAN'S
CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW: CRIMINAL LAW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 108 (1912) ("Adultery is
voluntary sexual connection between persons of opposite sexes, one of whom is married. It is punished
as an offence in every State in the Union."), and JOHN G. HAWLEY & MALCOLM McGREGOR, THE
CRIMINAL LAW 277 (4th ed. 1903) ("Adultery ... is now made [criminally] punishable by statute in all
of the states."), with JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF STATUTORY CRIMES § 654a (rev.
by Marion C. Early, 3d ed. 1901) ("In a considerable number of our states, not all, a single act of
adultery is made by statute indictable.").
117. See, e.g., 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND SEPARATION AS
TO THE LAW, EVIDENCE, PLEADING, PRACTICE, FORMS AND THE EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE IN ALL ISSUES ON A
NEW SYSTEM OF LEGAL EXPOSITION § 1501 (1891); FRANK H. KEEZER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: WrrH SYNOPSES OF THE MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE STATUTES OF ALL STATES AND
CONTAINING COMPLETE FORMS FOR ALL PURPOSES §§ 805-18, 820-43, 845, 848-59 (2d ed. 1923); see also
Chamallas, supra note 38, at 785 ("For married persons, the chief legal deterrent to adultery was a
fault-based divorce system that threatened the adulterous spouse either with loss of financial support or
punitively high support obligations. A wife's adultery was also likely to be punished by the denial of
custody of the children upon divorce." (footnotes omitted)).
118. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 346 (1993) (stating that
adultery enforcement was on its "last legs" in the 1970s and 1980s).
119. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 16 (Michie Co. 1958); ALASKA COMP. LAWS § 65-9-3 (Bancroft-Whitney
Co. 1949) (prohibiting cohabitation in open state of adultery); Aluz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-221 (West
1956); CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 269a-b (West 1957); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 40-9-3 (Callaghan & Co.
1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-218 (West 1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 311 (West 1953); D.C.
CODE Ann. § 22-301 (1961); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.01 (Harrison Co. 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-5801
(Harrison Co. 1953); HAW. REV. LAWS § 309-9 (Filmer Bros. Press 1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6601
(Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1979); 38 ILL. REV. STAT. 46/11 (Burdette Smith Co. 1957); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 10-4207 (Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1956); IOWA CODE ANN. § 702.1 (West 1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-908 (1949); Ky. REv. STAT. § 436.070 (1948); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 134, § 1 (Michie Co. 1954),
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 4 (Michie Co. 1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 14 (Michie Co. 1968);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.219 (Callaghan & Co. 1962); MINN. STAT. § 617.15 (1961); Miss. CODE ANN. ch.
1, § 1998 (Harrison Co. 1956); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.150 (Vernon Law Book Co. 1953); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 28-902 (1948); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 579:1 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:88-1 (West 1953); NEW
YORK PENAL LAW OF 1909 §§ 100-102 (appearing in N.Y PENAL LAW App. (West 1967)) (containing
"complete text of such law as it existed immediately prior to September 1, 1967"); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-184 (Michie Co. 1953) (text referring to fornication but title referring to adultery); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12-22-11 (Allen Smith Co. 1960); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.08 (W.H. Anderson Co. 1954);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 872 (West 1958); OR. CoM. LAWS ANN. § 23-901 (Bancroft-Whitney Co.
1940 & Supps. 1943, 1944-1947); 18 PENN. STAT. ANN. 18, § 4505 (West 1963); R.I. GEN. LAWS
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In the last half century, from 1961 to 2011, half the states have repealed their
criminal adultery laws;I20 of the twenty-two laws still in effect, almost all of
them penalize adultery as a misdemeanor.121 Enforcement, even at the behest of
a complaining spouse, has been quite rare-but adultery remains a ground for
divorce in most states and may have bearing on child-custody decisions in some
states. Although most Americans disapprove of adulterous conduct, the moral
disapproval is only weakly enforced, primarily through default rules and not by
mandatory rules.
Every state in 1911 had a rule barring the state from prosecuting husbands
from raping their wives.12 2 This marital-rape exemption was grounded in the
common law/natural law understanding of marriage as creating a unity for
purposes of procreation. Although feminists objected to this exemption in the
nineteenth century, American family law refused to abrogate the exemption, and
it strongly shaped the expectations of wives who felt they had no choice but to
submit to the sexual advances of their husbands.12 3 Even though American
family law moved away from the common law/natural law unitive ideal over
the course of the twentieth century, the marital-rape exemption persevered in
most states until well after World War II.124 Today, almost all states have either
abolished or significantly narrowed the exemption and the allowances; most
§ 11-6-2 (Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1956); S.C. CODE § 16-406 (1952); S.D. CODE § 13-3002 (1939 & Supp.
1960); TEX. PENAL CODE art. 502 (Vernon Law Book Co. 1952); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-53-3 (Allen
Smith Co. 1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 201 (Equity Pub. Corp. 1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-190
(Michie Co. 1950, rev. 1960); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.79.110 (Bancroft-Whitney Co. & West 1961);
W. VA. CODE § 61-8-3 (Michie Co. 1955); WEST'S WIs. STAT. ANN. § 944.16 (West 1958).
120. See Jeremy D. Weinstein, Note, Adultery, Law, and the State: A History, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 195,
226 & n.233 (1986) ("In 1955, the American Law Institute recommended in its Model Penal Code that
adultery be decriminalized, and many states have followed that recommendation." (internal footnotes
omitted)) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.1, cmts. at 204-10 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955), and
enumerating a list of states that have abolished adultery laws).
121. ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (2011); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1408 (2011); CoLo. REv. STAT.
§ 18-6-501 (2008); FLA. STAT. Ann. § 798.01 (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-19 (2011); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-6601 (2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-35 (West 2011); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW
§ 10-501 (LexisNexis 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 14 (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.30 (2004) (punishing as a felony); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.36 (2010); Miss. CODE. ANN. § 97-29-1
(2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:3 (West 2011); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 255.17 (McKinney 2011); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (West 2011) (text referring solely to fornication); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-09
(2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 871 (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-2 (West 2011); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-15-60 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-103 (West 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-365 (West
2011); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.16 (West 2011).
122. See THOMAS WELBURN HUGHES, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 288 (1919); Wm.
L. CLARK, WM. L. MARSHALL & HERSCHEL BOUTON LAZELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES 422 (2d ed.
1905); Annotation, Criminal Responsibility of Husband as for Rape, or Assault To Commit Rape, on
Wife, 18 A.L.R. 1063, 1063 (1922). See generally Hasday, supra note 40, at 1392-1406 (providing
detailed exegesis of the common law and early American exemption of spousal rape from sexual-
assault laws).
123. See Hasday, supra note 40, at 1407-13 (discussing KATHARINE BEMENT DAvis, FACTORS IN THE
SEx LIFE OF TWENTY-Two HUNDRED WOMEN (1929)).
124. See Rebecca M. Ryan, The Sex Right: A Legal History of the Marital Rape Exemption, 20 L. &




states treat marital rape substantially the same as rape outside of marriage. 1 2 5 Of
course, for rape generally, the default rule is no criminal liability, and the
override rules entailed in criminal prosecutions create high hurdles for success-
ful prosecution (such as the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard).
c. Marital Children. The point of marriage, according to the natural law
understanding, is marital procreation. Combined with the rule against extramari-
tal sexual activities, this precept supported the traditional mandatory rule that
any child born within a marriage was conclusively presumed to be the biologi-
cal child of the husband and the wife.12 6 As cohabitation became legal and state
penalties or discriminations imposed upon nonmarital children weakened, legis-
latures and judges grew more open to the utilitarian perspective, which focuses
on the flourishing of the child and implements the marital-children idea through
default rather than mandatory rules.127
In its earliest code, for example, California adopted the common law manda-
tory rule, 12 8 which persisted on the statute books through most of the twentieth
century with little alteration.12 9 In 1980, California's legislature changed the
statute, transforming it from a mandatory rule to a default rule that could be
rebutted by a blood test at the behest of the putative father or another interested
person.13 0 The override rule, however, was a stringent one, requiring the
putative father (and others) to introduce the blood test within two years of the
birth of the child, thereby rendering the presumption conclusive after that period
expires.' 3 ' More than two-thirds of the states allow putative fathers (and others)
to rebut the marital-parentage presumption, but usually the override rule is
stringent, for example requiring the challenger to make his case by clear and
convincing evidence rather than the normal civil standard of by a preponderance
of the evidence.13 2
Additionally, most states have created an additional barrier making it even
harder to rebut the marital presumption. These states have enacted statutes
establishing putative-father registries and requiring fathers not married to the
125. See Jennifer McMahon-Howard, Criminalizing Spousal Rape: The Diffusion of Legal Reform,
52 Soc. PERSP. 505, 513 tbl.1 (2009) (summarizing spousal-rape reform in the states through 2009).
126. E.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 117 (1988) (tracing California's conclusive
presumption in 1872 through loosening the presumption in 1975 and afterwards).
127. See Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support Enforce-
ment, and Fatherless Children, 81 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 325, 326-31 (2005).
128. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1962(5) (1872) (presuming "indisputably" that children born within a
marriage are the progeny of wife and husband, unless the latter is impotent).
129. 1965 Cal. Stat. ch. 299, § 2 (revised codification, replacing "indisputably" with "conclu-
sively").
130. 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 1380; see also 1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 1180 (providing that the mother/wife
could introduce blood-test evidence to rebut the presumption).
131. It was this version of the law that the Supreme Court upheld in Michael H., 491 U.S. at 117.
The current version, substantially similar to the 1980 statute, is codified at CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7540-
7541 (2011).
132. E.g., Weidenbacher v. Duclos, 661 A.2d 988, 1001 (Conn. 1995). See generally Note, Rebutting
the Marital Presumption: A Developed Relationship Test, 88 COLtuM. L. REv. 369, 373-75 (1988).
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mothers of their children to register with the state as a prerequisite to the
exercise of parental rights.13 3 The laws requiring putative fathers to register
have much broader effect, of course, because they operate to bar parental rights
even when the mother is not married to another man when the child is born.
Such laws are most frequently litigated, however, when the putative father and
the mother are not married when the child is born but the mother subsequently
marries another man who desires to adopt the child.134
Consider another, less dramatic, evolution. Under the common law, the
parent-child relationship could not be dissolved; the mandatory rule was that a
parent owed responsibilities to her or his legal child for life.' 35 In the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, all states enacted adoption statutes allowing parents
voluntarily to give up their rights and responsibilities to the couple or individual
wishing to adopt a child.' 36 In the twentieth century, the states created processes
by which parents could seek termination of their own parental responsibilities,
and minors could seek emancipation before reaching the usual age of adult
status.13 7 The default rule remains the same as it has always been: the legal
parent owes a continuing duty of support and nurture to the child, but that
default can now be overridden, though the requirements for override are quite
stringent.
3. Antenuptial Agreements
State courts traditionally enforced premarriage (antenuptial) agreements be-
tween spouses to divide property and assets in the event of the death of either
133. See Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Annotation, Requirements and Effects of Putative Father Registries,
28 A.L.R.6th 349 (2007) (West, Westlaw updated with current cases weekly). Some state courts have
applied these statutes leniently, to avoid unnecessary waiver of parental rights by unmarried fathers.
E.g., J.S.A. v. M.H., 863 N.E.2d 236, 252 (Ill. 2007).
134. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Snavely, No. 2000 CA 20, 2000 WL 1597977, at * 1 (Ohio Ct. App.
2000). See generally Gilsinger, supra note 133 (collecting cases, many of which follow the scenario
described in the text accompanying this footnote).
135. See, e.g., John Francis Brosnan, The Law of Adoption, 22 CoLUM. L. REV. 332, 335 (1922)
(explaining that the common law did not recognize adoption because parents could not abdicate their
responsibilities by contract); see also 4 CHESTER G. VERNIER & E. PERRY CHURCHILL, AMERICAN FAMILY
LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE FAMILY LAW OF THE FORTY-EIGHT AMERICAN STATES, ALASKA, THE
DisICT OF COLUMBIA, AND HAWAII § 254 (1936) (explaining that there is "no sanction, at common law,
for . .. adoption"); Leo Albert Huard, The Law ofAdoption: Ancient and Modem, 9 VAND. L. REv. 743,
745-48 (1956) (discussing the common law's lack of recognition for adoption).
136. Before 1911, most states permitted adoption. See WALTER C. TIFFANY & ROGER W. COOLEY,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 243 (2d ed. 1909); JOSEPH R. LONG, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMEsTIc RELATIONS 307 (1905). By 1925, every American jurisdiction
authorized adoption. See EMELYN FOSTER PECK, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ADOPTION LAWS IN THE UNITED
STArES: A SUMMARY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADOPTION LEGISLATION AND SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF
ADOPTION STATUTES, WITH THE TExT OF SELECTED LAWS 1 (1925). On the history and evolution of adoption
laws, see NAOMI R. CAHN & JOAN HEIFErz HOLLINGER, FAMILY BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER (2004); E.
WAYNE CAu, ADOPTION IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES (2002).
137. See ANNE L. ALsroTr, No Exrr War PARENTs OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND WHAT SOCIETY OWES
PARENTs 46 (2004); Carol Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating Children in
Modem Times, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 239 (1991).
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spouse but did not enforce such spousal agreements dividing assets and determin-
ing or waiving support obligations in the event of a divorce.' The reluctance
to enforce antenuptial agreements contemplating divorce was mainly justified
by the natural law understanding of romantic relationships: because marriage is
for life, the spouses ought not to "plan" for divorce. Thus, judges expressed
fears that such agreements would undermine "[t]he state's interest in the
preservation of the marriage"13 9 and would threaten the very integrity of the
institution of marriage.' 40
Since 1970, the states have modified that mandatory rule to respond to the
historically high divorce rate in the post-1961 United States.14 ' Either by
legislation or by court decision, all the states in the union and the District of
Columbia have replaced a mandatory rule (statutory division of assets upon
dissolution of civil marriage) with a default rule that the spouses can override
by contract, including antenuptial agreements.14 2 Most states, however, have not
treated antenuptial agreements the same as commercial contracts, and many
138. E.g., French v. McAnarney, 195 N.E. 714, 715 (Mass. 1935); Crouch v. Crouch, 385 S.W.2d
288, 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964), overruled by Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777, 781-82 (Tenn. 1996);
Fricke v. Fricke, 42 N.W.2d 500, 502 (Wis. 1950); cf Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 383-85 (Fla.
1970) (describing and then rejecting the traditional approach to antenuptial agreements); Ware v. Ware,
687 S.E.2d 382, 390-91 (W. Va. 2009) (similar).
139. Posner, 233 So. 2d at 383.
140. French, 195 N.E. at 716 ("The public interest in the integrity of marriage requires that its
underlying rights and obligations be not subject to variation by agreement of the parties such as here
shown.").
141. Developments in the Law-The Law ofMarriage and Family, supra note 35, at 2078-82.
142. For the statutes and cases authorizing the enforcement of antenuptial agreements concerning
separation or divorce in each state, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 323 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-933
(2006); ME. REv. STAt. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 604 (1998); Mowr. CODE ANN. § 40-2-605 (2011); N.M. STAr.
ANN. § 40-3A-4 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52B-4 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.03.1-03 (2011); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 15-17-3 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-2-18 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-501
(2012); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.003 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-8-4 (2011); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-150 (2011); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 376 So. 2d 732 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979); Brooks v. Brooks, 733
P.2d 1044, 1048-49 (Alaska 1987); Williams v. Williams, 801 P.2d 495 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990);
Dingledine v. Dingledine, 523 S.W.2d 189 (Ark. 1975); In re Marriage of Dawley, 551 P.2d 323, 325
(Cal. 1976); Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982); Parniawski v. Parniawski, 359 A.2d 719
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1976); Burtoff v. Burtoff, 418 A.2d 1085, 1089 (D.C. 1980); Posner v. Posner, 233
So. 2d 381, 386 (Fla. 1970); Scherer v. Scherer, 292 S.E.2d 662, 666 (Ga. 1982); Rossiter v. Rossiter,
666 P.2d 617 (Haw. 1983); Volid v. Volid, 286 N.E.2d 42 (Ill. 1972); In re Marriage of Boren, 475
N.E.2d 690 (Ind. 1985); In re Marriage of Sell, 451 N.W.2d 28 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989); Matlock v.
Matlock, 576 P.2d 629 (Kan. 1978); Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1990); Holiday v.
Holiday, 358 So. 2d 618 (La. 1978); Skelton v. Skelton, 490 A.2d 1204 (Me. 1985); Frey v. Frey, 471
A.2d 705 (Md. 1984); Osborne v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d 810 (Mass. 1981); Rinvelt v. Rinvelt, 475
N.W.2d 478 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Rudbeck v. Rudbeck, 365 N.W.2d 330 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985);
Long v. Long, 928 So. 2d 1001 (Miss. 2006); Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782, 787-88 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979); Buettner v. Buettner, 505 P.2d 600 (Nev. 1973); MacFarlane v. Rich, 567 A.2d 585 (N.H. 1989);
Marschall v. Marschall, 477 A.2d 833, 838-40 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1984); Propp v. Propp, 493
N.Y.S.2d 147 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Hook v. Hook, 431 N.E.2d 667 (Ohio 1982); Freeman v. Freeman,
565 P.2d 365 (Okla. 1977); Unander v. Unander, 506 P.2d 719 (Or. 1973); McGannon v. McGannon,
359 A.2d 431 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976); Hardee v. Hardee, 558 S.E.2d 264 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001); Bassler v.
Bassler, 593 A.2d 82 (Vt. 1991); Padova v. Padova, 183 A.2d 227 (Vt. 1962); In re Marriage of Hadley,
565 P.2d 790 (Wash. 1977); Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 114-16 (W. Va. 1985); Button v. Button, 388
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state judges will not enforce such agreements unless they are satisfied that both
spouses entered into the agreement voluntarily and that the antenuptial agree-
ment is substantively fair and reasonable.14 3
The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA), propounded by the Ameri-
can Law Institute in 1983 and adopted by twenty-six states by the turn of the
millennium,'" is a model statute for implementation of the new regime,
grounded in the utilitarian rather than natural law perspective. Section 6 of the
UPAA provides that antenuptial agreements are to be enforced by state courts
unless the agreement was not entered voluntarily or the terms of the agreement
are unconscionable and the complaining spouse was denied full and fair disclo-
sure by the other spouse. 145
The UPAA represents a moderate compromise between the old mandatory
rule and the default-with-easy-override regime adopted in some states during
the 1970s. As implemented by judges in adopting states, though, the UPAA's
enforcement rule looks a lot like the evolving common law standards judges
were following before the UPAA. Thus, judges in UPAA jurisdictions are most
likely to enforce antenuptial agreements when one spouse has signed the
agreement with full disclosure from the other spouse and an opportunity to
consider the terms of the agreement without being rushed into signing.' 4 6
In another regulatory proposal, the American Law Institute has propounded
Principles for Family Dissolution (Principles) that follow the rough consensus
that antenuptial agreements should usually be enforceable, unless they were not
entered into voluntarily or were unconscionable at the time they were signed by
the prospective spouses.147 In addition to these requirements, which track
evolving state law, the Principles would place the burden of proof on the spouse
relying on the antenuptial agreement to terminate spousal support and other
fundamental marriage rights and would stipulate that the reviewing court should
be reluctant to enforce an antenuptial agreement that a court would consider
involuntary.14 8
In the last century, the terms of asset division and support obligations
(alimony) between the spouses have evolved from a regime of mandatory rules
N.W.2d 546 (Wis. 1986); Lund v. Lund, 849 P.2d 731 (Wyo. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by
Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149 (Wyo. 1998).
143. See Judith T. Younger, Antenuptial Agreements, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 697, 700-02 (2001)
(discussing in detail recent judicial decisions examining antenuptial agreements for both procedural and
substantive fairness). For example, many states will not allow antenuptial agreements to waive child
support, and some states do not permit waiver of spousal support unless the parties have followed
rigorous override procedures. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612(c); IOWA CODE § 596.5(g)(2).
144. Younger, supra note 143, at 716-17 (describing the Uniform Law and its legislative adoption).
145. UN. PREMARTIAL AGREEMENT Acr § 6 (1983).
146. E.g., McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259, 267-68 (Minn. 1989) (mixing common law
and UPAA review of antenuptial agreement and remanding for further substantive review by the trial
court).
147. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FA.mY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 7.01 cmt. d (2000).
148. Id. § 7.05(3).
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to a regime of default rules with increasingly complicated and diverse override
rules. Indeed, the primary debate in the last generation has been over the
stringency of override rules. Contrast the UPAA and the Principles. The latter
follows the traditional default rule, namely, the statutory support obligations and
division of property upon divorce and requires the spouse invoking a prenuptial
agreement to demonstrate that the agreement is voluntary and fair. The former
creates a new default rule, namely, the agreement between the spouses, and
requires the spouse objecting to the agreement to demonstrate that it is not
voluntary and fair.
As we shall now see, the debate over antenuptial agreements finds both
parallels and differences in the important debate over no-fault divorce.
B. NO-FAULT DIVORCE: MARRIAGE FOR LIFE, WITH INCREASINGLY
LENIENT OVERRIDE RULES
A second big development in American family law in the last century has
been making it easier for spouses to end their marriage through divorce. The
liberalization of divorce law has roughly paralleled the liberalization of marital
rules-and both phenomena reflect the increasing influence of the utilitarian
understanding of family in American culture and law. The ability to obtain an
easy divorce is inconsistent with the natural law understanding of family,
especially as refracted through American religion. 14 9 But once our public
culture reached a consensus that marriage and family are best justified by
utilitarian and social advantages, the case for easier divorce became compelling.
As before, the happiness and sociability values of family supported state
regulation of divorce through default rules with relatively easy overrides, rather
than through the traditional rule banning divorce except for adultery and other
kinds of fault.
In 1911, American states allowed divorce, but a large majority did so only
when one spouse's dishonorable conduct essentially voided the marriage con-
tract.' 50 Every state except South Carolina allowed spouses to divorce because
of adultery,'"' and most states also granted divorces for extreme cruelty, deser-
149. As a matter of ecclesiastical practice, the Roman Catholic Church's natural law theology has
long considered divorce inconsistent with procreative God-given marriage; thus, many devout Catho-
lics have sought an annulment from the Church, a proceeding that may be influenced by the grounds by
which the spouses secure their civil divorce. See CATHOLIC DIVORCE: THE DECEPTION OF ANNULMENTS
9-20, 138-49 (Pierre Hegy & Joseph Martos eds., 2000) (discussing both historical and modem
Catholic doctrine in detail). Although fundamentalist Protestant denominations have allowed divorce,
they are attentive to Christ's admonition that one may not remarry unless abandoned by an unfaithful
spouse. See Matthew 19:9.
150. See S.B. KrTCHrN, A HIsTORY OF DIVORCE 215 (1912) (positing that states generally required
"some unlawful or disgraceful act on the part of one of the spouses entitling the other to dissolve the
marriage"); 2 FREDERIC J. STIMsON, AMERICAN STATUTE LAw § 6201 (1886) (detailing the "causes" that
could justify divorce); Denese Ashbaugh Vlosky & Pamela A. Monroe, The Effective Dates of No-Fault
Divorce Laws in the 50 States, 51 FAM. REL. 317 (2002) (examining the move to no-fault-based grounds
for divorce).
151. See BISHOP, supra note 117, § 1501.
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tion, conviction or imprisonment for a serious crime, habitual intoxication, and
nonsupport.15 2 Fault-based divorce was an expression of the natural law under-
standing of marriage as a relationship steeped in morality; only when the moral
basis for marriage was destroyed should divorce be granted, and a major goal of
divorce law was to punish the guilty spouse.' 53 Accordingly, fault-based divorce
could limit the at-fault spouse's rights to remarriage, child custody, alimony, his
or her real and personal property, inheritance, insurance rights, dower, and
curtesy.15 4 Fault-based divorce could also negatively affect the legitimacy of the
couple's children.155
One might understand this regime as one of mandatory rules, whereby the
legal rule was marriage for life unless the marriage was destroyed at its roots by
adultery or the other fault-based reasons. In my view, however, it makes more
sense to conceptualize this regime as one where there was a hard default rule of
marriage-for-life, with an override rule (such as proof of adultery) that was
difficult to meet. Understood that way, the history of American divorce law in
the last century has been a debate over what the override rule ought to be.
Although the default rule has remained the same-marriage-for-life-overrid-
ing the default has become much easier in the last hundred years.
The forces driving the relaxed override rules have been utilitarian ones: once
spouses find themselves in a marriage that is making them unhappy, they want
to end the marriage, and the law has made it progressively easier for them to do
so, contrary to the natural law attitude toward marriage. 156 A legal barometer for
this increasingly utilitarian focus of divorce law was the phenomenon of
"living-apart" laws, allowing spouses to divorce without a showing of fault if
they had lived apart for a specified period of time. Four states had enacted
living-apart laws by 1911, but they imposed long waiting periods (ten years for
152. See FRANK H. KEEZER, THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: GIVING THE LAW IN ALL THE STATES
AND TERRITORIES WITH APPROVED FORMS 233-343 (1906); 2 CHESTER G. VERNIER & BENJAMIN C. DUNIWAY,
AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS: A COMPARATVE STUDY OF THE FAMILY LAW OF THE FoRrY-EIGHT AMERICAN STATES,
ALASKA, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, AND HAWAu 3-4 (1932).
153. See, e.g., VERNIER & DUNIWAY, supra note 152, at 216 (explaining that many of the statutes were
"designed to penalize the guilty or to favor the innocent spouse"). See generally Margaret F. Brinig &
Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 869 (1994) (defending fault-based
divorce along utilitarian rather than natural law lines); Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage:
Divorce Law in Historical Perspective, 63 OR. L. REv. 649, 653-54 (1984) (explaining the moral basis
for marriage and the morals-saturated rules of divorce).
154. See VERNIER & DUNIWAY, supra note 152, at 215-64 (presenting the array of penalties imposed
upon the spouse at fault, including denial of alimony).
155. See id. at 185-91 (showing that in some states, parental fault-based divorce rendered the
marital children legal "bastards").
156. See CHERLiN, supra note 19, at 32 (observing that Americans overwhelmingly support marriage-
for-life as a default rule but also overwhelmingly favor divorce when the marriage sours for one
partner, even when there are minor children still in the household). But see Brinig & Crafton, supra
note 153 (arguing that social utility does not support no-fault divorce, because the ease of divorce
undermines the worthy promises embedded in the marriage contract).
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all but one).' 57 Between 1911 and 1967, most states adopted laws allowing
divorce after a period of living apart, and most of the states shortened the
required period of separation to between one and three years.15 8 In that same
period, seven states added incompatibility as a "fault" justifying divorce.'" 9
Without directly challenging the natural law understanding of marriage as a
lifetime commitment, the living-apart and incompatibility laws were bows to
the utilitarian understanding of family that was sweeping the country in the
middle part of the century.
Between 1870 and 1945, divorce rates increased, even though the legal
regime of fault-based divorce did not change significantly in most states. 60 in
1910, there were 8.8 divorces for every 100 marriages, a ratio that doubled by
1930, dipped during the Great Depression, and rose to high levels by the end of
World War 11.161 During that period, most practitioners and judges believed that
the override rule was increasingly more lenient in practice than it was in theory:
many married couples were manufacturing fault in order to secure jurisdiction
for a divorce whose terms were worked out in advance.1 62 Additionally, Nevada
and a few other states offered easy divorce judgments for short-term residents
that the courts of the marital domicile were required to respect.16 3 Such "quickie
divorces" were another mechanism whereby many couples were able to take
advantage of easier override rules than the high-cost rules that dominated state
statute books.
In the first half of the twentieth century, therefore, the states were reluctant to
abandon the natural law notion that marriage is inherently a lifetime commit-
ment-but they were also unwilling to deny their citizens the freedom to escape
157. The states were Kentucky, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. See J. HERBIE
DIFONzo, BENEArm THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN TwENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 78-79 tbl.4 (1997) (summarizing state-by-state changes in divorce law).
158. See James Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 946-47 (2000).
159. The states were Alaska, Delaware, Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico, and Oklahoma. See DiFoNzO,
supra note 157.
160. Even in the states with living-apart and incompatibility grounds for divorce, few couples took
advantage of the new standard because courts still expected a showing that the spouse petitioning for
divorce was blameless. See id. at 69, 76-77.
161. See Max Rheinstein, The Law of Divorce and the Problem of Marriage Stability, 9 VAND. L.
REv. 633, 633 & n.2 (1956); Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Marriage and Divorce: Changes and
Their Driving Forces, 21 J. EcoN. PERSP., Sept. 2007, at 27, 29 fig.1.
162. See Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its
Afternath, 56 U. CINN. L. REV. 1, 28, 118 (1987); see also Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language:
Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1504-05 (2000) (opining that most
American divorces after 1870 were "collusive" divorces, where the spouses worked together to
manufacture fault and thereby to terminate their marriages).
163. See Friedman, supra note 162, at 1504-07 (tracing the popularity of Nevada divorces after the
state in 1931 reduced its residency requirement to six weeks); Thomas Reed Powell, And Repent at
Leisure, 58 HARv. L. REv. 930, 937-38 (1945) (describing the emergence of Nevada as a center for
divorces for out-of-state couples); see also Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 231 (1945)
(ruling that states could relitigate the jurisdictional issue of whether the divorcing spouses were bona
fide domiciliaries of Nevada); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297 (1942) (requiring states to
give full faith and credit to quickie divorces secured in Nevada).
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marriages that had become terribly unhappy for one or both spouses. Theoreti-
cally, the states were bowing to the new utilitarian philosophy, although they
kept those bows in a legal closet. The law made that possible, through the new
override rules: consistent with the natural law aspiration for marriage still
endorsed by most Americans, state law retained the default rule of marriage-for-
life-but at the same time allowed unhappy couples to escape marriage through
easier-to-meet override rules.64
The sexual revolution of the 1960s jump-started a more dramatic statutory
reform, one that was an even greater departure from the natural law ideal and
more openly responsive to the utilitarian view of marriage. This was the
no-fault divorce revolution. Between 1969 and 1985, every state adopted some
kind of statutory regime allowing divorce without fault; most of these states
followed the lead of either California's Divorce Reform Act of 1969 or of the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act of 1970, as revised in 1973.165 The core
reform was to translate the utilitarian understanding of family into a no-fault
basis for divorce, namely "irreconcilable differences" or "irretrievable break-
down of the marriage."1 The core reform was carried out by making it easier
for unhappy couples to override the default rule of marriage-for-life.
Many of the divorce-reform statutes also allowed "unilateral" divorce, namely,
a formal divorce decree provided at the behest of only one spouse.' 6 7 Unilateral
no-fault divorce represents a highly liberal rule for overriding the marriage-for-
life default, but it would be wrong to assume that the utilitarian understanding
always favors the maximum amount of choice. Indeed, exponents of the utilitar-
ian perspective have sharply criticized unilateral no-fault divorce regimes for
making divorce too easy and for relaxing previous mandatory rules for alimony
and even child support, with the result that dependent spouses and children have
often been left destitute after divorce.' 6 8
164. Recall that overrides of the marriage-for-life default became easier because the old override
rules were evaded or applied leniently, because new override rules were easier to meet, and because
court decisions required that divorces granted in easy-override states like Nevada were binding on
harder-override states.
165. See Jonathan Gruber, Is Making Divorce Easier Bad for Children? The Long-Run Implications
of Unilateral Divorce, 22 J. LAB. EcON. 799, 803 tbl.1 (2004); Kay, supra note 162, at 4-14 (providing
a summary of the move towards no-fault statutory regimes), 51-55 (providing a state-by-state analysis).
166. See MAx RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAw 383-85 (1972); see also Kay,
supra note 162, at 44-51 (providing a detailed account of the reform by a law professor involved in the
uniform law as well as the California act).
167. See Gruber, supra note 165, at 140 & tbl. 1 (documenting the trend of unilateral divorce
regulations).
168. See H. Elizabeth Peters, Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contract-
ing, 76 Am. EcON. R. 437, 443-44 (1986) (arguing that unilateral divorce harmed the economic interests
of dependent wives whose consent had to be purchased in the prior regime); Richard R. Peterson, A
Re-Evaluation of the Economic Consequences of Divorce, 61 AM. Soc. REV. 528 (1996) (documenting a
significant decline in the postdivorce standard of living for wives and a more modest increase in the
postdivorce standard of living for husbands); see also ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNooKiN,
DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 260-62 (1992) (similar).
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Interestingly, the popular conception that no-fault divorce has led to astronomi-
cal divorce rates is also inaccurate. It is true that divorce rates continued to
escalate in the 1970s, reaching an all-time high for our country in 1981-but the
number of divorces has fallen since then.' 9 The declining divorce rate is
mainly a consequence of a sharp increase in the age of marriage for college
graduates in the last generation; Americans without college degrees marry at
younger ages and experience higher divorce rates.170
Most of the regulatory work in family law is now being accomplished neither
by mandatory rules, which have sharply declined in importance, nor even by
default rules, which have increased in importance, but instead by override rules
and governmental incentives. Override rules fine-tune the default rule regimes:
the harder it is to override, the more a default will operate like a mandatory rule;
the easier it is to override, the more a default will conduce to a regime where the
partners make their own choices, with some guidance from the state. Incentives
provide a gentler, prochoice mechanism for the government to encourage what
it considers "best practices," without the openly coercive and inefficient features
of the old regime dominated by mandatory rules.17 '
If our polity wants to encourage marriage, there are more effective means for
doing so than the discredited mandatory rules of the old regime. For example,
state incentives often work better than punitive rules: some couples get married
and stay married at least in part because of governmental or employment-based
rewards for married couples. State endorsement can also serve as a focal point
for community support; as Margaret Brinig has demonstrated empirically,
169. RoSE M. KREIDER & RENEE ELLIS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NUMBER, TIMING, AND DURAnON OF
MARRIAGES AND DIVORCEs: 2009, at 4 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p70-125.
pdf.
170. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 7 (providing a class basis for explaining different divorce rate
trends in red and blue states: later-marrying college graduates have driven lower divorce rates in blue
states, while red states have more nongraduates who are marrying earlier and divorcing more often); see
also Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring Under the Second Demographic
Transition, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 607 (2004); June Carbone, Unpacking Inequality and Class: Family,
Gender and the Reconstruction of Class Barriers, 45 NEw ENG. L. REV. 527 (2011). Compare Justin
Wolfers, Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results, 96 AM.
EcON. RE. 1802, 1802 (2006) (finding a short-term effect for no-fault divorce laws but no long-term
effect on divorce rates), with St6phane Mechoulan, Divorce Laws and the Structure of the American
Family, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 143, 167 (2006) (finding that initial divorce rate increases in "true" no-fault
jurisdictions were reversed when the age of marriage increased in the last generation).
171. There is a historical parallel between the nation's disastrous experience with Prohibition and its
post-Prohibition policies. Prohibition, lasting from 1919 to 1933, was implemented by federal and state
statutes and constitutional-amendment-based mandatory rules against alcohol manufacture, sale, and
sometimes possession and consumption. See Charles H. Whitebread, Freeing Ourselves from the
Prohibition Idea in the Twenty-first Century, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 235, 237-39 (2000). After 1933, the
country moved to gentle nudges as the best response to alcohol abuse--especially through high taxes
on liquor and regulation through licensing requirements. Taxation has been a highly efficient means for
discouraging excessive consumption; licensing has probably been less effective but not as costly as
Prohibition was. See Harry G. Levine & Craig Reinarman, From Prohibition to Regulation: Lessons
from Alcohol Policy for Drug Policy, 69 MLBANK Q. 461, 462-66,474-82 (1991).
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stronger networks of community (including government) support for relation-
ships are correlated with longer lasting unions. 17 2
C. ENDING MARRIAGE'S MONOPOLY: THE EMERGING MENU OF RELATIONSHIP REGIMES
In 1911, civil marriage enjoyed a monopoly position in America's culture of
sexual romance. State governments offered no other institution within which
romantic couples could enjoy lives together-but, even more importantly, state
governments made sexual relations outside of marriage a crime, usually a
felony. State law had traditionally made it a serious crime for unmarried adults
to enjoy penile-vaginal sex in private (fornication), for a married person to have
such relations with someone other than his or her spouse (adultery), and for any
person to commit the crime against nature (sodomy).' 7 3 In addition, the federal
government used the White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act of 1910174 to prosecute
adultery and sometimes fornication when it involved crossing state lines.' 75 As
late as 1961, every state in the union treated consensual sodomy as a crime,' 7 6
and forty-four states criminalized adultery.' 77 Many states and municipalities
also made sexual or lewd cohabitation outside of marriage a separate crime.' 7 8
Like lesbian and gay couples, romantic heterosexual couples enjoying sexual
relations outside of marriage were sexual outlaws, theoretically subject to
criminal sanctions but, even more importantly, isolated from the normal chan-
nels of legal planning and protection.
Moreover, children born in nonmarital relationships were themselves mini-
outlaws. Thus, state law denied nonmarital children the rights of parental
support and inheritance that were guaranteed to marital children.17 9 Fathers
wanting support and custody of their nonmarital children were sometimes
denied these opportunities, even when mothers put those children up for adop-
tion.1 s0 States denied nonmarital children benefits from their workers' compensa-
172. See MARGARET F. BRINIG, FAMILY, LAW, AND COMMUNITY. SUPPORTING THE COVENANT (2010). See
also Wardle, supra note 20, at 281-85 (reporting recent federal and state initiatives to provide
encouragement and support for marriage).
173. See MORRIS PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW (1951) (providing a comprehensive survey of state sex
crimes).
174. White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2421-2424 (2006)).
175. See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 487-91 (1917); Jeremy D. Weinstein, Note,
Adultery, Law, and the State: A History, 38 HASTINGs L.J. 195, 227 n.235 (1986). See generally DAvID
LANGUM, CROSSING OVER THE LINE: LEGISLATING MORALITY AND THE MANN ACT (1994) (providing a
thorough account of the Mann Act's role in overbroad prosecutions of sexual laws).
176. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 33, at 387-407 app. (presenting a state-by-state survey of sodomy
laws from 1789 to 2003, with documentation of each state's regime).
177. See sources cited supra note 119.
178. See Martha A. Mahoney, Forces Shaping the Law of Cohabitation for Opposite-Sex Couples, 7
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 135, 141 (2005).
179. See HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY- LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 22-25 (1971); Harry D. Krause,
Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MIcH. L. REV. 477, 478 (1967).
180. In Petition of Malmstedt, for example, the court ruled that it would not allow a child "to be
reared as an illegitimate child by the father alone," when the child could instead "be raised in a normal,
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tion and wrongful death statutes. 8 ' At the federal level, New Deal Era safety-
net programs tended to exclude nonmarital children from those benefits as
well.182
Were these prohibitory laws actually enforced? In the early twentieth century,
thousands of persons were arrested each year for violating the foregoing sex-
crime laws, although police enforcement focused strongly, especially in the
South, on racial, sexual, and gender minorities.1 In the course of the century,
governmental bars to sex outside of marriage were transformed by police
practice into increasingly soft mandatory rules. Specifically, police enforcement
of fornication and adultery laws steadily abated; by the 1940s, such laws were
rarely enforced by the police.'84 According to the Kinsey reports released after
World War H, few sexually active American women as well as men had
confined their sexual activities to marital relationships; an overwhelming major-
ity of adult Americans had violated one or more of these sex-crime laws.' 85
However lax enforcement of these laws was in the 1940s and 1950s, the laws
were dead letters by the 1970s.t8 6
wholesome [adoptive] home with a mother and father." 220 A.2d 147, 150 (Md. 1966). It then denied
the father's petition to adopt his daughter on that basis. Id. Indeed, Georgia, Illinois, Mississippi, New
Jersey, and Texas all excluded fathers from custody and adoption proceedings for their nonmarital
children. Note, Father of an Illegitimate Child-His Right To Be Heard, 50 MINN. L. REv. 1071,
1076 n.29 (1966) (citing statutes from these jurisdictions); see also Norman Gardner Tabler, Jr.,
Paternal Rights in the Illegitimate Child: Some Legitimate Complaints on Behalf of the Unwed Father,
11 J. FAM. L. 231, 231 (1971) ("In the United States today a man has few legal rights in his illegitimate
child.").
181. E.g., Levy v. State, 192. So. 2d 193, 195 (La. Ct. App. 1966) (preventing recovery by
"illegitimate and putative children for the wrongful death of a parent"), rev'd, 391 U.S. 68 (1968);
Stokes v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 242 So. 2d 567, 570 (La. 1970) (denying nonmarital children
workmen's compensation, but granting marital children rights to such compensation), rev'd sub nom.
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
182. See Note, The Rights of Illegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76 HARv. L. REv. 337, 353 (1962).
183. See GEOFFREY MAY, SOCIAL CONTROL OF SEx ExPRESsION 256-70 (1931) (reporting significant
enforcement of adultery laws in the 1910s and 1920s); Geoffrey May, Experiments in the Legal Control
of Sex Expression, 39 YALE L.J. 219, 244 (1929) (reporting that in 1916 Washington and Cincinnati,
adultery arraignments totaled 131 and fornication arraignments totaled over 1000 and that in 1920
Boston, there were 70 arraignments for adultery and 321 arraignments for fornication); see also
ESKRIDGE, supra note 33, at 55-57 (documenting significant albeit racially discriminatory enforcement
of sodomy, fornication, and adultery laws in the early twentieth century).
184. See AM. LAW INST., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES: PA~r II DEFINITION OF SPECIFIC
CRIMEs art. 213 at 434-37 (1980) (characterizing American adultery laws as "dead-letter statutes" by
the 1950s); PLOSCOWE, supra note 173, at 155-56 (1951) (citing data demonstrating nonenforcement
and noting that "non-enforcement is the general rule with respect to [criminal] statutes directed against
fornication and adultery").
185. See KINSEY ET AL., MALE, supra note 62, at 392; KINSEY ET AL., FEMALE, supra note 62, at
255-59, 280-86, 419, 453.
186. Adultery laws were almost never enforced after 1961. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 118, at 346
("In April 1990, when a district attorney in northern Wisconsin actually brought a prosecution for
adultery, the story made the front page of the New York Times."); Katherine Annuschat, Comment, An
Affair To Remember: The State of the Crime of Adultery in the Military, 47 SAN DiEGo L. REV. 1161,
1167-68 (2010). On the nonenforcement of consensual sodomy laws, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 33, at
170-73. Cohabitation laws may be the exception here, in the declining number of states that still had
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At the same time the Kinsey researchers were publishing their reports, the
American Law Institute (ALI) was launching its ambitious effort to draft and
secure adoption at the state level of a model penal code. Professors Herbert
Wechsler, the Reporter for the project, and Louis Schwartz, the Reporter for the
sex crime portions of the project, approached sex-crime reform from a purely
utilitarian approach to criminal law that explicitly rejected natural law base-
lines."' Thus, the drafters of the Model Penal Code were not inclined to
criminalize conduct that pleased its perpetrators and did not harm other persons,
and they did not care that such conduct violated some natural law ideal. Hence,
the final version of the Code, ratified by the ALI in 1962, decriminalized
consensual fornication, adultery, sodomy, and cohabitation.' 88 One animating
idea was to conform the law to practice: if citizens and police nullified a
mandatory rule, without undue harm to society, why not formally change the
rule to a default that could be overridden by the consent of the persons
involved?
In 1961, Illinois was the first state substantially to adopt the Model Penal
Code; in the next half century, most states have followed that lead, typically
revising and adapting the Code to local politics.' 8 9 Between 1961 and 2003, all
but thirteen states decriminalized consensual sodomy, and the Supreme Court
invalidated the remaining laws in 2003.o90 Twenty-two states today criminalize
adultery, almost always as a misdemeanor9 usually unenforced by the police.
Only four states criminalize sexual cohabitation,19 2 and another five states
criminalize fornication 13 all as substantially unenforced and probably uncon-
stitutional misdemeanors.
During the same period that state legislatures and judges were bringing
nonmarital couples within the normal legal regulatory system, the Supreme
them. See Martha L. Fineman, Law and Changing Patterns of Behavior: Sanctions on Non-Marital
Cohabitation, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 275, 288-89 (reporting modest albeit uneven enforcement of the state
cohabitation ban in the 1970s).
187. Louis B. Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 CoLuM. L. REV. 669 (1963);
see ESKRIDGE, supra note 33, at 118-27 (providing a detailed account of the MPC's official philosophy
and its decriminalization of consensual sex).
188. See Mahoney, supra note 178, at 144-47 (detailing history of the ALI's approach to cohabita-
tion).
189. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 33, at 121-27, 144-47, 161-65, 176-84, 197-201 (detailing the
complicated politics of sex-crime reform; many states followed the MPC to deregulate consensual
fornication, cohabitation, adultery, and sodomy, while several states left "homosexual sodomy" regu-
lated, usually as a misdemeanor).
190. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
191. See sources cited supra note 121.
192. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.02 (West 2007); MIcH. COMP. LAWS AN. § 750.335 (West 2004);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (2006); VA. CODE § 18.2-345 (Westlaw 2010).
193. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6603 (2004); 720 ILL. Comp. STAT. 5/11-40 (2010 & Supp. 2011)
(fornication if "open and notorious"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 18 (2000) (dubious constitution-
ality); MINN. STAT. §§ 609.34, 480.059(7) (2010); UTAH ANN. CODE § 76-7-104 (West 2010). Virginia
still has a fornication statute, but its Supreme Court ruled in Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va.
2005), that the statute could not be applied to private consensual conduct.
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Court issued a series of decisions bringing nonmarital children into the normal
legal regulatory system. Specifically, the Supreme Court struck down a series of
laws that excluded nonmarital children from ordinary property or inheritance
rights and legal benefits.19 4
As the foregoing account reveals, the one hundred years from 1911 to 2011
not only witnessed the expansion of marriage to allow millions of formerly
outlaw couples to choose marriage but also allowed romantic couples of all
stripes the possibility of romance under the law but outside of marriage. Once
fornication and sexual cohabitation were formally decriminalized, as they were
in most states by the 1970s, civil law rules of contract and property became
applicable to nonmarital cohabiting couples in ways not typically possible
before decriminalization. For example, written contracts and wills involving
cohabiting partners were subject to legal objection on the ground that the
underlying relationship was "meretricious," and decriminalization potentially
legitimated those potential contract and property rights.195
After sexual cohabitation became legal and normal rules of contract and
property applied to cohabiting couples, many states in the last generation have
taken a further regulatory step to create special rules tailored to the relationship
presumptively created by cohabitation. Thus, some states have created new
regulatory regimes that romantic couples-including the same-race, hetero-
sexual couples who have always been able to get married-can choose instead
of marriage. In other words, romantic couples can now flourish (or suffer) under
the eye of the law without getting married, and in an increasing number of
jurisdictions they are subject to a distinct regime of legal rights and regulations.
Indeed, every state now offers a menu of regulatory institutions from which
romantic couples can choose. The menu is different from state to state, and in
most states it is a short one. But the number of states following a menu
approach is expanding, and the regimes included within the menu have ex-
panded as well.
The ongoing expansion, consolidation, and reevaluation of relationship menus
will be a dominant feature of American family law in the next generation.
Consider the new regimes that have been added to the family law menu of
options since 1961. The big addition, both socially and legally, has been the
regime of modern cohabitation law, but new regimes created as a response to
the same-sex marriage movement and the traditional-family-values response are
194. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (striking down state policy barring nonmarital
children from recovery for the wrongful death of their mother); Glona v. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391
U.S. 73 (1968) (striking down state policy barring mother from recovery for the wrongful death of her
nonmarital child). See generally Christine H. Kellett, The Burger Decade: More Than Toothless
Scrutiny for Laws Affecting Illegitimates, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 791 (1979) (surveying the Court's
nonmarital-children cases).
195. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976) (applying normal contract principles of a
cohabiting couple, and triggering similar lawsuits all over the country). But see Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394
N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979) (rejecting the Marvin approach and reaffirming the traditional rule that courts
will not enforce contracts tainted by illicit, nonmarital sexual cohabitation).
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theoretically important, because they expand the contours of the regulatory
pluralism of modem family law. Not only have lesbian and gay couples been
brought into the regulatory ambit of civil, rather than criminal, family law, but
the new family law regimes also offer a different mix of default rules and
benefits for all romantic couples.
1. Sexual Cohabitation
Before states decriminalized fornication and sexual cohabitation outside of
marriage, cohabiting couples were not only presumptive criminals, but they also
forfeited some basic civil protections and rights. For example, courts would not
enforce ordinary support-and-maintenance contracts between cohabiting couples
because judges assumed that the consideration for such contracts was the
parties' "meretricious" relationship.19 6 Courts would typically not even enforce
support obligations on biological fathers when children were born out of
wedlock. 97 Although tort and criminal law governed the partners' behavior
toward one another (just as it would persons in a dating relationship), the law
did not impose tort duties on third parties, such as a duty not to impose
emotional distress on the partner of someone a defendant has accidentally
injured or killed.198
Once states decriminalized sexual activities outside of marriage, these civil
disabilities were retired in most jurisdictions. In a large majority of jurisdic-
tions, these disabilities were replaced with civil rules that brought cohabiting
relationships within the normal rule of law; in an increasing number of jurisdic-
tions, the legal disabilities have given way to a distinctive regime of rules
governing cohabiting relationships.199 With the caution that there are a variety
of different state regimes for cohabiting couples, let me suggest the broad
contours of the regulatory regime that has slowly been emerging over the last
fifty years for cohabiting couples. The overall story is that state and federal
governments have created a variety of legal default rules that are triggered once
a romantic couple is "cohabiting." In every state, these default rules, and the
196. See Harry G. Prince, Public Policy Limitations on Cohabitation Agreements: Unruly Horse or
Circus Pony?, 70 MIN. L. REV. 163, 165 (1985) (discussing the traditional policy invalidating contracts
between cohabitants); see also Jeffrey Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 225, 263 (1981) (documenting judicial reluctance to enforce the intent of "homosexual"
testators and life-insurance contractors through the doctrine of "undue influence").
197. See Murphy, supra note 127, at 326, 332 (explaining the traditional common law rules
applicable to nonmarital children, including the rule against support by the biological father).
198. See Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 588-90 (Cal. 1988) (summarizing the law prevailing
almost everywhere in 1979, that third-party liability for harms to loved ones cannot be extended to
cover injuries to persons unrelated by blood or by marriage).
199. The idea that cohabitation would become a new legal regulatory regime originated with Grace
Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 1125
(1981); see also William Reppy, Jr., Property and Support Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants: A
Proposal for Creating a New Legal Status, 44 LA. L. REV. 1677 (1984); Ira Mark Ellman, "Contract
Thinking" Was Marvin's Fatal Flaw, 76 NoTRE DAm L. Rav. 1365 (2001) (criticizing the contract-
based framework of Marvin as unworkable and ad hoc).
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accompanying override rules, constitute a regulatory regime that gives form and
imposes limitations on cohabiting partners. For the large majority of states, the
regulatory regime is a bare-bones, minimalist regime where most of the default
rules are "let the partners do what they want and the state will neither subsidize
nor interfere," but in an increasing number of states there are default rules
entailing state regulation or support for cohabiting partners.
a. Duties of Support and Property Division. Before decriminalization of forni-
cation and sexual cohabitation, state courts generally would not recognize
cohabiting relationship-based contractual obligations, such as duties of support
and maintenance. In its landmark ruling of Marvin v. Marvin,2'" the California
Supreme Court held that courts could enforce express or implied contracts for
mutual support between cohabiting persons. Since Marvin, almost all states
have recognized contract-based claims for "palimony" relief to enforce support
and other obligations where one of the partners has relied on promises.20 The
large majority of states have followed the default rule that cohabiting partners
have not agreed to support one another, with the override rule (typical in
contract cases) that the parties can supersede that default by express or implied
agreement.2 02
Some states are willing to infer partners' agreement to support or to share
property from the fact that one partner took care of the household, allegedly "in
return" for the other partner's tacit agreement to support the household finan-
cially.2 0 3 In those states, the finding that the couple is engaged in a cohabiting
relationship more or less creates a new default rule, where the partners in a
longer term cohabiting relationship are presumed to be mutually supportive or
200. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
201. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, Legal Treatment of Cohabitation in the United States, 26 L. &
Po.'y 119, 126 (2004) (surveying post-Marvin practice in the various states).
202. E.g., Bums v. Koellmer, 527 A.2d 1210 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987); see Elizabeth S. Scott,
Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225
(2004) (surveying and endorsing the contract-based approach most states have taken since Marvin).
There are three states with leading (albeit dated) court opinions ruling against enforcement of contracts
between cohabiting partners. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979); Schwegmann v.
Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Thomas v. La Rosa, 400 S.E.2d 809 (W. Va. 1990).
203. E.g., Levar v. Elkins, 604 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1980); Carroll v. Lee, 712 P.2d 923 (Ariz. 1986);
Salzman v. Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263 (Colo. 2000); Bums v. Koellmer, 527 A.2d 1210 (Conn. App. Ct.
1987); Mason v. Rostad, 476 A.2d 662 (D.C. 1984); Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980) (implied contract for support but not property sharing); Tyranski v. Piggins, 205 N.W.2d 595
(Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (cautious application of this rule); Kinkenon v. Hue, 301 N.W.2d 77 (Neb.
1981); Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 672 (Nev. 1984); In re Estate of Roccamonte, 808 A.2d 838 (N.J. 2002);
Collins v. Davis, 315 S.E.2d 759 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984), aff'd per curiam, 321 S.E.2d 892 (N.C. 1984);
Beal v. Beal, 577 P.2d 507 (Or. 1978); Knauer v. Knauer, 470 A.2d 553 (Pa. Super. 1983); Doe v.
Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090 (R.I. 2002) (imposing property sharing but not contractual support payments);
Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. 1987). States are less likely to find "implied" agreements of
support or property division if the cohabiting relationship has been a short one. E.g., Landreth v. Malik,
221 P.3d 1265 (Nev. 2009).
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to share property.204 The movement from contract back to (quasi-)status may be
a subtle one. For example, Marvin recognized that palimony rights could arise
from an implied contract, and some states will "imply" a contract when one
partner in a longer term cohabiting relationship specializes in managing the
household or raising the couple's children, while the other partner specializes in
creating a money-earning career.2os
A number of states have provided, either by court decision or by statute, that
only an express and not an implied contract can provide rights of support or
property settlement.20 6 But courts in some of those states have ruled that
cohabiting partners can sue for unjust enrichment with much the same effect: by
providing household services or support for a partner's career or business, the
claiming partner has established an equitable basis for recovering the value of
her or his services.20 7 In Mississippi, for example, courts will not enforce an
implied contract for support of a dependent cohabiting partner-but they may
exercise their equity authority to order a fair partition of the assets of a
cohabiting couple upon break up,2 0 8 and sometimes to order compensation for
household services rendered during the partnership.2 09
Even if a judge concludes that a dependent person is presumptively entitled
to support from or an equitable division of property by her or his cohabiting
partner, that presumption is rebuttable. Thus, the palimony defendant would
usually be able to override the default through evidence that there was an
explicit (or perhaps implicit) cohabitation agreement excluding support obliga-
tions-but the key inquiry in many of the reported cases is whether there exists
a cohabiting marriage-like relationship, namely, one entailing long-term commit-
ment, intermingling of resources, and specialization of responsibilities (that is,
one partner runs the household and has primary care for any children); if this
finding is made, obligations flow to the dependent partner.21 o
204. See Grace G. Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation: Rights and Responsi-
bilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NorRE DAME L. REv. 1265, 1266 (2001). Some states have
rejected the notion that a marriage-like division of responsibilities between cohabiting partners creates a
new default. E.g., Poe v. Levy's Estate, 411 So. 2d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Champion v. Frazier,
977 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
205. See cases cited in supra note 203.
206. Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992); Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 145 n.3
(Mass. 1998); Merrill v. Davis, 673 P.2d 1285 (N.M. 1983); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y.
1980); see also MINN. STAT. §§ 513.075-.076 (West 2010) (requiring that contracts between cohabiting
partners be in writing, with two witnesses).
207. See Phillips v. Blankenship, 554 S.E.2d 231 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); In re Estate of Palmen, 588
N.W.2d 493 (Minn. 1999); Gfrerer v. Lemcke, No. A08-0873, 2009 WL 749584 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar.
24, 2009).
208. Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So. 2d 872 (Miss. 1986).
209. Wooldridge v. Wooldridge, 856 So. 2d 446 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
210. E.g., W. States Constr. Co. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220 (Nev. 1992) (finding an implied contract
from the couple's intertwined lives and applying state community-property law "by analogy"). Al-
though they recognize contractual rights implied from cohabitation, the large majority of state courts go
out of their way to say that "cohabitation" per se does not create specific property rights. E.g., Glasgo v.
Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
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Even in the large majority of states where cohabitation is not treated as a
status per se, practitioners are publicizing the rights and duties of cohabiting
couples-and are outlining standardized cohabitation agreements that address
issues such as support obligations, joint property rights, qualification for safety-
net programs, and so forth. 2 1' Following Marvin, many states providing part-
ners with support or property-division rights based upon express or implied
contracts have also recognized unjust enrichment claims.2 12
Not only has cohabitation been legalized and rights and responsibilities
created for cohabiting couples, but discrimination against children born outside
of marriage is also now legally off-limits. Hence, support obligations of cohabit-
ing partners typically apply to children born within their relationship; the
default rule for cohabiting relationships is that a child's biological father and
mother both owe the child duties of support and maintenance. 2 13 Correlatively,
the biological father can often assert parental rights as well as suffer the duties
even if he is not cohabiting with the biological mother.2 14 Lesbian and gay
families have taken this precept one step further. Even though children born and
raised within their relationships are not the biological progeny of both cohabit-
ing partners and thus the default is no parental rights, most states now afford the
nonbiological partner the override opportunity to establish parental rights, either
through second-parent adoption or de-facto or psychological parenting. 21 5 Al-
though beyond the scope of this Article, it is important to note that lesbian and
gay parents have been at the cutting edge of alternative reproductive technolo-
gies (such as artificial forms of insemination) and practices (such as surrogacy).
211. See, e.g., LAWRENCE CHEESEMAN, RIGHTS OF PARENTS AND COHABITANTS IN CONNECTICUT § 3.4
(2009) (setting forth contract provisions cohabiting couples should consider); WOMEN's LAW CTR. OF
MD., INC., THE RIGHTS OF UNMARRIED COHABITANTS IN MARYLAND 11-12 (2d ed. 2002), available at
http://www.mlcmd.org/pdf/publications/UnmarriedCohabitants.pdf (setting forth issues that cohabiting
couples might easily settle by contract).
212. E.g., Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 672, 674 (Nev. 1984); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902, 909
(N.J. 1979); Collins v. Davis, 321 S.E.2d 759, 761 (N.C. Ct. App.), aff'd per curiam, 321 S.E.2d 892
(N.C. 1984); Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090, 1095 (R.I. 2002); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 532
(Wis. 1987).
213. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-606 (2011) (biological father and mother are jointly respon-
sible for the welfare of a child, without respect to marital status).
214. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (striking down a law that denied a putative
father the right to seek parental rights to his biological child, even though the father had not been a
caregiver for the child); Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Right of Putative Father to Visitation with
Child Born out of Wedlock, 58 A.L.R.5th 669 (1998) (West, Westlaw updated with current cases
weekly) (collecting cases concerning visitation rights of putative fathers for children born out of
wedlock). But see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (upholding the constitutionality of state laws
requiring putative fathers to "grasp the opportunity" to have a relationship with the child before he can
claim parental rights).
215. See ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 1143-44 app. 8 (providing state-by-state survey of
allowances for second-parent adoption or de facto parental rights for lesbian and gay partners; adoption
provides full parental rights for the second parent, but de facto parenting usually provides only some
parental rights); Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Adoption of Child by Same-Sex Partners, 61 A.L.R.6th 1
(2011) (providing survey of case law recognizing or refusing to recognize adoptions by lesbian and gay
persons and couples).
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Some states have created a new default rule for property division when
cohabiting couples split up. Washington, for the best example, will apply its
community-property rules to govern partition of assets upon separation if the
cohabiting couple is found to have a committed marriage-like relationship.2 16
Other states will apply common law doctrines of constructive trusts to recognize
property rights that can be enforced by one partner against another upon the
dissolution of the cohabiting relationship.2 17 In its Principles for family dissolu-
tion, the ALI proposes that states apply the same property-division and support
rules to cohabiting couples that they apply to married couples.2 18 No state has
explicitly adopted the ALI's Principles, however, and the fate of this particular
proposal remains uncertain.
b. Special Rules and Structures for Domestic Disputes. The default rule
provided by American tort law is that all persons are entitled to be free from
assault, including sexual assault, from other persons. As noted above, that
default rule is typically applicable to married couples, now that the marital-rape
exemption has been revoked or substantially repealed at the state level. Indeed,
the old default (nonintervention in domestic disputes) has been substantially
reversed, for government now treats domestic violence as a particularly pressing
problem and recognizes that abuse by a family member or intimate partner
tends to be more destructive than abuse by strangers.
Thus, every American state and the District of Columbia have created special
protections for victims of domestic violence-and thirty-seven states and the
District of Columbia have, in explicit statutory language, extended those protec-
tions to cohabiting couples as well as married couples.2 19 An increasing number
216. See, e.g., Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 837 (Wash. 1995); Foster v. Thilges, 812 P.2d
523, 524-26 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991); Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 672 (Nev. 1984). This is decidedly the
minority rule. A large majority of state courts have explicitly declined to apply marital-property-
settlement laws to cohabiting couples. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.3d 106, 120 (Cal. 1976).
217. See generally George L. Blum, Annotation, Property Rights Arising from Relationship of
Couple Cohabiting Without Marriage, 69 A.L.R.5th 219 (1999) (West, Westlaw updated with current
cases weekly) (survey of state court deployment of constrictive trust and other common law doctrines
to protect the interests of cohabiting partners upon breakup).
218. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES FOR FAMILY DISSOLUTON: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDAIONS ch. 6
(2002); see ROBIN FRETWELL WILsON, RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY- CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW
INsTrUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUMON (2006) (collecting essays criticizing the ALI's
Principles; most of the esssays suggest, and some insist, that the Principles will have little influence
upon state legislative reform of family law); Blumberg, supra note 204, at 1295-99 (explaining the
ALI's approach and contrasting it to the approach taken in most states). Note that the Chief Reporter for
the ALI's Principles is Professor Ellman, and the Reporter for Chapter 6 is Professor Blumberg; they
are the law professors who have been most influential in support of the idea that cohabitation should be
regularized as a status and regulated like marriage, rather than left entirely to ad hoc contract-based
rules. See sources in note 199, supra.
219. See Ruth Colker, Marriage Mimicry: The Law of Domestic Violence, 47 Wm. & MARY L. REV.
1841, 1888-98 app.B (2006) (documenting the statutory coverage of domestic-abuse laws as of 2006 in
a state-by-state survey). See generally EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE (3d ed. 2003) (providing a historical analysis of the evolving state response
to domestic violence by intimate partners as well as spouses).
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of jurisdictions extend those protections to cohabiting same-sex as well as
different-sex couples.220 Under this statutory regime, domestic-violence com-
plaints are given priority by law-enforcement officials, and there are special
procedures for expeditious adjudication of violence-based claims, with injunc-
tive relief tailored to the particular circumstances. Additionally, the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 (as amended in 2006) makes it a federal crime to
cross state lines to commit violence against a "spouse, intimate partner, or
dating partner." 221
c. Regulatory Rights and Benefits for Cohabiting Couples. In the early de-
cades of the new Marvin era, states recognizing reciprocal rights and duties of
cohabiting couples usually declined to recognize rights of partners vis-t-vis
third parties.22 2 In a leading case, Elden v. Sheldon,223 the California Supreme
Court ruled that a gay person did not have a cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress from witnessing the death of his cohabiting
partner. The court reasoned that it would be unfair to impose regulatory burdens
upon third parties unless the couple were married.22 4
Although Elden still represents the majority rule, the trend in the case law is
toward recognition of common law claims for relief by cohabiting partners
against third parties.2 25 As another leading case has recognized, the tort of
220. See Shannon Little, Note, Challenging Changing Legal Definitions of Family in Same-Sex
Domestic Violence, 19 HASTINGS WomEN's L.J. 259, 264-69 (2008); see, e.g., Peterman v. Meeker, 855
So. 2d 690, 691 (Fla. App. 2003); Ireland v. Davis, 957 S.W.2d 310, 312 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997); State v.
Yaden, 692 N.E.2d 1097, 1101 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). See generally Colker, supra note 219, at 1888-98
app.B (providing state-by-state survey as of 2006); Robin Miller, Annotation, Validity of Legal Claim
Predicated on Nonmarital Same-Sex Relationship, 8 A.L.R.6th 339 (2005) (West, Westlaw updated
with current cases weekly) (collecting cases).
221. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, codified in part as 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (2006) (making
it a crime to travel interstate to commit domestic violence against an "intimate partner"); id. § 2261A
(making "interstate stalking" of an "intimate partner" a federal crime); id. § 2262 (making interstate
travel to violate a "protection order" for an intimate partner a federal crime).
222. Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078, 1079 (D.N.J. 1980) (discussing cases from other
states that both held marriage is a prerequisite to recovery and then only permitted recovery for
cohabitating couples upon a finding of common law marriage); John G. Culhane, A "Clanging
Silence": Same-Sex Couples and Tort Law, 89 Ky. L.J. 911, 947 (2001) ("While legal spouses have
recovered for injuries to the other spouse, those in 'spouse-like' relations have usually not been
successful.").
223. 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988).
224. See id.; see also Butcher v. Superior Court of Orange Cnty., 139 Cal. App. 3d 58 (Cal. 1983)
(similar result for heterosexual cohabiting partner).
225. See Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 380 (N.J. 1994) (allowing cohabitants in an "intimate
familial relationship" to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the event of a
cohabitant's death or grievous bodily injury); see also Yovino v. Big Bubba's BBQ, L.L.C., 896 A.2d
161, 165, 167 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006) (holding that engaged couples may be considered "closely
related" for recovery from a bystander emotional-distress claim); Graves v. Estabrook, 818 A.2d 1255,
1262 (N.H. 2003) (allowing recovery to an engaged cohabitant); Binns v. Fredendall, 513 N.E.2d 278
(Ohio 1987) (Holmes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (accepting "the new law ...
which allows recovery by a person unrelated by blood or law, but who is a loved one of the deceased"
in a case involving cohabitants). For examples of similar recovery for other third-party relationships,
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negligent infliction of emotional distress compensates partners with "deep,
intimate, familial ties" for the loss of, essentially, the utilitarian joys and
benefits imposed by harm to the victim. 2 2 6 The California Supreme Court had
recognized the utilitarian loss in Elden but feared that recognizing liability to
cohabiting partners would be hard to police and would yield expansive liability;
subsequent judges have not been so reluctant and have recognized the primacy
of the utilitarian harm suffered by cohabiting as well as married partners.22 7
The primary situs for intimate-partner claims are not in the law of tort,
however. State entitlement programs often include benefits for a person's
family, and it is a natural impulse for committed partners to wonder why they
should not be included. Although there are thus far few cases litigating such
benefits for LGBT families, the trend in gay-friendly jurisdictions is to include
such families in state regulatory programs.2 2 8 in a pioneering decision, a
California court ruled that the state workers' compensation law entitles a
dependent person to benefits for injury to her or his same-sex partner.2 2 9 This
decision makes great regulatory sense: because the purpose of workers' compen-
sation laws is to protect family members who depend on the wages of the
injured worker, such laws should be interpreted, where textually possible, to
reflect the pluralism of our current array of family forms. In New York City, for
another example, the court of appeals ruled that municipal regulations granting
"family" members the right to step into the shoes of a decedent's rent-controlled
lease agreement apply to cohabiting partners as well as spouses. 2 3 0 This 1989
ruling was an early example of judicial translation of the plurality of actual
family relationships into a modem family law.
In short, cohabitating couples are already subject to an array of legal rights,
duties, and regulations that would not apply to romantic couples who are just
dating and that would not have applied to cohabiting couples a generation ago.
In an increasing number of states, cohabitation has become a reasonably
coherent legal regime that is not just a private alternative to marriage but is also
see Keck v. Jackson, 593 P.2d 668 (Ariz. 1979); Hislop v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement &
Power Dist., 5 P.3d 267 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000); Richmond v. Shatford, No. CA 941249, 1995 WL
1146885, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 8, 1995); James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d 109 (Neb. 1985); Thurmon
v. Sellers, 62 S.W.3d 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); and Heldreth v. Marrs, 425 S.E.2d 157 (W. Va. 1992).
226. Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 374.
227. See, e.g., id. at 377-80 (rejecting the Elden concerns and following the Elden dissenting
opinion).
228. A useful survey is Miller, supra note 220.
229. See Donovan v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 187 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Cal. App. 1982). This is an
area where there will surely be more cases in the future. See POLIKOFF, supra note 14, at 196-202
(arguing that workers' compensation regimes ought to recognize losses to partners and children in
nontraditional relationships entailing commitment and dependency); Miller, supra note 220, at § 10.1.
230. See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989) (interpreting the municipal law
and its regulations to include same-sex as well as different-sex cohabitating partners as "family"
entitled to assume the decedent's rights to rent-controlled housing); Nancy D. Polikoff, Equality and
Justice for Lesbian and Gay Families and Relationships, 61 RUTGERs L. REV. 529 (2009) (situating
Braschi within the larger reconfiguration of a more pluralistic family law).
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a regulatory alternative to civil marriage. Importantly, LGBT persons in a
coupled relationship increasingly have access to this legal regime.
In addition to this cohabitation regime, straight couples also have the option
to marry in every state of the union; hence, they have access to a menu of
options rather than the old take-it-or-leave-it option of getting married. Interest-
ingly, straight couples also have at least one other legal option in most states-an
option that is a byproduct of the same-sex-marriage debate, namely, domestic-
partnership rights. Likewise, lesbian and gay couples also have access to a
menu of regulatory regimes in an increasing number of states, a direct result of
the LGBT rights movement.
2. Domestic Partnership/Reciprocal Beneficiaries/Civil Unions
Just as cohabiting straight couples came out of the closet in a big way during
the 1960s and 1970s, so lesbian and gay couples came out of their closets in a
big way during the 1980s and 1990s. 2 3 1 Both social events have changed the
way Americans think about families, and both have yielded legal innovations
that have added to the menu of relationship regimes. The traditional exclusion
of same-sex couples from civil marriage has yielded a generation of intense
legal-reform efforts by gay rights organizations to secure relationship rights for
lesbian and gay couples. That law-reform movement has generated a debate that
has transformed American family law and its discourse.
To begin with, the gay-marriage movement has revived and transformed the
"traditional family values" (TFV) social movement of the 1970s. 32 Originally
committed to ensuring some state discrimination against gay people, the TFV
movement found itself on the defensive in the early 1990s, when Americans
were embracing a tolerant stance toward this sexual minority. In the mid-1990s,
however, the Hawaii Supreme Court's suggestion that marriage laws unconstitu-
tionally discriminate against same-sex couples 233 enabled the TFV movement to
shift its public stance away from discriminating against gay people toward
"defending" marriage from access by couples deemed too distant from the core
234purposes of marriage.
Even more interesting, the TFV movement shifted its anti-gay-marriage
rhetoric away from the natural law baseline that inspired its religious leaders
and toward the utilitarian baseline that has become the dominant discourse in
231. E.g., LAURA BENKOv, REINVENTING THE FAMILY. THE EMERGING STORY OF LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTS
16-33 (1994).
232. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 33, at 201-18 (tracing the galvanizing effect of gay rights on the
emerging "traditional family values" social movement of the 1970s).
233. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw.), clarified by 852 P.2d 74 (Haw. 1993) (holding that the
state bar to same-sex marriage is sex discrimination subject to strict scrutiny under the state constitu-
tion).
234. For the TFV backlash to marriage equality in general and to Baehr in particular, see ESKRIDGE,
supra note 33, at 9-12, 26-42.
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family law. 2 3 5 Starting in the mid-1990s, the case for denying marriage equality
to LGBT persons moved away from their supposed "perversion," and even
away from traditional fears about "predatory" homosexuality, the old natural
law discourse. Increasingly, their rhetoric shifted toward the openly utilitarian
argument that gay marriage is a bad idea because it would undermine "tradi-
tional marriage" that brings such great happiness and good health to most
straight men, many women, and their children.2 36
Thus, even though TFV supporters swept the field politically between 1993
and 2009, they did so, in part, by abandoning their core moral philosophy and
acquiescing in their opponents' utilitarian emphasis. Supporters of marriage
equality emphasized the happiness that marriage can bring to committed lesbian
and gay couples; opponents emphasized that equality for "homosexuals" came
at a cost of less happiness for heterosexuals and the proverbial "wavering
adolescent" trying to make up her mind about which sexuality to "choose."
Because of public support for the TFV position, gay rights supporters had in
the 1980s abstained from demands for access to marriage and had focused,
instead, on easier-to-secure municipal and corporate partnership policies. Once
the gay-marriage movement took off in earnest in the 1990s, moreover, tradition-
alist opponents were still successful in holding off access to marriage. This
strategy had the unintended consequence of driving legislators in the emerging
gay-tolerant states to create new institutions for recognizing committed relation-
ships. These new family law institutions have, perhaps provisionally, enriched
the menu of regulatory regimes the state offers straight as well as lesbian and
gay couples.
a. Domestic Partnership: Employment Benefits. In the early 1980s, gay mar-
riage was not politically viable, but gay rights leaders devised another strategy
to secure legal recognition of their relationships, namely, domestic-partnership
ordinances adopted at the municipal level, where lesbian and gay political
power was greatest.2 37 Because municipalities cannot create most of the legal
rights and duties of state family law, the benefits of domestic partnership
ordinances have typically been limited to health insurance and other employ-
ment benefits for partners of municipal employees and visitation rights for
235. On the modernization of antigay discourse in general and the TFV response to marriage
equality in particular, see ESKRIDGE & SPEDALE, supra note 13, at 20-31, 37-41.
236. E.g., David Blankenhom, Opinion, Protecting Marriage To Protect Children, L.A. TIMES (Sept.
19, 2008), http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-blankenhornl9-2008sepl9,0,
6057126.story; Wardle, supra note 11, at 289-90, 299-301 (emphasizing utilitarian arguments for
preserving the traditional "boundaries" of marriage); Lynn D. Wardle, What Is Marriage, 6 WHrTER
J. CHuLD & FAM. ADVOC. 53 (2006) (emphasizing functional, that is, utilitarian, arguments supporting the
traditional definition of marriage of one man, one woman). See also sources in note 273, infra.
237. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 23 (noting that San Francisco and Berkeley, California, were




persons whose partners are hospitalized.23 8 Dozens of cities and counties all
over the country now maintain domestic-partnership registries.
Embracing the same idea, corporations created their own domestic-partner-
ship policies, allowing lesbian and gay employees to designate partners who
could receive employee benefits previously reserved for spouses.24 For most
couples, the biggest benefit of such policies is that the employee's domestic
partner can be added as a health-insurance beneficiary on roughly the same
terms as a married partner. Other employee benefits available to such partners
include free or discounted travel and other employer services, use of employer
facilities, attendance at employer-sponsored functions, and time off to care for
one's domestic partner.2 4 1 Although large corporations have flocked to the
banner of domestic partnership on the ground that it makes business sense, it is
noteworthy that TFV supporters have pushed back with arguments framed by
the utilitarian understanding explored in this Article; specifically, they maintain
that domestic partnership, especially for gay employees, is bad for corporate
culture because it discourages marital relationships that are the best foundation
for personal happiness and employee productivity.242
Increasingly, both municipalities and corporations have opened up their
domestic-partnership policies to different-sex as well as same-sex cohabiting
partners.24 3 As a result, the menu for straight couples in many jurisdictions
includes domestic partnership, as well as cohabitation and marriage, as options
on the menu of regime choices most romantic couples enjoy.
b. Reciprocal Beneficiaries: Unitive Rules. Lesbian and gay couples were not
content to fight for domestic-partnership policies and increasingly (after 1989)
demanded the right to marry as well. In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled
238. See Raymond O'Brien, Domestic Partnership: Recognition and Responsibility, 32 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 163 (1995); Craig Bowman & Blake Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and Social
Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1164 (1992); Robert L. Eblin, Note,
Domestic Partnership Recognition in the Workplace: Equitable Employee Benefits for Gay Couples
(and Others), 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 1067, 1072-77 (1990).
239. For a listing of most of these registries, see City and County Domestic Partner Registries, Hum.
RTs. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/city-and-county-domestic-partner-registries (last vis-
ited Mar. 23, 2012).
240. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 204, at 1282-92 (providing first-person account of the politics
and drafting of the University of California's provision of health-insurance benefits to lesbian and gay
employees through domestic partnership in 1997).
241. EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INsT., Domestic Partner Benefits: Facts and Background, FACTS FROM
EBRI, http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0209fact.pdf (last updated Feb. 2009) (finding fifty-
four percent of surveyed corporations offered domestic-partnership policies to unmarried but partnered
employees and describing the benefits offered by such policies).
242. CORPORATE RESEARCH COUNCIL, Do DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS MAKE GOOD BUSINESs SENSE?
(2002), available at http://www.corporateresourcecouncil.org/white-papers/DPGoodBusinessSense.
pdf (arguing that domestic-partner benefits do not make good business sense and invoking the TFV
literature grounded upon utilitarian arguments).
243. Thus, almost all of the municipal partnership registries reported in City and County Domestic
Partner Registries, supra note 239, are open to different-sex as well as same-sex partners.
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that the exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage constituted a sex-
discriminatory policy subject to strict scrutiny under the state constitution. 2 " A
national firestorm of protest followed the court's decision, and the Hawaii
Legislature placed before the voters a constitutional amendment allowing mar-
riage to be restricted to different-sex couples; the voters adopted the amend-
ment, foreclosing marriage equality in that state.245 But as part of the deal
placing same-sex marriage on the ballot, the legislature also created a new
institution, reciprocal beneficiaries, that was available for same-sex and some
different-sex couples.2 46
The Hawaii statute created a new institution for couples who were barred
from getting married under Hawaii law.24 7 Becoming a reciprocal beneficiary is
as easy as filling out a form.24 8 Once a couple has properly registered, they are
legal beneficiaries until death or until one party files another document terminat-
ing the legal relationship; hence, "divorce" is much easier in this relationship
than it is in marriage.249 The 1997 law recognized about five dozen legal rights and
duties associated with marriage that reciprocal beneficiaries could access. Among
the rights and duties available to reciprocal beneficiaries are the following:
* partner health insurance, pension, and other benefits employers are required
to provide for spouses;250
* workers' compensation benefits;25 1
* inheritance rights; 252
* the right to own property jointly as "tenants in the entirety";253
* the right to sue third parties for the wrongful death of one's partner;254
* and rights to visit one's partner in the hospital and to make healthcare
decisions for him or her if incapacitated.25 5
The Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act of 1997 provides the hospital and health
insurance benefits that ordinary domestic-partnership ordinances provided, plus
an array of unitive benefits and rights similar to those accorded spouses. Unlike
244. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993).
245. See EsKRIDGE, supra note 23, at 22-42 (providing a detailed account of the political backlash
after the court's decision in Baehr).
246. See A Bill for an Act Relating to Unmarried Couples, 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 383 (codified in
Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 572C-1 to -7 (2011)).
247. See id. § 1 (codified at Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572C-4 (2011)).
248. See id. § I (codified at Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572C-5 (2011)) (registration).
249. See id. § 7 (codified at Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572C-7 (2011)) (dissolution).
250. Id. §§ 9, 22-33.
251. Id. § 29.
252. Id. §§ 12-19.
253. Id. § 10.
254. Id. § 20.
255. Id. § 3.
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cohabitation regimes, the Hawaii reciprocal-beneficiary regime does not impose
rights of support and property division such as those imposed by the cohabita-
tion regimes of some states. In 2000, the Vermont Civil Unions Law included a
provision creating a new institution of reciprocal beneficiaries, open to all
persons who wanted to create a caregiving relationship.2 5 6
In 2009, the Colorado Legislature created a new institution for "designated
beneficiaries."25 7 The statute provides a form contract that can be the basis of a
same-sex or different-sex couple's agreement to serve as one another's desig-
nated beneficiaries. Epitomizing the new family law pluralism described in this
Article, each person can choose whether to opt into or opt out of a legal default
simply by checking a line on the form.25 8 Among the defaults that either or both
partners can opt into are property ownership as joint tenants; status as the
presumptive beneficiary of a trust, will, retirement policy, or insurance policy;
priority to become the guardian, personal representative, or executor for the
other partner; status as a surrogate healthcare decision maker in the event of the
partner's incapacitation; and rights to workers' compensation benefits and to
suit for wrongful death.2 59
Similar laws have been adopted, under the rubric of "domestic partnerships,"
in Maine, Maryland, and Wisconsin. 2 6 0 Like the Hawaii reciprocal-beneficiary
law and the Colorado designated-beneficiary law, these particular domestic-
partnership laws provide what might be deemed unitive defaults, namely,
default rules that reflect the realistic assumption that each partner wants the
other to be her or his beneficiary, surrogate decision maker, or heir, should
something befall the partner.
c. Civil Unions: Rights and Duties of Marriage, Without the Name. Although
same-sex marriage did not fly in Hawaii, six (and potentially eight) states and
the District of Columbia extended marriage rights to lesbian and gay couples
between 2003 and 2012.261 Ten states (including Hawaii) and the District of
256. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1303 (2011).
257. Colorado Designated Beneficiary Agreement Act, 2009 Colo. Legis. Serv. ch. 107 (codified at
COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 15-22-101 to -112 (2011)).
258. See CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-22-104, 15-22-106 (2011) (specifying the form that must be
"substantially" followed to designate a beneficiary).
259. See id. § 15-22-106 (list of defaults that each partner can opt into or out of).
260. An Act To Promote the Financial Security of Maine's Families and Children, 2004 Me. Legis.
Serv., ch. 672 (2004) (codified in various parts of Me. Laws) (new institution of "registered domestic
partners"); 2009 Md. Laws ch. 602; 2008 Md. Laws chs. 590, 599 (new institution of "domestic
partnership"); Wis. STAT. § 770 (2011) (new institution of "domestic partnership").
261. The states are Massachusetts (2003-04), Vermont (2009), Connecticut (2008), New Hampshire
(2009), Iowa (2009), and New York (2011). Washington (2012) and Maryland (2012) have adopted
statutes recognizing same-sex marriages, but they will not take effect until after voter referenda taking
place in November 2012. California has provided marriage equality by court decisions, fleetingly in
2008 (after The Marriage Cases) and provisionally in 2012 (Perry v. Brown, 671 F3d 1052, 1064-95
(9th Cir. 2012)). Maine (2009) recognized marriage equality, but a voter initiative revoked that
recognition before the statute could take effect. See sources cited supra note 102 and accompanying
text.
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Columbia have created new institutions of civil unions and statewide domestic
partnerships that provide lesbian and gay couples all of the legal rights and
duties of marriage, without the hallowed name.2 62
In fifteen state-level jurisdictions, including California and New York, lesbian
and gay couples have access to more or less the same menu of regimes that
straight couples have access to, namely (1) local and private domestic-
partnership employee benefits, (2) cohabitation, and (3) either marriage or civil
unions.26 3 Nevada presents an interesting variation: in addition to local and
private domestic partnership, both straight and gay couples have access to
cohabitation and civil-union regimes (which Nevada calls "domestic partner-
ships"), but straight couples also have a fourth choice of civil marriage. In the
District of Columbia, same-sex and different-sex couples have access to em-
ployer-provided domestic partnership, to a cohabitation regime, to a civil-union-
like governmental domestic-partnership status, and to civil marriage. Hawaii
presents another variation: in addition to state, municipal, and private domestic-
partnership benefits, both straight couples and gay couples have a choice of
either cohabitation or marriage/civil-union regimes, but romantic gay couples
(and some nonromantic straight couples) also have a choice of the reciprocal-
beneficiary regime.
Contrast the menu in these jurisdictions with the one in Colorado. Lesbian
and gay couples in Colorado have access to (1) local and private domestic-
partnership employee benefits, (2) cohabitation, and (3) designated beneficia-
ries. Straight couples in that state have all of these options, including the new
designated-beneficiary regime, as well as civil marriage. A similar contrast
262. The original civil-unions law was adopted by Vermont in 2000. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 23, at
ch. 2. When that state's legislature recognized same-sex marriages, the civil-unions experiment was
terminated. Since 2000, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, and Rhode Island have recognized
civil unions for same-sex couples. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 201-17 (West, Westlaw through 78 Laws
2012); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 572B-1 to -ll (West, Westlaw through Act 235 of the Reg. 2011 Legis.
Sess.); 750 ILL. Comp. STAT. 75/1-190 (2010); N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 37:1-28-36 (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. §§ 15-3.1-11 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-07 (West 2012). California, the District
of Columbia, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington have created a new statewide institution of domestic
partnership for same-sex couples along the same lines as the Vermont civil-unions statute. D.C. CODE
§§ 32-701 to -710 (2010); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 122A.200-10; OR. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 106.300-40
(West 2012); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 26.60.010-901. The Nevada and the District of Columbia
domestic-partnership laws include different-sex as well as same-sex partners. See OFFICE OF THE
ArORNEY GEN., Gov'T OF D.C., DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP, PARENTAGE, AND CHILD SuPPORT 1, available at
http://csed.dc.gov/csed/frames.asp?doc=/csed/lib/csed/pdflbrochures/domesticpartnership.pdf ("A do-
mestic partnership refers to an opposite sex or same-sex couple who registers as domestic partners.");
Domestic Partnership-FAQ, NEV. SEC'Y ST., http://nvsos.gov/index.aspx?page=274#283 (last visited
Apr. 27, 2012) ("As a civil contract, Nevada domestic partnerships may be entered into by couples of
any sexual orientation as long as they meet the eligibility requirements defined above.").
263. It is not clear whether municipal and corporate domestic-partnership health-insurance policies
will be phased out once a jurisdiction recognizes same-sex marriages or civil unions. I suspect that
domestic-partnership programs that provide employer health insurance and other fringe benefits for the




characterizes the different array of regimes for citizens of Maine and Wiscon-
sin.26 Maryland and Washington have just recognized same-sex marriages,
subject to voter referenda in November 2012. Hence, there are at least six (and
potentially eight) states and the District of Columbia where lesbian and gay
couples have all the regime options that straight couples have.
3. Covenant Marriage
Defenders of traditional-marriage limitations have expended most of their
political energy opposing gay marriage, perhaps partly as a matter of penance
for not speaking out more strongly against cohabitation regimes and no-fault
divorce, two legal changes that have revolutionized and undermined "tradi-
tional" marriage. Traditionalists have not been without an affirmative agenda,
however. In Arizona, Arkansas, and Louisiana, traditionalists have persuaded
state legislatures to create a new institutional option for particularly committed
265straight couples-covenant marriage.
Couples opting for covenant marriage are bound by special rules making
divorce more difficult. 2 6 6 Articulated in natural law terms, as a return to
God-sanctioned marriage for life, the covenant-marriage movement cashes out
its normative vision in a substantially utilitarian fashion through a moderate
adjustment in the override rule for divorce. For example, couples opting for
covenant marriage in Arkansas can still secure a divorce by going through a
counseling process and then asking a court for a decree ending the marriage on
one of the statutory grounds, which include adultery, family abuse, and spousal
separation without reconciliation for two years.26 7 The statutory grounds do not
include irreconcilable differences.
Rhetorically, the covenant-marriage movement is a challenge to the utilitarian
understanding of marriage and family law; however, its legal expression not
only operates snugly within the default-override rule framework of the utilitar-
ian understanding but also reveals the social power of that understanding. That
is, even fundamentalist leaders do not believe that religious Americans will
agree to traditional marriages for which there is no easy exit; instead, they want
an override rule that gives them freedom to escape unhappy marriages but
retains a process for working out remediable differences. Thus, the override rule
264. See discussion supra section II.C.2.c.
265. See STEVEN L. NOCK, LAURA ANN SANCHEZ & JAMEs D. WRIGHT, COVENANT MARRIAGE: THE
MOVEMENT To RECLAIM TRADITION IN AMERICA 1-4 (2008); Joel A. Nichols, Comment, Louisiana's
Covenant Marriage Law: A First Step Toward a More Robust Pluralism in Marriage and Divorce
Law?, 47 EMORY L.J. 929, 946-47, 971 (1998).
266. See Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, Covenant and Contract, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 9,
10-11 (1999) (providing a detailed account of the ways that covenant marriages are harder to exit than
ordinary marriages in no-fault divorce jurisdictions).
267. Arkansas Covenant Marriage Act of 2001, 2001 Ark. Laws Act 1486 (codified at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-11-801-08 (2011); see also ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-901 (2011); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 9:272-75, 9:307-09 (2011).
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for divorce in covenant marriages is tougher than the override rule for no-fault
divorce in regular marriages, but it is no return to the fault-based regime of
1911. Surprisingly, even this watered-down version of the natural law understand-
ing of marriage has not caught on in jurisdictions that are havens for traditional
family values: tiny percentages (one to two percent) of marriages in Louisiana,
and probably Arkansas and Arizona too, are covenant marriages, and the idea
has been soundly rejected in other southern states that heartily endorse "tradi-
tional" marriage as a reason to exclude lesbian and gay couples from the
institution.2 68 On the other hand, couples who are involved in covenant mar-
riages have fifty-five percent the divorce rate as other married couples, possibly
the result of selection effects but still an impressive difference.26 9
In Arkansas, Arizona, and Louisiana, therefore, romantic different-sex couples
have access to three regulatory-regime options from which to choose: cohabita-
tion, marriage, and covenant marriage. What is available for lesbian and gay
couples? Very little. In Arizona, lesbian and gay couples, like straight couples,
can register as domestic partners in Phoenix and Tucson, but registration carries
with it only hospital-visitation rights, as state and municipal employers in that
state do not provide benefits to domestic partners.2 70 In Arkansas, lesbian and
gay couples (like straight couples) can only register in tiny Eureka Springs, with
a population of only a few thousand persons.27 1 In Louisiana, lesbian and gay
couples, like straight couples, can register as domestic partners in New Orleans
if one partner is a municipal employee.27 2
Arkansas, Arizona, and Louisiana are today highly exceptional jurisdictions.
In most of America, long-excluded lesbian and gay couples enjoy state recogni-
tion-and state regulation---of their partnerships, unions, and, increasingly,
marriages. Access to civil marriage is now broader than ever before in American
history-but so are access to and ease of divorce, as well as access to other civil
regimes for regulating nonmarital families of choice. Ironically, the utilitarian
guideline for our country's family law pluralism has generated a menu of
regimes that has not only shattered the monopoly civil marriage long enjoyed
but has also created a legal structure that threatens to undermine marriage itself.
268. See NOCK ET AL., supra note 265, at 43 (most people in the covenant-marriage jurisdictions do
not even know about the option); Katherine Shaw Spaht, Covenant Marriage Seven Years Later: Its as
Yet Unfulfilled Promise, 65 LA. L. REv. 605 (2005) (providing a pessimistic assessment of the Louisiana
law).
269. See NoCK ET AL., supra note 265, at 117.
270. See Judy Hedding, Domestic Partner Registry: Arizona Cities Establish Domestic Partner
Registry, AOUT.COM, http://phoenix.about.com/od/gay/qt/domesticpartner.htm (last visited Mar. 23,
2012).
271. See Ed Vitagliano, Eureka! Exclaim Gay Activists, AM. FAM. Ass'N J. (Oct. 2007), http://www.
afajoumal.org/1007eureka.asp.
272. See City and County Domestic Partner Registries, supra note 239 (describing the New Orleans
partnership registry).
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Consider Table 1 below, which reflects the menu of regimes offered in each
state and the District of Columbia as of June 2012. The trend is not only that
more regimes are being offered over time but also that more regimes are being
offered to same-sex as well as different-sex couples. My prediction is that the
regimes will continue to proliferate and that many more will be offered on equal
terms to lesbian and gay couples in the next decade.
Table 1. State-by-State Family Law Menus, January 2012
(Repealed Status in Parentheses)
Covenant
Domestic Civil Marriage Marriage
Partner Cohabitation Unions (Different (Different
Employee Reciprocal (Different (Same Sex Sex Sex
Jurisdiction Benefits Beneficiaries Sex Only*) Only*) Only*) Only*)
Alabama X* X*
Alaska X X* X*
Arizona X* X* X*
Arkansas X* X* X*
California X X X* X* (X)
Colorado X X X X*
Connecticut X X (X*) X
Delaware X X X* X*
District of
Columbia X X X X
Florida X X X*
Georgia X X X*
Hawaii X X X X X*
Idaho X* X*
Illinois X X X X*
Indiana X X* X*
Iowa X X X*
Kansas X X* X*
Kentucky X X* X*
Louisiana X X* X* X*
Massachusetts X X X
Maine X X X X* (X)
Maryland X X X X
Michigan X X X*
Minnesota X X X*
Mississippi X X* X*
Missouri X X X*
2012] 1943
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
Table 1. State-by-State Family Law Menus, January 2012
(Repealed Status in Parentheses) (Continued)
Covenant
Domestic Civil Marriage Marriage
Partner Cohabitation Unions (Different (Different
Employee Reciprocal (Different (Same Sex Sex Sex
Jurisdiction Benefits Beneficiaries Sex Only*) Only*) Only*) Only*)
Montana X X* X*
Nebraska X* X*
Nevada X X X X*
New Hampshire X X (X*) X
New Jersey X X X* X*
New Mexico X X X*
New Mexico X X X*
New York X X X
North Carolina X X* X*
North Dakota X* X*
Ohio X X* X*
Oklahoma X* X*
Oregon X X X* X*
Pennsylvania X X* X*
Rhode Island X X X* X*
South Carolina X* X*
South Dakota X* X*
Tennessee X X* X*
Texas X X X*
Utah X X* X*
Vermont X X X (X*) X
Virginia X X X*
Washington X X X* X
West Virginia X* X*
Wisconsin X X X X*
Wyoming X* X*
Source: ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 1139-41, app. 6-7 (3d ed. 2011).
III. MENUS, DEFAULT RULES, AND OVERRIDE RULES: LESSONS FOR MARRIAGE
EQUALIrY AND THE FUTURE OF OUR PLURALIST FAMIY LAW
The public discourse regarding American family law is now-and has long
been-predominantly utilitarian in its normative goals and justifications. Even
proponents of traditional family values defend their proposals in public forums
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primarily in terms of facilitating the best legal structure for nurturing couples
who are happy and fulfilled and for rearing children in a healthy productive
environment.2 73 While there is now a rough consensus in our country that
family law ought to create structures that positively contribute to individual
happiness and flourishing, there is not a consensus as to precisely what mix of
legal rules and institutions optimize happiness and flourishing. An important
issue is whether marriage provides unique advantages that cannot be replicated
by other institutional forms, from a utilitarian perspective.
One reason for our lack of policy consensus is that we do not agree about
what makes us happy. Utilitarian variables are protean and plastic: one can
identify a wide array of utilitarian values and construct a wide array of surveys
to measure success. One might ask people if they are happy and what would
make them happier. Or what makes them fulfilled. One can focus on material or
economic success. One can focus on health. All of these are plausible ways to
think about our happiness-and all are subject to debate about how they should
be counted and measured. Another reason for policy disagreement is that it is
hard to ascertain a causal link between institutional structure and happiness
(however defined). Even if married people are "happier" than nonmarried
people, that tells us nothing about whether marriage causes the greater happi-
ness; it might be the case that happier people tend to get married, not that
marriage transforms unhappy people into happier ones. Finally, policy dissensus
is driven by varying normative precommitments: differently motivated observ-
ers will emphasize some utilitarian values more than others and will interpret
the same causal data in strikingly different ways. For example, many Americans
are influenced by the natural law understanding of family law; in policy
discussions, these folks believe that their moral stances are also supported by
utilitarian criteria: the marriage that God requires of us is also good for our health.
There is, indeed, a lot of empirical evidence that married persons in the
United States are richer, healthier, happier, and more generative than persons
who do not marry, including those who cohabit with their romantic partners.2 74
Natural law believers, often writing as utilitarian social theorists, tend to
over-interpret this evidence, which, properly read, is more equivocal about the
utility of marriage. The happiness bounce that marriage confers probably owes
much to selection effects; that is, richer, better-adjusted people might be more
likely to marry than to remain single or to cohabit. 2 7 5 The evidence also
273. See, e.g., DAVID BLANKENHORN, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 199 (2007); STEVEN L. NoCK,
MARRIAGE IN MEN'S LIVEs (1998); LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY
MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY 1-12 (2001).
274. E.g., WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 273; Steven L. Nock, A Comparison of Marriages and
Cohabiting Relationships, 16 J. FAM. ISSUES 53-76 (1995); see also Janice K. Kiecolt-Glaser & Tamara
L. Newton, Marriage and Health: His and Hers, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 472, 472 (2001) (surveying and
analyzing the many empirical studies).
275. For a recent effort to test this hypothesis, finding it partially confirmed, see Judith P.M. Soons
& Matthijs Kalmijn, Is Marriage More Than Cohabitation? Well-Being Digferences in 30 European
Countries, 71 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1141 (2009). ,
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demonstrates that the marriage bonus is sex-asymmetrical: husbands benefit
significantly more from it than wives do.2 76 And there is recent evidence that
the marriage bonus owes a lot to social attitudes supporting marriage; in
countries where cohabitation is socially accepted and not stigmatized, the
marriage bonus is significantly reduced and sometimes disappears. 277
Traditionalists are not the only observers who find and interpret utilitarian
evidence to confirm their preconceived normative viewpoints. Many feminist
critics of natural law baselines celebrate women's expanded choices, including
278 thsccohabitation, no-fault divorce, and lesbian parenting. Yet those critics rarely
cite to empirical evidence that expanded choice actually makes women happier
or enriches their lives-and the evidence is subject to debate as to these matters.
Thus, feminists ought not to ignore the evidence that marriage is correlated with better
health and happiness for both wives and husbands and certainly ought to focus on the
stronger evidence that children tend to thrive most in stable two-parent households.
Even more startling are the conclusions from a recent study from the National
Bureau of Economic Research. From an empirical analysis of data from the
United States, Canada, and Europe, Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers con-
clude that, notwithstanding women's dramatically expanded choices as to rela-
tionships and families, the happiness of the average woman has declined both
absolutely and relatively (compared to the happiness of the average man)
between 1970 and the present.2 7 9 Why is that? The authors are not sure-yet as
long as this big question remains unanswered, feminist critics of traditional
marriage lack a secure utilitarian anchor for their viewpoint.
Thus, Americans of varying belief structures disagree about what family
institutions and rules conduce toward the greatest happiness among couples and
ensure the best childrearing environments. Their debate, however, has helped
clarify the pluralist web of purposes that family law legitimately serves, consis-
tent with utilitarian premises:
* Encouragement of committed relationships, which plausibly enrich the lives
of the partners280 and serve the happiness of children reared within the
relationships; 281
276. See generally Joan K. Monin & Margaret S. Clark, Why Do Men Benefit More from Marriage
Than Do Women?, 65 SEX ROLES 320-26 (2011) (surveying literature and speculation about the various
causes for this phenomenon).
277. This is the precise finding of two recent comparative empirical studies, namely Aart C.
Liefbroer & Edith Dourleijn, Unmarried Cohabitation and Union Stability: Testing the Role of
Diffusion Using Data from 16 European Countries, 43 DEMOGRAPHY 203, 218-19 (2006), and Soons &
Kalmijn, supra note 275, at 1152-53. This finding is broadly consistent with BRINIG, supra note 172, which
argues that a supportive community network is an important cause of relationship stability and longevity.
278. See, e.g., POLIKOFF, supra note 14.
279. Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, The Paradox of Declining Female Happiness #1 (Nat'1 Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14969, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14969.
280. Margaret S. Clark & Joan K. Monin, Giving and Receiving Communal Responsiveness as Love,
in THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF LOVE 200-17 (Robert J. Sternberg & Karin Weis eds., 2006).
281. See, e.g., Sara McLanahan, Father Absence and the Welfare of Children (MacArthur Working
Papers), available at http://apps.olin.wustl.edu/macarthur/working%20papers/wp-mclanahan2.htm.
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* Efficient decision rules for romantic couples, including off-the-rack default
rules for healthcare decision making, guardianship in the case of incapacita-
tion, inheritance in the case of death, and so on;282 and
* Protection for immature or vulnerable persons, including victims of domes-
tic abuse and violence, romantic partners who rely on assurances of commit-
ment and are then harmed when the relationship ends, and children whose
lives are affected by decisions parents and other caregivers might make.283
The vocabulary and concepts presented in this Article do not tell us which
values family law ought to serve, how to prioritize competing values, or how to
predict which rules or institutions will optimize the happiness or flourishing of
romantic partners and the children they are raising in their households. These
are enduring issues for public discourse, and their resolution will depend on the
force of social practice and evolution of public norms. Specifically, neither the
mandatory-default-override rule vocabulary nor the notion of a family law
menu of different regimes will resolve the same-sex-marriage debate. As a
supporter of marriage equality, I believe that the debate will be resolved by the
social fact that many serious lesbian and gay couples want to celebrate their
commitment to one another and to their children through the same institution-
civil marriage-that straight couples have long deployed. But the vocabulary
and concepts in this Article contribute nothing to my confidence on this issue.
Nonetheless, the vocabulary and concepts presented here can contribute to a
productive understanding and evaluation of our evolving family law. Specifi-
cally, the vocabulary and concepts help us to see more clearly the range of
potential regulatory options available to pursue any of the three classic purposes
of family law, or to pursue all of them. Consider some examples of such a
regulatory matching game.
First, this analysis suggests a resetting of the academic and policy agenda of
America's family law. American family law has long been more pluralistic than
most academics, virtually all policymakers, and all partisans have made it out to
be. Our pluralistic family law has long been committed to a guided-choice
philosophy that is inexorably dynamic in its institutional consequences. The
guided-choice precept, elaborated in this Article, ought to be the death knell for
the simplistic thinking that underlies the defense of traditional marriage and the
libertarian privatization of marriage slogans that opened this Article. Traditional
marriage, replete with mandatory rules reflecting sexual and gender mores, died
many decades ago, and what we have now is an updated understanding of
282. See e.g., David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal
Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 45 MICH. L. REv. 447 (1996) (providing excellent analysis of
the different purposes of family law, including useful decision-making rules).
283. Compare WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 273, at 4, 124-49 (invoking family law goal of
protecting vulnerable children as a reason to support traditional marriage), with POLIKOFF, supra note
14, at 84 (invoking family law goal of protecting vulnerable children as a reason to get "beyond
marriage").
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marriage as a set of default rules structuring individual choices and subject to
override rules of various sorts. No longer is marriage regulated on the basis of
mandatory requirements grounded upon the unity of the married couple. Like-
wise, marriage was privatized decades ago, and contract-based alternatives to
marriage have been entrenched for a generation, yet privatization and contractu-
alization of marriage and other family law institutions have not taken Big
Brother out of the bedroom and will not, contrary to the aspirations of the Cato
Institute.
More fundamentally, the policy debate in family law is no longer just about
marriage.2 84 Ruth Colker is right to say that cohabitation and other new regimes
tend to "mimic" marriage.285 While she and other authors insightfully point out
that the marriage-equality movement threatens to marginalize many nontradi-
tional relationships, the project of American family law has been more pluralis-
tic than the critics recognize. Cohabitation-regime protections have been
increasingly extended to a broad range of intimate (and not just marriage-lite)
relationships. Domestic partnership and reciprocal-beneficiary rules suggest a
substantially different model for recognition of relationships, including nonro-
mantic ones, that offer security, friendship, and protection for individuals in an
isolating but dangerous world. And state rules for caregiving relationships are
increasingly detached from the rules governing romantic relationships.
Second, the analysis in this Article ought to clarify the proper debate over
governmental rules applicable to lesbian and gay relationships. Whatever your
position on governmental treatment of romantic relationships involving LGBT
persons, the analysis in this Article enables you to make a better-informed
regulatory choice. Thus, if you believe lesbian and gay relationships are nothing
but sexual unions that society has no business promoting, you still ought to
consider equal treatment for such couples through a reciprocal beneficiary law,
such as the ones adopted in Colorado or Hawaii. That is, the efficient decision-
making goal of family law is one that is not tightly linked to the traditional
procreative goal of marriage. This helps us disaggregate not only different
purposes served by family law but also different institutions and the purposes
they serve.
Conversely, if you believe that LGBT persons form healthy relationships and
rear children capably within those relationships, you ought to support equal
treatment for LGBT relationships. As above, you might tailor your support to
the particular goal of family law you consider most important. For example, if
you consider the most important role of family law to be protecting children and
providing a good environment for rearing children, you might deemphasize
marriage equality, especially if you do not believe that marriage contributes to
284. E.g., Blumberg, supra note 204, at 1266 (emphasizing cohabitation as a new regime option for
romantic couples, competing with marriage); David L. Chambers, For the Best of Friends and for
Lovers of All Sorts, a Status Other Than Marriage, 76 NorRE DAME L. REv. 1347, 1348-49 (2001)
(proposing that the state create a new status for "designated friends").
285. See Colker, supra note 219.
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stable relations between a child and her two adult caregivers. If you consider
protection of children to be intimately tied to conmmitted caregiver relationships,
you ought to support civil unions or marriage equality.
Note that jurisdictions adopting reciprocal-beneficiary or civil-union laws
have strongly tended to move to full marriage equality. This has been the
experience in Europe as well as the United States.286 The process by which this
works is simple. Resistance to equal treatment for LGBT families often rests
upon stereotypes that such persons are intrinsically antifamily; these beliefs are
fanned by the partisan charge that gay marriage will cause a further decline in
traditional marriage. In fact, LGBT persons form lasting romantic relationships
and raise children, with all the joys and problems straight couples have. In my
judgment, a gay-anxious individual who personally knows out-of-the-closet
lesbian and gay couples, especially those rearing children, is less likely to
oppose civil unions or marriage equality than is a gay-anxious individual who
does not know any same-sex couples. Each institutional recognition-starting
with municipal and corporate domestic-partnership policies, then with state
reciprocal beneficiary and cohabitation rules, culminating in recognition of civil
unions-brings more couples out of the closet, falsifies campaigns of vilifica-
tion, and increases positive support for marriage equality.
Third, the foregoing analysis drives home a stark regulatory inconsistency. A
central purpose of American family law has been not just the protection of
children but also the encouragement of adult interpersonal commitment that
creates the best environment within which children can flourish. This has been
the best argument supporting marriage, and now civil unions, as the most
favored institution in even a pluralistic family law. Protection of the interests of
children is an important normative caution against the increasing number of
couples who cohabit without marriage, but the tension within our family law
pluralism is even deeper. It is conventional wisdom among experts that the
advantages for children assuredly derived from marriage are undermined if the
parents divorce. 2 8 7 Hence, the no-fault divorce revolution of 1967 to 1985 is a
prochoice move that generates enormous utilitarian costs and, arguably, sounds
as the most destructive change in family law, from the perspective of children.
(It is certainly a family law development that harms children's interests much
more than even the most antigay theorist can imagine for the consequences of
marriage equality.)
The more general lesson from this example, and one demanded by the
analysis in this Article, is that our pluralistic family law requires tradeoffs; there
286. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Comparative Law and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate:
A Step-by-Step Approach Toward State Recognition, 31 McGEORGE L. REV. 641 (2000).
287. The leading study demonstrating the ill effects of divorce upon children is JUDrT WALLERSTEIN,
JULIA LEWIS & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE: A 25 YEAR LANDMARK STUDY
(2000). See also E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON & JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DIVORCE RECONSID-
ERED (2002) (similarly critical of the effect of divorce upon the welfare of children but finding the net
effects of marriage beneficial for most children).
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is no single purpose of family law that always trumps the others, and frequently
the different purposes will be in conflict. In particular, the prochoice efficient-
decision-making purpose is often at odds with the more paternalistic purposes
of encouraging committed relationships and protecting vulnerable persons.
Thus, no-fault divorce, a prochoice move toward efficient decision making,
undermines the procommitment and child-protective goals of family law. The
old state rules penalizing nonmarital children are an example of a pro-
commitment policy that was at odds with the child-protective goal.
Moreover, the precise composition of the menu of regime options reflects a
balance of goals. The old marriage-monopoly regime of the early and mid-
twentieth century reflected the procommitment goals of family law, often at the
expense of efficient decision making (many married couples were deeply
unhappy, including gay and lesbian persons impelled to marry unsuspecting
straight persons because of social pressure) and sometimes at the expense of
children's best interests (especially children born outside of wedlock). The
current menu of regimes is one that undermines marriage, which must now
compete with other options. But the extent of the conflict depends on how
differentiated cohabitation is from marriage; to the extent cohabitation mimics
marriage (to use Ruth Colker's terminology), it ought to be a less successful
competitor over time. Most obviously, if the state wants to encourage commit-
ted relationships as the overwhelming goal of family law, the state ought to
adopt a covenant-marriage alternative and endow it with generous incentives or
bonuses.
As the remainder of this Article will explore, the menu approach offers
simple yet powerful insights that help clarify the ideological debates within
family law-especially the marriage-equality debate that pits traditionalists and
progressives critical of same-sex marriage against liberals who believe it a
constitutional necessity. Consider the recent decision in Perry v. Brown,288
where the Ninth Circuit invalidated Proposition 8, a California voters' initiative
that revoked the state supreme court's recognition of marriage equality. TFV
groups have defended the initiative as a proper preservation of the traditional
family, while liberals and some progressives have assailed it as an irrational,
animus-soaked denial of basic equality. The analytical framework of this Article
may not resolve the dispute in Perry, but it does illuminate certain features of
that dispute and the tendentiousness sometimes displayed by opponents of
marriage equality.
288. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1064-95 (9th Cir. 2012). On February 21, 2012, the appellants,
proponents of Proposition 8, petitioned the Ninth Circuit for en banc review of the panel's decision.
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Perry, 671 F.3d 1052 (No. 10-16696), available at http://
www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2012/02/21/Petition-forRehearingEnBanc.pdf. The Ninth
Circuit denied en banc review on June 5, 2012. A petition for Supreme Court review is expected. See
Howard Mintz, California's Proposition 8 Case Headed to U.S. Supreme Court, SAN JOSE MERCURY




For example, it is notable that all the parties in the case defended or indicted
the exclusion of lesbian and gay couples from marriage on the basis of the
utilitarian understanding of family law. Represented by sophisticated counsel,
the proponents of Proposition 8 understood that the federal judiciary is commit-
ted to equal protection doctrine that refuses to admit arguments grounded on
pure "morality" to justify denial of rights to LGBT persons and so defended
Proposition 8 along utilitarian lines.2 89 Because Proposition 8 was substantially
inspired by the natural law perspective, their arguments rang false and were
brushed aside by the Ninth Circuit as makeweights. Perry illustrates the extent
to which constitutional law doctrine has settled firmly in support of the utilitar-
ian perspective and has contributed to the marginalization of the natural law
understanding in public discourse. Within the utilitarian understanding, as
proponents surely realize, it is increasingly difficult to defend the exclusion of
lesbian and gay couples (one-fifth of whom are rearing children within their
households) from civil marriage.
The regulatory vocabulary of this Article suggests, moreover, that both the
traditionalists and the liberals and progressives are overinvested in the gay-
marriage debate; both "camps" would better serve their own agendas and the
public interest if they focused more of their energies on the human realities that
ought to concern each group of Americans. Thus, the TFV advocate who
believes family law should encourage committed relationships ought to consider
the notion that the best strategy is not to oppose same-sex marriages but rather
is to seek covenant marriages with more benefits, especially for families with
children (section A). Progressives, too, ought to ameliorate their opposition to
same-sex marriage and seek to strengthen and differentiate more strongly the
menu-based alternatives to marriage (section B). In a grand bargain, traditional-
ists, liberals, and progressives ought to support state legislation that equalizes
marriage rights while also formalizing covenant marriage, cohabitation, and
reciprocal-beneficiary regimes. The Article will conclude with some broader
suggestions for all interested citizens to create greater order and coherence to
the emerging menu of family law regimes (section C).
A. TRADITIONAL FAMILY VALUES (CoMMITTED RELATIONSHIPS)
AND MENUS, DEFAULTS, AND OVERRIDES
To the extent that its arguments are cast in utilitarian terms, traditionalist
opposition to same-sex marriage usually rests upon the assumption that the
primary or sole purpose of family law is to encourage committed relationships
that might produce children and provide the best conditions for rearing those
289. See Defendants-Intervenors-Appellants' Opening Brief at 77-78, 98-102, Perry, 671 F.3d 1052
(No. 10-16696) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief, Perry], available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/
general/2010/09/22/10-16696_openingbrief.pdf (distinguishing Proposition 8 from the Colorado initia-
tive struck down in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), on the ground that Proposition 8 is grounded
in utilitarian values, such as the happiness straight couples and their children derive from "traditional
marriage," which they believe "gay marriage" imperils).
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children. Traditionalists, including the defenders of Proposition 8 in Perry,
argue that gay marriage is fundamentally different from the traditional, and
optimal, institution of marriage, where a husband and a wife procreate and rear
children. 2 9 0 Because the purpose of marriage is intimately tied to that traditional
model, they maintain, same-sex marriage will undermine the institution of
marriage generally and will specifically discourage committed relationships and
harm the interests of children, who need two different-sex parents.29 '
Supporters of marriage equality, including the critics of Proposition 8 in
Perry, have responded that jurisdictions recognizing same-sex marriages have
seen no decline of marriage as an institution and that children raised in lesbian
and gay households have health profiles similar to children raised in straight
households.2 9 2 More importantly, there is also evidence that state recognition
has enriched the lives of many lesbian and gay couples and the children they are
raising.2 93 Although this is an empirical debate, many opponents of marriage
equality will never be persuaded by empirical evidence or by the stories
generated by marriage recognition all over the world. Many older Americans
are opposed to marriage equality for reasons that are deeply rooted in their
self-identification, in stereotypical ways of thinking, or (to be blunt) in prejudice
or bigotry.
Yet it appears to me that increasing numbers of traditionalist opponents are
bothered by the lack of empirical support for their concerns, and a younger
generation of traditionalists is more open to these stories and to the empirical
evidence. The vocabulary of menus, defaults, and overrides offers valuable
lessons for the open-minded traditionalist and for the undecided traditionalist
young person. Indeed, even the most diehard opponent of same-sex marriage
290. Thus, the Proposition 8 defenders' main argument is that "the traditional definition of marriage
reflected in Proposition 8 bears at least a rational relationship to the State's vital interest in increasing
the likelihood that children will be born and raised in stable family units by the couples who brought
them into the world because it provide[s] special recognition and support to those relationships most
likely to further that interest." Id. at 17-18, 77-78; see also BLANKENHORN, supra note 273, at 205-06
(written by Proposition 8 expert witness who makes the same argument).
291. There are other traditionalist arguments against same-sex marriage, e.g., Wardle, supra note 11,
but the ones in this text are most popular in public discourse and relate best to the purposes of marriage.
292. E.g., Brief of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 2,
Perry, 671 F.3d 1052 (No. 10-16696) (demonstrating that civil marriage has flourished in Massachu-
setts in the decade since the state's highest court ruled in favor of marriage equality); ESKRIDGE &
SPEDALE, supra note 13 (demonstrating similar experience in the early Scandinavian recognition of
lesbian and gay partnerships).
293. Reported benefits of marriage to same-sex spouses include increased feelings of commitment to
partners, increased feelings of social inclusion, less anxiety about legal problems, and increased health-
insurance coverage. See CHRISTOPHER RAMOS, NAOMI G. GOLDBERG & M.V. LEE BADGETT, WILLIAMS
INST., THE EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY IN MASSACHUSETrS: A SURVEY OF THE EXPERIENCES AND IMPACT
OF MARRIAGE ON SAME-SEX COUPLEs 1 (2009), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/
uploads/Ramos-Goldberg-Badgett-MA-Effects-Marriage-Equality-May-2009.pdf; MV. Lee Badgett, So-
cial Inclusion and the Value of Marriage Equality in Massachusetts and the Netherlands, 67 J. Soc.
ISSUES 316, 316 (2011). Surveyed same-sex spouses also reported that as a result of their marriage, their
children were "happier and better off," "felt more secure and protected, gained a sense of stability, and
saw their families validated by society." RAMOS ET AL., supra.
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might benefit from an analysis that situates the same-sex marriage debate in the
larger narrative of family law in the last hundred years. Because traditionalists
form a significant minority of the American population, their concerns are ones
that everyone should consider in a deliberative fashion.
1. The Decline of Marriage as the Divorce Override Got Easier and the Menu
Expanded
Our society has long valued marriage as an institution entailing lifetime
commitments between two persons. This is the core precept of the natural law
understanding of family-yet the utilitarian understanding tends to embrace this
ideal, on the ground that the long-term interpersonal commitment inherent in
marriage offers enormous benefits to the romantic couple, to the children they
are expected to raise, and to society as a whole. On the other hand, there is
considerable literature claiming that marriage-for-life is not good for everybody
and that the marriage bonus accrues mostly to men.2 94 Set these important
arguments aside and assume, with TFV supporters, that committed marriage-for-
life is beneficial to the flourishing of the couple, their children, and society.
Anything that would undermine the benefits of committed marriage-for-life is
normatively objectionable from such a TFV perspective, and this belief under-
writes the opposition to marriage equality for most TFV intellectual and reli-
gious leaders. It is also important to understand the historical context for their
present concerns. Marriage-for-life has taken a nosedive in the last century.
Many fewer Americans marry, their marriages often end in divorce, and increas-
ing numbers of children are being reared in households headed by unmarried
adults. Under TFV assumptions, liberalization of marriage law has been a
national calamity, and further liberalization, many TFV persons fear, would
spell the end of marriage for everyone. This is an argument that has attracted a
wide array of political support, including support from such different leaders as
Presidents William J. Clinton and George W. Bush.295
As noted above, such a "defense of marriage" objection is strikingly inconsis-
tent with the experience of states and nations that have recognized same-sex
marriages. Since 2003, when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court re-
quired marriage equality as a constitutional mandate, the marriage rate has
edged upwards in that state, at the same that the marriage rate has plummeted
294. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
295. See President's [Bill Clinton's] Statement on DOMA, Sept. 20, 1996, available at http://www.
cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs/user/scotts/ftp/wpaf2mc/clinton.html (declaring prior to signing DOMA his longstand-
ing opposition to "governmental recognition of same-gender marriages"). Even though denying
committed lesbian and gay couples marriage recognition deprives them of more than 1100 federal
rights, benefits, and duties, President Clinton insisted that the act does not "discriminat[e]" against gays
and lesbians. See id. Similarly, President George W. Bush urged adoption of the Federal Marriage
Amendment to protect the time-honored institution of one man, one woman marriage. See Bush Calls
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nationwide; in the same period, the Massachusetts divorce rate took a nosedive,
while national divorce rates dropped more modestly.2 9 6 The Massachusetts
experience is the typical one: marriage equality for LGBT persons has not
undermined the institution for straight persons. The vocabulary of this Article, how-
ever, reveals an even deeper problem with the defense-of-marriage objection.
Consider this. After the Supreme Court liberalized marriage by striking down
mandatory rules against different-race marriages in Loving v. Virginia in 1967,297
the rates of divorce and children born outside of marriage immediately skyrock-
eted and continued a steep upward climb for more than a decade. 2 9 8 Even
though Loving changed the institution of marriage in a fundamental way for
most Americans at the time, and even though different-race married couples
enjoyed less social acceptance and therefore higher divorce rates, almost no one
today thinks that opening up marriage to romantic couples of different races
caused the decline of marriage in the 1970s. Instead, it is likely that changing
social mores drove the decline of marriage in the United States (just as they did
in Canada, Europe, and elsewhere). With ebbs and flows, the general trend for
the last one hundred years has been for romantic couples to value sexual
relations increasingly for their utilitarian pleasure values and not for procreation-
and that shift in family values surely had more to do with rising divorce rates
and nonmarital births than opening up the institution to new interracial couples.
Did the law have no impact on this demographic shift in family formation?
The law probably did have an impact, but it was not expansion of the right to
marry that had such an impact. Instead, any effect of law on marriage and
divorce rates surely came from three other kinds of prochoice legal reforms:
removing the mandatory rule against sexual cohabitation, eliminating manda-
tory rules discriminating against nonmarital children, and easing the override
rules for divorce. As explained in Part II, these changes, accommodating the
new sexual mores of our population, constituted genuine revolutions in family
law, and revolutions that probably contributed, in some hard-to-determine
degree, to the perceived decline of lifetime marriages with children among
American adults.
Thus, a much more important regulatory event in the narrative of the decline
of traditional marriage was Nevada's decision in 1931 to authorize easier
divorce and to open its courts to couples from other states. Nevada also allowed
296. These data are assembled and analyzed in Brief Amici Curiae, Professors William N. Eskridge
Jr., Rebecca L. Brown, Bruce A. Ackerman, Daniel A. Farber, Kenneth L. Karst, & Andrew Koppel-
man, in Support of Appellees at 27-30, Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-16696).
297. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
298. See DiFonzo, supra note 5, at 524-25 (discussing census data). See also Edward Stein, Past
and Present Proposed Amendments to the United States Constitution Regarding Marriage, 82 WASH.
U. L. Q. 611 (2004) (presenting a history of proposed constitutional amendments to protect marriage
against different-race couples); Rose M. Kreider, Interracial Marriage and Marriage Instability (Popula-
tion Assoc. of Am. Mar. 24, 2000), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/marriage/data/sipp/
interracial-instability.pdf (presenting empirical support for the proposition that different-race marriages
are not as lasting as same-race marriages and enjoy a significantly higher divorce rate).
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unilateral divorce, where only one spouse petitioned for an end to the marriage,
and other states have followed Nevada's lead, which has resulted in escalating
divorce rates in the half century from 1931 to 198 1.299 More than any other
legal development of the last hundred years, no-fault divorce has changed the
fundamental nature of marriage-not only undermining the aspiration that
marriage is "until death do we part" but also recasting marriage as a choice-
based relationship. Perhaps most disturbingly, there was a bait-and-switch
feature to no-fault divorce: wives who invested human capital in their marriages
under the fault-based regime found that their husbands could exit more easily
than anticipated after no-fault divorce and often ended up destitute because their
bargaining position had eroded so badly. In short, if law played any role in the
nation's rising divorce rates in the 1970s, the culprit is surely the relaxation of
override rules allowing easier divorce and not the revocation of mandatory entry
rules for different-race and other couples.
At the same time divorce rates were climbing, so were nonmarital birth rates.
Did the law play a role in that phenomenon? As far as I can tell from the
literature, allowing different-race marriage played no role whatsoever in this
phenomenon-though other legal reforms may have, namely, the repeal of
mandatory rules that rendered marriage the only legal situs for sexual inter-
course and the invalidation of pervasive discriminations against nonmarital
children. Once sexual cohabitation became legal, the state was offering roman-
tic couples a short menu of regulatory options-either marriage, with strong
fidelity and support duties as well as hundreds of legal benefits and rights, or
cohabitation, where each partner enjoyed rights guaranteed by ordinary con-
tract, property, and tort law. The Marvin line of cases made this regime explicit,
and the Supreme Court decisions sweeping away discriminations against nonmari-
tal children removed a further incentive for romantic couples to get married.
Once romantic couples had a menu of choices, marriage and cohabitation,
rather than one choice, marriage, for their sexual partnership, it stands to reason
that fewer couples would choose marriage. In the 1970s, committed couples
who were planning or expecting their first child were strongly motivated to get
married but less motivated than they would have been in the 1960s, when many
states discriminated against nonmarital children. The expanded menu of legal
regimes for romantic couples and the improved status for nonmarital children
did not impose a death sentence on marriage but did ensure that some indetermi-
299. GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE: AN AMERICAN TRADION 135-44 (1991) (providing an account of
Nevada's unilateral no-fault-divorce reform and its contribution to easier divorces for Americans across
the country); see Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, No-Fault Laws and At-Fault People, 18 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 325 (1998); Jonathan Gruber, Is Making Divorce Easier Bad for Children? The Long-Run
Implications of Unilateral Divorce, 22 J. LAB. EcON. 799 (2004) (providing empirical evidence for a
significant and broad effect of unilateral divorce though not for no-fault divorce standing alone); Justin
Wolfers, Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results, 96 AM.
EcON. REV. 1802 (2006) (providing similar evidence, but with a more-sophisticated empirical founda-
tion).
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nate number of couples who would have married under the old marriage-
monopoly system would not marry after the 1970s. Hence, marriage rates would
be expected to fall and nonmarital birth rates expected to increase. The most
plausible legal reason for declining marriage rates, therefore, is not the repeal of
mandatory rules against interracial marriage, but is instead the repeal of manda-
tory rules penalizing sexual cohabitation and nonmarital children and the cre-
ation of a menu of legal options for romantic couples."
The foregoing thought experiment offers the following lessons for the mar-
riage-equality debate, and especially for the TFV critics of same-sex marriage.
First, marriage is not for everyone. Offered a choice of cohabitation with fewer
legal benefits than marriage, many couples have chosen not to marry. There is
every reason to believe that many of these couples have made choices that are
optimal for them. Likewise, some marriages are better off being terminated, as
the divorce statistics reveal. Many divorced couples would have been much
happier if they had never married. Are children better off being reared in
households where their married parents divorce? The jury is out on that
issue-especially for those children whose lives are harmed by acrimonious
divorce proceedings. From the utilitarian perspective, encouragement of commit-
ted relationships is not a goal that government should insist upon for all
Americans. This is one reason why even traditionalists do not insist on a return
to the marriage-monopoly (natural law) approach of the early twentieth century.
By abandoning the natural law framework to satisfy heterosexual preferences
for easier divorce and remarriage, however, traditionalists have sacrificed their
underlying philosophy and conceded the dominance of the utilitarian framework
for family law. This is a fatal concession unless traditionalists can make a better
showing that gay marriage will cause harm to society or third parties.
Second, to the extent that traditionalists believe that government should
encourage lifetime committed relationships (whether for natural law or utilitar-
ian reasons), devoting political resources to deny lesbian and gay couples
marriage rights is deeply misguided. At the very least, traditionalists need to
explain why lesbian and gay couples would not benefit from state-encouraged
lasting commitments. Moreover, traditionalists sincerely wanting to protect
children should focus on strengthening committed relationships among those
children's parents and should not disrespect committed relationships among
lesbian and gay couples, especially those couples raising children who would
theoretically benefit from their parents' marriages. The defense-of-marriage
argument invoked by many traditionalists, in response, is deeply unfair: straight
couples have insisted upon legal reforms that have met their needs while
demonstrably undermining marriage, and it is the worst form of scapegoating
for a majority group to use minority rights as the place to draw the line so as to
protect an institution the majority has selfishly compromised.
300. Accord Larry L. Bumpass, James A. Sweet & Andrew Cherlin, The Role of Cohabitation in
Declining Rates of Marriage, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 913 (1991).
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Third, the history of family law suggests that the government has been a poor
decision maker when it has adopted hard mandatory rules excluding relation-
ship choices made by mature, competent adults. To be sure, mandatory rules are
useful and sometimes necessary to protect immature or vulnerable persons
whose interests might be slighted by selfish or short-sighted parents-but the
history of mandatory rules for adult relationships is a history of failure, and the
history of openly discriminatory mandatory rules is a national disgrace. Nondis-
criminatory default rules work much better here, because they respect the
romantic choices of the partners. As every parent knows, or comes to know,
neither government nor parents can tell young adults whom they should love.
2. How Traditionalists Have Contributed to the Decline of Marriage
There is an even more striking lesson for traditionalists who are sincere in
their support of committed relationships. Assume that TFV persons are right to
think that civil recognition of same-sex marriage will further undermine the
morally good institution of marriage. Are traditionalists also right to believe that
gay marriage is such a central threat to traditional marriage that their public law
agenda should focus on that issue, to the exclusion of divorce reform, covenant-
marriage laws, and other adjustments to the current menu of family-law default-
rule regimes? It is hard to believe that marriage equality for same-sex couples is
such a central threat-any more than marriage equality for different-race couples
was a central threat back in the 1960s.o1
Consider a deeper way in which menu theory presents new dilemmas for
traditionalists opposing marriage equality. That is, their opposition to same-sex
marriage has driven an expansion of the menu of regimes for romantic couples-
and, ultimately, the creation of institutions competing with marriage and thereby
undermining the older institution.30 2 The political logic of this phenomenon is
301. There are other features that make the race and sexual-orientation parallels even tighter. In the
1950s, many traditionalist persons, inspired by their religious faith, believed that different-race mar-
riage was the same kind of anti-Christian move that today's traditionalists claim for same-sex marriage.
See William N. Eskridge Jr., Noah's Curse: How Religion Often Conflates Status, Belief and Conduct
To Resist Antidiscrimination Norms, 45 GA. L. REv. 657, 672-73, 682-83 (2011) (documenting how
American fundamentalist religions construed the Word of God to exclude people of color or interracial
couples as morally not worthy of belonging to their faith communities); Stein, supra note 298
(documenting how many Americans supported constitutional amendments to bar different-race mar-
riages because they did not belong in a God-fearing republic). Compare Wardle, supra note 11 (arguing
that fundamental institutions such as marriage need to be exclusionary, as "community" is constructed
by deciding who does not "belong").
302. Competing institutions such as civil unions and cohabitation draw some couples away from
marriage and so undermine the institution in that respect, but the expanded menu undermines marriage
in another way as well. As Peg Brinig suggested to me, economists argue that some of the utilitarian
benefits of marriage derive from its signaling effect: employers, banks, and other third parties might
"trust" a married person more than an unmarried person because marriage signals stability and
commitment as well as a better social support system. E.g., Michael J. Trebilcock, Marriage as a
Signal, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CoNTRAcr 245 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999). When the state
recognizes other relationships as ones entailing commitment, especially civil unions (which are just as
hard to exit as marriage) but also perhaps domestic partnerships and cohabitation (easier to exit), it is
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simple. Most lesbian and gay couples want legal recognition for their romantic
relationships as marriages. Many traditionalists oppose marriage equality, often
intensely. For a long time, intense traditionalist opposition killed every single
gay-marriage proposal, but the perseverance of committed lesbian and gay
couples, many rearing children, has given the gay-marriage movement a Termi-
nator quality: even after repeated defeats in legislatures, state-initiative votes,
and even court cases, marriage equality has kept coming back and coming back
stronger, as more Americans have been persuaded that gay marriage is a
legitimate demand by honorable couples and not an exercise in political correct-
ness to accommodate the selfish "homosexual agenda." Indeed, support for
marriage equality, which hovered at just over ten percent in 1988, is now
roughly equal to or greater than support for excluding same-sex couples from
civil marriage.30 3
With increasing demand for legal recognition of lesbian and gay relation-
ships, as well as intense even if declining opposition, legislators and judges in
an increasing array of states have found it natural to look for compromises that
give LGBT people what they most want, namely, a dignified legal structure for
their families, without conferring on these couples what traditionalists most
fervently protect, namely, the hallowed institution of marriage. The obvious
compromises have been those suggested by the European experience with
registered partnerships, which provide all the legal rights and benefits of
marriage to lesbian and gay couples, and with pactes civils, which provide
many of the rights and duties of marriage to couples who can dissolve their
unions easily. 30 In the United States, we have called these options civil unions
or domestic partnerships (like registered partnerships) and reciprocal beneficia-
ries (like pactes civils).
In an increasing number of states, the new institutions add to the menu
regimes from which both straight and gay couples can choose. Thus, municipal
and corporate domestic-partnership policies (granting important employee ben-
efits) are typically offered to straight as well as gay and lesbian cohabiting
employeeso.3 " Reciprocal-beneficiary laws of Hawaii and Vermont apply to
some straight couples the state views as nonromantic, as well as to romantic
diluting the once-unique signal that marriage offered to third parties. Robert Rowthorn, Marriage as a
Signal, in THE LAW AND EcoNoMIcs OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 132 (Antony W. Dnes & Robert Rowthom
eds., 2002).
303. For graphs and trendlines depicting increasing support for marriage equality, see Nate Silver,
Gay Marriage Opponents Now in Minority, N.Y. TIMES BLOGS (Apr. 20, 2011), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.
nytimes.com/2011/04/20/gay-marriage-opponents-now-in-minority, and PEw RESEARCH CTR., TEN YEARS
OF CHANGING ATrnTUDES ON GAY MARRIAGE (2011), available at http://features.pewforum.org/gay-marriage-
attitudes/index.php.
304. For an excellent introduction to the variety of European marriage-like and marriage-lite
institutions created after 1989, see LEGAL RECOGNON OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NA-
TIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 417-732 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenaes eds., 2001)
[hereinafter LEGAL RECoGNmON].
305. See EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., supra note 241 (finding thirty-two percent of surveyed
corporations offered domestic partnership policies to different-sex as well as same-sex partners of
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lesbian and gay couples. Nevada and the District of Columbia offer the state-
wide domestic-partnership option to all couples.
The expanded menu generated by the marriage-equality debate contributes,
theoretically, to the decline of marriage. As we have seen before, the more
options romantic couples have for legal recognition of their relationships, the
fewer couples will choose marriage. Thus, the couples who marry in part
because one partner needs the spousal healthcare benefits afforded by the
employer of the other partner will hesitate to marry if they can secure the same
benefit by designating a domestic partner to the employer.
The phenomenon outlined above remains modest in the United States, but if
the examples of Canada and Europe are any guide, then these new family law
regimes will continue to multiply as more states and municipalities feel political
and even constitutional pressure to create some kind of legal structure for
LGBT families. In France, for example, pactes civils are very popular with
straight couples, who are substituting such unions for marriage at a rapid
clip.30 6 More broadly, defenders of traditional marriage face a new dilemma
now that at least half of Americans support marriage equality: they risk associat-
ing religion with prejudice, in the same way that fundamentalist Protestant
religions did in the 1950s, when their support for apartheid and antimiscegena-
tion laws was grounded upon interpretations of the Bible that now appear to
have been pervasively bigoted. Traditionalists opposed to gay marriage today
ought to follow the path taken by antimiscegenation traditionalists in the 1960s
and 1970s: abandon hard-line opposition to committed nontraditional unions
and focus on other policies that might advance the family-values agenda.
Consider, now, a policy focus and strategy that ought to be attractive to TFV
Americans.
3. A New Approach to Covenant Marriage for Families with Children
The most thoughtful argument made by TFV supporters is that family law
should encourage committed relationships, both because they, assertedly, im-
prove the partners' quality of life and provide the best home for the rearing of
children. If this is true, TFV persons really ought to support, rather than oppose,
similar rights for LGBT couples. But TFV persons instead invest their energies
into opposing gay marriage because that is a symbolic battle they can win in
most states; in contrast, the primary legal rules undermining marriage-for-life-
legalized cohabitation and unilateral no-fault divorce-are politically difficult to
roll back.
From the perspective of the mandatory-default-override approach deployed
in this Article, the most logical response for supporters of traditional marriage
would be to add a new item to the menu: marriage that is harder to exit. Indeed,
employees); City and County Domestic Partner Registries, supra note 239 (listing municipal and
county domestic-partnership registries).
306. See LEGAL RECOGNITION, supra note 304, at 475-492.
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this is the idea of the new covenant-marriage regime discussed above. While
allowing romantic couples to continue to choose regular marriage, with its
no-fault divorce rule, the three covenant-marriage states have created a new
institution where the override rule for escaping the marriage-for-life default is
somewhat tougher. Unfortunately, even traditionalists are not buying this promis-
ing idea. Few couples have opted into the covenant-marriage regime in the
states offering it, and traditionalists scoff at covenant-marriage bills proposed in
other southern states.3 07 This phenomenon reveals the profound limits of family
law to channel couples into institutional formats that deprive them of future
choices, even in the relatively minor way that covenant marriage does. (Existing
covenant marriage regimes do not return to the fault-based override rules
prevailing before the 1960s but instead require more deliberation and longer
waiting periods before the couple can divorce.)
The menu approach suggests another angle for this regulatory experiment.
The available evidence supports the TFV concern that divorce often imposes
significant costs on children.3 08 Who can disagree with the normative point that
family law should protect children, usually the most vulnerable persons in the
family, against the costs of potentially selfish decision making by their married
parents? So covenant marriage should make it harder to divorce than current
regimes do, and the legislature should create additional protections for children.
In light of this policy goal, traditionalists ought to consider supporting a new
kind of rule for overriding the marriage-for-life default: when a romantic couple
gets married, they enjoy the (now normal) no-fault override rule-until they
have or adopt a child, in which case the override rule becomes more stringent
(along the lines laid out in covenant-marriage laws). In other words, having a
child legally transforms the ordinary marriage into a covenant marriage that is
harder to terminate.30 9 Perhaps when the children all reach the age of majority,
the override rule might fall back to no-fault divorce upon the assumption that
the children are less vulnerable to parental break-up at that point.
To be sure, this option might also be a hard sell politically and might in
practice deter some romantic couples from marrying. To make covenant mar-
307. See NOCK ET AL., supra note 265, at 43 (reporting low rates of knowledge of and registration for
covenant marriages in the jurisdictions that have them); BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Some Alabama Lawmakers
May Think 'Covenant Marriage'a Good Idea but Not Many Commenters, AL.COM (Mar. 19, 2012, 2:28
PM), http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2012/03/some alabama-lawmakersmaythi.html (reporting skepti-
cism about a covenant marriage bill in Baptist Alabama, with bloggers feasting on the idea like
famished dieters).
308. E.g., WALLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 287 (presenting a leading empirical study of the high costs
of parental divorce on children); Paul R. Amato & Bruce Keith, Parental Divorce and the Well-Being of
Children: A Meta-Analysis, 110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 26 (1991).
309. Ian Ayres and Peg Brinig suggested this idea to me. Tennessee and Virginia impose longer
waiting periods for married couples seeking divorce when there are minor children in the households.
See TENN. CODE § 36-4-101; VA. CODE § 20-91. California's domestic-partnership law for lesbian and
gay couples makes it much easier for those couples to divorce if they are partnered for less than five
years and are rearing no children in the partnership household (as well as meeting various other
conditions). See CAL. FAM. CODE § 299(a) (Deering 2006), added by 2003 Cal. Stats., ch. 421, § 8.
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riages more attractive to romantic couples, a better proposal might be to
sweeten covenant-marriage laws with one or two big legal benefits not available
to regular married couples. Given the child-protective rationale, the most obvi-
ous benefit that might be added would be a significantly larger tax deduction for
each child in a covenant marriage. Thus, if state law (and federal law if
Congress went along) afforded married or cohabiting parents a $2000 deduction
from gross income for each dependent child, the state might as a matter of
policy afford parents in a covenant marriage a $10,000 deduction for each
dependent child. This would not only make the covenant-marriage regime more
attractive but would also tie the bonus to the main rationale for covenant
marriage-protecting the interests of children reared within the relationship.
Although it is uncertain whether this or other added legal benefits would
induce large numbers of romantic couples to opt for covenant marriages, this is
precisely the sort of policy TFV persons and associations ought to be studying
and advocating, rather than opposing marriage equality. Now that romantic
couples enjoy a menu of relationship choices, traditionalists must ask them-
selves: Why should romantic couples opt for covenant marriages that are harder
to exit? Opposition to same-sex marriage does not contribute to such a norma-
tive project and, if anything, will undermine it if the state creates yet another
menu regime competing with marriage. The best strategy for traditionalists is
not one grounded upon prohibitory rules at all-but instead one grounded upon
positive incentives.
Indeed, I would suggest that the time has come for sincere supporters of
marriage equality and sincere traditionalist opponents to reach a grand compro-
mise in a state that has not recognized same-sex marriages. In return for liberal
and progressive support for a covenant-marriage regime with extra child-based
regulatory benefits, conservatives and traditionalists ought to agree to marriage
equality. If something like this grand compromise could be achieved in just one
state, its success could be a model for other states as well.
B. PROGRESSIVE FEMINIST VALUES (WOMEN'S RELATIONAL FLOURISHING)
AND MENUS, DEFAULTS, AND OVERRIDES
Many progressives have the opposite problem with the marriage-equality
movement than most traditionalists have: the latter object to homosexual couples
entering the institution of marriage, whereas the former object to LGBT persons
and feminists seeking to enter the institution of marriage. The progressive
objection, voiced most articulately by feminist thinkers such as Paula Ettelbrick
and Nancy Polikoff, is that marriage is a patriarchal institution with a poor
history of treatment for women, sexual minorities, and the poor. Why should
lesbian and gay couples want to inhabit such an institution? 310 More broadly,
310. For examples of progressive-feminist or lesbian-feminist critiques of marriage and of the
marriage-equality movement, see RUTHANN RoBsoN, LESBIAN (Otrr)LAw: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF
LAw (1992); Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?, 13 DIFFERENCES 14 (2002);
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progressives maintain that family law reform should not focus on extending
marriage rights to more couples but rather should focus on reconfiguring family
law so that more "families" (understood broadly to include caregivers, friends,
and cohabitants) are provided governmental benefits and protections tradition-
ally afforded only married spouses. This broader agenda is articulated in the
Beyond Same-Sex Marriage website and movement.3 '
To be sure, progressives generally believe that lesbian and gay couples ought
to have the same legal options that straight couples have, and thus many.
progressives do not absolutely oppose marriage equality. Instead, they oppose
efforts to make marriage equality such a priority of the LGBT rights movement,
when other problems are just as important or more important to American
families, broadly understood.3 12 Consistent with the theme of this Article, these
critics correctly understand that both legal options and legal prohibitions are
regulatory. So long as the state channels citizens into marriage by providing
special legal-benefits rights only (or primarily) to married couples, the state is
regulating and penalizing persons and couples who form important relationships
outside of marriage. By normalizing gay marriage, the state is further marginal-
izing single gay persons, unmarried cohabiting couples, and open relationships,
including those of married lesbian and gay couples.3 13
Supporters of same-sex marriage respond that marriage equality ought also
be understood as normalizing gays.314 The normative struggle for marriage
equality has a potentially large payoff for all sexual minorities because it
promises to undermine homophobia. A central theme of antihomosexual animus
is the stereotype of the gay or lesbian person as selfish and hedonistic; homo-
sexual relationships are denigrated as sterile and sad.31 Marriage equality
undermines these narratives, for it reveals how LGBT people form meaningful
relationships and, increasingly, raise children within those relationships. LGBT
Claudia Card, Against Marriage and Motherhood, HYPATIA, Summer 1996, at 1; Colker, supra note 219;
Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK, Fall 1989, at 9;
Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not
"Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REv. 1535 (1993).
311. Beyond Same-Sex Marriage: A New Strategic Vision for All Our Families & Relationships,
BEYONDMARRIAGE.ORG (July 26, 2006), http://www.beyondmarriage.org/fullstatement.html [hereinafter
Beyond Same-Sex Marriage].
312. This is the main point made in Beyond Same-Sex Marriage: "Marriage is not the only worthy
form of family or relationship, and it should not be legally and economically privileged above all
others. While we honor those for whom marriage is the most meaningful personal-for some, also a
deeply spiritual-choice, we believe that many other kinds of kinship relationship, households, and
families must also be accorded recognition." Id.
313. E.g., Ettelbrick, supra note 310; Polikoff, supra note 310; Beyond Same-Sex Marriage, supra
note 311.
314. E.g., CHESHIRE CALHOUN, FEMINISM, THE FAMILY, AND THE POLITICS OF THE CLOSET' LESBIAN AND
GAY DISPLACEMENT 107-15 (2000); ESKRIDGE, supra note 23, at 197-230.
315. Angela Simon, The Relationship Between Stereotypes of and Attitudes Toward Lesbians and
Gays, in STIGMA AND SEXUAL ORIENTAION: UNDERSTANDING PREJUDICE AGAINST LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND
BISEXUALS 62, 62-63 (Gregory M. Herek ed., 1998); Gregory M. Herek, Sexual Prejudice, in HANDBOOK
OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION 441, 448-51 (Todd D. Nelson ed., 2009).
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couples with children constitute a performative counternarrative to antigay
stereotyping, as they demonstrate the reality of LGBT families.31 Many progres-
sives remain unpersuaded by this line of argument, insisting that the payoff for
undermining these traditional stereotypes will be concentrated in the hands of
"respectable" married "homosexuals," and not "queers" and nontraditional
families. 1 The vocabulary of menus, defaults, and overrides deployed in this
Article provides a useful way for progressives to approach this issue.
1. Ameliorating the Progressive Critique of Marriage
Some progressive critics of marriage equality object that marriage is a
.patriarchal institution saturated with deep and pervasive historic discriminations
against women, persons of color, and LGBT persons. 318 A central mistake of
this particular critique is its tendency to treat marriage as a static institution-
when in fact it is highly mobile, having changed dramatically in the last century
and even more in the new millennium. 31 9 The decline of mandatory rules and
the new guided-choice regime have created a new institution still called mar-
riage but a very different institution from the one that some progressive critics
fixate upon. (Ironically, of course, when opponents of marriage equality claim
they are defending "traditional marriage," they are invoking an equally dynamic
concept-they are not defending marriage as it existed in 1911 or even as it
existed in 1961. For leading defenders of marriage such as Bill Clinton in the
1990s and George Bush in the 2000s, "traditional marriage" is post Loving, post
no-fault divorce, and post adultery decriminalization.)
For a demonstration of the normative as well as legal mobility of marriage,
consider this example invoked by lesbian-feminist critics. During Reconstruc-
tion and through most of the twentieth century, marriage was a thoroughly racist
institution, utilized by some to discipline cohabiting black couples while at the
same time segregated by law to preserve the integrity and supremacy of the
"white race." 3 2 0 This is a morally squalid history-but does that squalid history
mean that marriage remains a racist institution today? Indeed, is it not possible
that interracial marriages (now 7.5% of all marriages) are one way that our
society can undermine racism, by removing the hard racial lines of the past and
literally integrating family networks?
316. See Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-Orientation: Transgendered People and Same-Sex Marriage, 8
UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 219, 265-66 (1998).
317. E.g., Ettelbrick, supra note 310.
318. See generally Beyond Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 311 (objecting to campaigns of "conserva-
tive ... coercive, patriarchal marriage promotion"); Ettelbrick, supra note 310.
319. On the constant evolution of marriage, the standard source (and a book worth reading) is Corr,
supra note 26.
320. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (reporting lower court opinions that affirmed the
"white supremacy" assumption of southern antimiscegenation laws); Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a
Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251
(1999) (reporting the deployment of marriage law by racist southern governments to discipline
cohabiting blacks).
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Vicki Schultz and Michael Yarbrough respond that western marriage is
intrinsically and deeply patriarchal in ways that it never was intrinsically
racist.3 2 ' As a cultural institution, marriage is gendered and is associated with a
division of labor (with women still doing most of the housework) that reinforces
the sexist trope of working husband and caregiving wife. As a legal institution,
civil marriage subsidizes spouses who stay at home and raise children. Whether
it comes from social gender stereotyping or legal rules, Schultz and Yarbrough
argue that marriage channels people's energies into-specialized and nonegalitar-
ian roles within the home.3 22 I am more doubtful. As Nan Hunter and Mary
Coombs have argued, the introduction of same-sex couples and transgender
persons into the institution is a potentially powerful force for de-gendering
marriage and, with it, American society.3 2 3 So long as civil marriage is limited
to one man and one woman, the institution rests upon the sexist assumption that
love, romance, and family for any woman require the inseminating presence of
a man. Once marriage is opened up to two women, this central institution of our
legal culture becomes a testament to the antisexist notion that a woman can find
love, romance, and family with another woman. This is potentially quite
liberating-and synergistic.32 4 Evidence from couples who entered into civil
unions in Vermont during the first decade of the new millennium indicate that
lesbian and gay couples who joined in the institutional equivalent of marriage
revealed the same nongendered practices of household management that other
scholars have found for nonmarried LGBT families. 3 2 5 Given the short time
span and nonrandom sampling virtually inevitable in any study of LGBT
families, these conclusions are preliminary and tentative-but there are no
studies suggesting otherwise at this point.
Like most traditionalist critics of marriage equality, many progressive critics
321. Vicki Schultz & Michael Yarbrough, Will Marriage Make Gay and Lesbian Couples Less
Egalitarian? A Cautionary Tale 14-16, 21-42 (Apr. 15, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author). .
322. Id.
323. Coombs, supra note 316, at 266; Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist
Inquiry, I LAw & SEXUALITY 9, 16-19 (1991).
324. Thus, progressive critics of marriage equality seem to assume that the LGBT rights agenda
involves a zero-sum game: working for marriage equality means fewer resources for campaigns against,
for example, sexual violence. That is wrong. The marriage-equality movement, for example, helped
pave the way for decriminalization of consensual sodomy, both by raising public consciousness about
lesbian and gay families and by pressing traditionalists to prove that their opposition to gay marriage
did not arise out of antigay bigotry. See EsKRUDGE, supra note 33.
325. See Sondra E. Solomon et al., Pioneers in Partnership: Lesbian and Gay Male Couples in Civil
Unions Compared with Those Not in Civil Unions and Married Heterosexual Siblings, 18 J. FAM.
PSYCHOL. 275, 282 (2004); Sondra E. Solomon et al., Money, Housework Sex, and Conflict: Same-Sex
Couples in Civil Unions, Those Not in Civil Unions, and Heterosexual Married Siblings, 52 SEX ROLES
561, 567-68, 570 (2005); see also Robert-Jay Green, Risk and Resilience in Lesbian and Gay Couples:
Comment on Solomon, Rothblum, and Balsam, 18 J. FAM. PsycHoL. 290 (2004) (commenting on
Solomon et al., supra); Charlotte J. Patterson, What Diference Does a Civil Union Make? Changing
Public Policies and the Experiences of Same-Sex Couples: Comment on Solomon, Rothblum, and
Balsam, 18 J. FAM. PsycHoL. 287 (2004) (same).
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have misplaced their own energies. If their concern is to protect marginalized
persons and couples who do not want to marry or who value their sexual
freedom, the progressive agenda ought to focus on the content of the emerging
family law menu of regimes.3 26 For example, at the same time LGBT groups
have been pressing their case for same-sex marriage, judges and law professors
have been pressing for increased legal regulation of cohabitation. I should
submit that the latter, making the cohabitation regime more like the marriage
regime, represents a much bigger challenge to the sexual freedom of unmarried
couples than marriage equality does. An even more exciting opportunity for
progressive critics of marriage is presented by the expanding menu, which I
now consider.
2. Progressive Opportunities Within the Expanding Menu of Relationship
Options
Recall the ways in which the same-sex marriage debate has created a larger
context in which the family law menu of relationship regimes has been expand-
ing. Progressives* should take advantage of these opportunities to press for
alternatives to marriage that they consider to be good. This was the original
concept of domestic partnerships: progressive activists in San Francisco created
a new, secular institution for municipal recognition of lesbian and gay partner-
ships. Because recognition of such relationships was, early on, possible only at
the municipal level, domestic partnerships carried few legal rights. An excep-
tion has been the District of Columbia, whose 1992 domestic-partnership law
provided only employment benefits for partners.32 8 But subsequent amendments
expanded the range of benefits afforded domestic partners-until the 2006 and
2008 amendments conferred on domestic partners almost all the rights, benefits,
and duties of spouses. 3 2 9 Notably, different-sex as well as same-sex couples can
register in the District.
Consistent with the District of Columbia's experience, Robin West has argued
that the new institution of civil unions provides a robust alternative to marriage
326. Thus, Beyond Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 311, says much about how America's family
pluralism ought to be reflected in a more pluralistic family law but says virtually nothing about the new
institutions (discussed in this Article) that have been implemented in the last thirty years to fill part of
that need. Moreover, the statement seems unaware that the same-sex marriage movement has actually
resulted in the creation of several experimental institutions, such as reciprocal and designated beneficia-
ries, that address the precise problems the statement identifies.
327. Beyond Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 311, does not discuss the tremendously important
issues surrounding the law of cohabitation-including the increasing numbers of legal benefits that are
accorded cohabiting couples in many jurisdictions (a trend the statement ought to find useful) as well as
the tendency in some states to impose marriage-like duties onto cohabiting partners (a trend the
statement might find more problematic).
328. Health Care Benefits Expansion Act of 1992, 1992 D.C. Law 9-114.
329. Domestic Partner Equality Amendment Act of 2006, 2006 D.C. Legis. Serv. 16-79 (West);
Omnibus Domestic Partner Equality Amendment Act of 2008, 2008 D.C. Legis. Serv. 17-231 (West).
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without the patriarchal baggage of that institution. 3 30 The virtue of Professor
West's proposal, from a progressive perspective, is that it delinks the state's
institutional support for committed couples from the religion-saturated institu-
tion of marriage. Everyone-straight couples, lesbian and gay couples, and
couples including transgender persons-would have access to the same civil
institution that values interpersonal commitment but without the linkage to the
sacramental religious institution of God-blessed marriage. Politically, the pro-
posal might be especially attractive if it were combined with the preservation of
marriage as a civil institution, perhaps one that is much harder to exit than it is
now (so something more like covenant marriage rather than today's marriage
with unilateral no-fault divorce as an easy exit route).
Another possible focus for progressive reform is the institution of reciprocal
or designated beneficiaries, along the lines set by Hawaii in 1997 and Colorado
in 2009."' Unlike civil unions and marriage, the reciprocal or designated-
beneficiary institution does not entail a hard-to-exit lifetime commitment; end-
ing a reciprocal or designated-beneficiary relationship is as easy as filling out a
form. This arrangement is less likely than cohabitation to entail complicated
property-division and support obligations upon the couple's separation. The
institution also does not carry with it fidelity rights and duties-but does
provide beneficiaries with much of the social-safety-net and decision-making
rules that marriage law provides. Many couples may care for their partners and
consider them to be the best decision makers in bad times but may not desire the
support obligations or sexual fidelity of marriage. For these couples who are
happy to forego the benefits of marriage, progressives might want to press for
something like the reciprocal-beneficiary institution in states beyond Hawaii,
Vermont, and Colorado.
Some progressives believe that these new institutions, these new items on the
menu of relationship regimes, will be swallowed up by the marriage-equality
movement. In other words, once same-sex marriages are recognized, the earlier
established institutions will be revoked. In states now recognizing same-sex
marriages, some employers no longer recognize domestic partnerships and now
demand a marriage license for a partner to qualify for healthcare insurance and
other employee benefits.33 2 When the Vermont and New Hampshire legislatures
enacted same-sex-marriage statutes, they converted then-existing civil unions
and domestic partnerships, respectively, into marriages and abrogated those
330. RoslN WEST, MARRIAGE, SEXUALITY, AND GENDER (2007). Compare Professor Solomon's articles,
supra note 325, providing an empirical snapshot of Vermont's experience with civil unions. See sources
cited supra note 310.
331. See supra section II.C.2.b.
332. For example, Yale University, where I teach, abandoned its domestic-partnership benefits
program when Connecticut recognized civil unions and then same-sex marriages. See Tara Siegel





alternate family law regimes.
Yet this scenario is far from inevitable; it is a political choice made by elected
legislators. This choice reflects the reality that citizens in most states agree with
traditionalists that the state should be encouraging (but not requiring) romantic
couples to enter into long-term committed relationships-and do not agree with
progressives who criticize marriage. Yet the erasure scenario is far from inevi-
table, for earlier adopted regimes for state recognition often survive marriage
equality-especially when the earlier regimes are available to different-sex as
well as same-sex couples. The best example of this phenomenon is employer or
municipal recognition of different-sex as well as same-sex domestic partners for
purposes of employee benefits, including health insurance, family leave, and so
forth. When these benefits are available to all domestic partners, and not just
lesbian and gay partners, marriage equality has usually not impelled these
employers and municipalities to revoke such benefits.33 4 Other examples of this
phenomenon include registered partnerships in The Netherlands, common law
spouses in Canada, domestic partnerships in the District of Columbia, and
reciprocal beneficiaries in Hawaii-all of which survived the enactment of new
statutes recognizing same-sex marriages (or, in the case of Hawaii, civil
unions).33 5
More broadly stated, the marriage-equality movement gives progressives the
golden opportunity they need to advance their own positive proposals for family
law reform because the door is open to legislative consideration of new institu-
tions at the same time policymakers are seeking compromises between marriage-
equality groups and opposing (mostly traditional-family-values) groups.
3. Family Equality: New Default and Override Rules for Parent-Child
Relationships
The challenge for progressives is to rethink the menu of relationship regimes.
Some ideas flow from the progressive critique that the state gives far too much
emphasis and encouragement to marriage. (This objection would be more
powerful if progressives backed it up with the kind of empirical analysis
scholars have devoted to the proposition that marriage secures utilitarian advan-
333. N.H. REv. STAr. ANN. § 457.46 (2012) (marriage-equality statute, transforming civil unions into
marriages); 2009 VT. STAT., S.B. 115, § 12(b) (marriage-equality statute, repealing the 2000 civil-unions
law).
334. See supra section H.c.2.a.
335. See LEGAL RECOGNITION, supra note 304, at 211-78 (discussing Canada); id. at 437-64 (discuss-
ing The Netherlands); D.C. OFFICE OF GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER AFFAIRS, Marriage and
Domestic Partnership Information, http://dc.gov/DC/GLBT/Resources +and+ Publications/Marriage+
and+Domestic+Partnership (last visited May 21, 2012) (describing the rights same-sex couples now
have to marry or to register as domestic partners in the District); 2011 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 1 (S.B.
232) (leaving the state reciprocal-beneficiaries law intact but providing that reciprocal beneficiaries
could not secure a civil union until they had terminated their reciprocal-beneficiary status); HAWAII
DEP'T OF HEALTH, About Reciprocal Beneficiary Relationships, http://hawaii.gov/health/vital-records/vital-
records/reciprocallindex.html (last visited May 21, 2012) (describing rights reciprocal beneficiaries
continue to have under Hawaii law).
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tages for romantic couples and their children.) Thus, progressives might urge
the creation of alternative institutions, like civil unions and reciprocal beneficia-
ries, and reconsideration of the many extralegal benefits the law accords mar-
ried couples. A primary progressive focus would then be federal law, which
rewards married couples in many ways, as the Defense of Marriage Act
litigations are now illustrating. This kind of progressive agenda faces an uphill
battle, for most Americans agree with the traditionalist position that the state
ought to encourage committed relationships, especially when there are children
in households. But, in a democracy, progressives ought not to complain too
loudly that the government is not recognizing the "right" institutions simply
because most citizens and voters reject progressive ideas and proposals.
Another progressive option offers more exciting possibilities for alliances
with traditionalists who focus on the welfare of children. Exemplified by
Martha Fineman, many feminist theorists argue that family law reform should
deemphasize the menu of options for horizontal (romantic) relationships and
give more attention to the menu of options for vertical (caregiving) relation-
ships. 3 3 6 Much feminist work thus far has been devoted to providing more
resources to such relationships-for example, along family-medical-leave lines.
Complementing such work is a newer focus on rethinking the traditional
mandatory rules about parent-child relationships.
Founded upon the natural law understanding, the traditional rules were that
children born within marriage were conclusively presumed to be the progeny of
the married couple, whereas children born outside of marriage were "bastards"
with at most one parent (the birth mother) and a host of discriminations against
them. 3 These mandatory rules have been abandoned or softened everywhere
in the country. Thus, the traditional presumption of the husband's paternity for
children born within the marriage has been largely replaced with a default rule
that can be overridden. Another mandatory rule that is in the process of
abandonment is the exclusion of same-sex parents from joint parenting of
children; this mandatory rule has been revoked in as many as half the states, and
the traditional default rule has been relaxed with override rules that protect the
"best interests" of children. 3 3 9
The basis for these new default-with-override rules has been the same
utilitarian understanding that has revolutionized other areas of family law and
336. See FINEMAN, supra note 16.
337. See, e.g., JOAN WDLtAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICr AND WaT To
Do ABOUT IT 229, 237 (2000).
338. Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have To Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for
Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 208-10 (2009).
339. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood To Meet the
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990); see
also Eleanor Michael, Comment, Approaching Same-Sex Marriage: How Second Parent Adoption
Cases Can Help Courts Achieve the "Best Interests of the Same-Sex Family," 36 CONN. L. REV. 1439,
1447 (2004) ("Courts have permitted same-sex couples to adopt children in all but a few states by using
[a] 'best interests of the child' standard.").
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given the field its current pluralistic texture. Thus, marriage and blood, the
traditional bases for parental rights, have been supplemented, and sometimes
have been replaced, by functional defaults. Those defaults, in turn, are informed
by attachment theory, the notion that children benefit from continued nurturing
by early caregivers.
The energy devoted to marriage equality ought to be matched, or perhaps
now exceeded, by energy devoted to family equality, where lesbian and gay
partners can rear children on the same terms as straight partners. This has been a
project long advocated by Nancy Polikoff." The vocabulary and concepts of
this Article contribute to a deeper appreciation of Professor Polikoff's agenda.
When children are born into a marital household, the married spouses are
presumed to be the legal parents of those children. That presumption of
parenthood ought to be extended to cases where children are born into a
household of same-sex partners joined in a civil union, or other state equivalent
institutions. This is the emerging rule. In the District of Columbia, for example,
both same-sex domestic partners and spouses (including same-sex spouses) are
automatically reported as a child's legal parents.34 '
Thirty-six percent of Americans live in jurisdictions where lesbian and gay
couples can marry or enter a civil union-which means that almost two-thirds
live in a nonrecognition jurisdiction.34 2 For lesbian and gay couples raising
children in most of those nonrecognition jurisdictions, the current default rule is
that only one partner (usually the biological mother) will be the legal parent.
This is a default rule that ought to be easier to override than it is now for lesbian
and gay parents who are unmarried and not joined in a civil union or its
equivalent. The simplest, and best, solution is the one advocated by Professor
Polikoff and adopted in the District of Columbia: for unmarried and unpartnered
couples who voluntarily agree to co-parent, District law now allows both
parents to be listed on the birth certificate.34 3 This is an approach that ought to
be adopted everywhere. Even some traditionalists might be willing to support,
340. Compare Polikoff, supra note 339 (articulating early family equality for lesbian couples), with
PoLIKoFF, supra note 14 (articulating a more recent vision of such equality and in more depth).
341. D.C. CODE § 7-205(e)(2)-(2A) (2001).
342. The United States has 308.8 million people. Jurisdictions recognizing (or soon to recognize)
gay marriage, civil unions, or equivalent domestic partnerships include California (37.3 million), New
York (19.4 million), Illinois (12.9 million), New Jersey (8.8 million), Washington (6.8 million),
Massachusetts (6.6 million), Maryland (5.8 million), Connecticut (3.6 million), Iowa (3.1 million),
Nevada (2.7 million), Hawaii (1.4 million), New Hampshire (1.3 million), Rhode Island (1.1 million),
Vermont (0.6 million), and the District of Columbia (0.6 million). See KiusTm D. BuRNErr, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, 2010 CENSUS BluEFs: CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT 1-2 (2011), available at http://www.census.
gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2OlObr-08.pdf; see also 2010 Census Interactive Population Search: DC-
District of Columbia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://2010.census.gov/2010census/popmaplipmtext.php
(last visited Mar. 24, 2012). Note that I am including Maryland and Washington, whose marriage-
recognition statutes will probably be subject to popular referenda later in 2012 and might not go into
effect if they are negated.
343. D.C. CODE § 7-205(e)(3); see Polikoff, supra note 338, at 238-40 (justifying such laws, based
upon the best interests of children).
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or not oppose, this needed reform, because allowing children to have two legal
parents from birth is usually better for children than having just one legal
parent, even under a philosophy that considers lesbian and gay unions inferior
to straight marriages as situses for rearing children.
Often straight, lesbian, and gay partnerships form after children have been
born. Straight unmarried couples have the option of adoption: if the other legal
parent does not stand in the way (because of death, waiver, or absence), the
nonparent partner can usually adopt the child. Many states have allowed lesbian
and gay couples to enter "second-parent adoptions," whereby the same-sex
nonparent partner can adopt the child.3 " Some states that do not allow same-
sex marriages, civil unions, or second-parent adoptions recognize the rights of
"de facto parents," namely, caregiving partners who are important to the child's
early development and wish to remain in the child's life after the legal parent
and the de facto parent have broken up as a romantic couple.
To recognize de facto parenting rights but not second-parent adoption (or
step-parent adoption in those states recognizing same-sex marriages or civil
unions) is an inferior legal regime-and frankly one that flaunts the best-interests-
of-the-child standard that governs these issues. A particularly questionable
approach is the one taken recently by the North Carolina Supreme Court in
Boseman v. Jarrell.345 Some lower courts in North Carolina had been recogniz-
ing second-parent adoptions for female partners of children's biological moth-
ers. The state supreme court not only disapproved of the practice as a matter of
the state adoption law but also went out of its way to rule that the lower courts
had no jurisdiction to enter such orders.3 46 As a result, a number of adoption
orders were technically voided by a highly dynamic reading of the jurisdictional
provision, a point that dissenting justices cogently pursued.34 7 Although the
majority opinion held out the possibility that the same-sex partner could be
recognized as a de facto parent because the biological mother had agreed to
share responsibilities with her,348 the ruling potentially disrupted the lives of an
undetermined number of children without legal or moral justification.
The larger problem with Boseman is the court's refusal to allow lesbian
parents to create clear lines of legal authority to support their children. Second-
parent adoption permits the parents to establish such authority before problems
arise, whether because of the death or disability of the biological mother or
because of the breakup of the couple. De facto parenthood, in contrast, vests
parental authority only after a problem arises-usually the breakup of the
romantic couple. An ex post remedy such as de facto parenting is greatly
inferior to an ex ante remedy such as second-parent adoption because it is
344. See Polikoff, supra note 339, at 522. For a survey of state practices as of January 2011, see
ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 8, at app. 7.
345. 704 S.E.2d 494 (N.C. 2010).
346. Id. at 500-01.
347. Id. at 505 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting); id. at 509-10 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
348. Id. at 504 (majority opinion).
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expensive to pursue and does not provide clear guidance (de facto parenthood
requires an inquiry into the child's domestic situation and is often hard to
predict beforehand).
C. FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR OUR PLURALIST FAMILY LAW
In light of family law's heterogeneous goals and the different utilitarian
visions that fuel continuing debates over marriage equality and other issues,
directions for the future are hard to predict with great certainty. Consider some
recommendations that flow from the analysis found in this Article and in the
emerging corpus of scholarship regarding what I am calling the new pluralist
family law.
1. Family Law Pluralism: The Reach of the Nondiscrimination Norm
The central question for a pluralist family law is what relationships the law
ought to recognize and what regulatory regime ought to be offered to each
relationship. The biggest difference between the old natural law understanding
of family law and the newer utilitarian one is that the latter supports a baseline
of nondiscrimination that is alien to the former. Such a baseline does not
militate against legal distinctions but does demand that exclusions be supported
by something more than moral disapproval.
As both a normative aspiration and a predictive matter, family law's longtime
discrimination against LGBT relationships will continue to erode and will
ultimately be ended, as a matter of open, formal discrimination.3 4 9 American
family law has abandoned the natural law understanding that enshrined discrimi-
nation against lesbian and gay families, as well as against interracial families,
and has adopted an openly utilitarian understanding that is a favorable context
for marriage-equality claims. Now that happiness and human flourishing have
become the linchpins for family recognition, LGBT families will have to be
given fair and equal recognition, for pluralism-based reasons. As a matter of
utilitarian pluralism, it appears to be the case that same-sex marriage and civil
unions are sites for human flourishing, fulfilling (as well as disappointing) the
aspirations of lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and transgendered Americans. As a
matter of political pluralism, LGBT persons are swiftly becoming an integral
group in American politics-and a group that must be treated with dignity and
respect. Just as it is unthinkable today for a public figure to support the old
exclusion of different-race couples from civil marriage, so thirty years from
now it will be unthinkable for a public figure to support the old exclusion of
same-sex couples.
A pluralist family law that incorporates romantic LGBT couples must also
349. Lesbian and gay families are prominent agenda setters at several cutting edges of a reconfig-
ured family law that accommodates this new pluralism, but they are not alone. Families where at least
one of the partners is transgender are at another, related cutting edge-and the normative issues are just
as easy: our pluralist family law needs to afford full recognition to these families of choice, respecting
adult partnerships and protecting parental rights of transgender persons.
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fully and equally incorporate LGBT parents. Thus, the agenda relentlessly
pursued by Professor Polikoff is, contrary to her own pronouncements, closely
connected with the agenda of marriage equality.3 50 The United States is in the
process of recognizing that LGBT persons are just as functional, just as digni-
fied, and just as flawed as straight persons and that their flourishing often entails
romantic relationships and the rearing of children. Once this simple fact is
internalized within our political culture, marriage equality will result, as will
Professor Polikoff's norm, where the state facilitates rather than frustrates the
efforts of LGBT parents to establish secure legal relationships with the children
they are raising.
Marriage equality for LGBT persons is hard to deny under utilitarian prem-
ises. There are, however, more difficult issues on the horizon. For example, our
pluralist family law must confront normative issues raised by romantic partners
who are related to one another or who consist of more than two participants.35 2
These newly salient partnerships need to be evaluated from the utilitarian
perspective that now dominates our family law and not from a moralistic or
religious perspective characteristic of the natural law understanding that has
been displaced. For example, American family law must confront incest-based
bars to marriage and other institutions. Can the traditional bar to first-cousin
marriages be maintained? Marriages between persons who are related by affin-
ity (such as step-siblings) rather than by blood? Should Woody Allen have been
able to marry his step-daughter?
So how should the law relate to unions between "related" persons? The
analysis of this Article raises three questions that policymakers need to con-
front.35 3 To begin with, what should be the role of mandatory criminal rules?
The most powerful justification for mandatory criminal rules is present in those
instances where an older relative (especially a parent) engages in sexual conduct
with a minor,35 4 but most states are dealing with that urgent problem through
350. Cf POLIKOFF, supra note 14 (objecting to the LGBT rights movement's focus on marriage
equality and arguing in favor of a greater focus on family equality).
351. That agenda is laid out in Polikoff, supra note 338, at 212-14.
352. For thoughtful reconsiderations, see generally, Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage,
Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary Family
Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1543 (2005) (discussing how the incest taboo has
been used to trigger disgust toward same-sex relations and suggesting that incest laws, to the extent that
they should continue to exist, be justified by reasoned argument rather than disgust); David L.
Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 26 HoFsrtA L. REv. 53 (1997) (comparing the governmen-
tal response to polygamy to the response to same-sex marriage); and Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions
of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1501 (1997)
(arguing that the prohibition of polygamy is justified, but that same-sex marriage should be permitted because,
like traditional monogamous marriage, it contributes to the development of the modern liberal state).
353. In applying my analysis, I draw from the exhaustive and brilliantly analyzed work in Leslie
Pope, The Disputed Boundaries of Incest: Trying To Justify the Scope of U.S. Incest Law After Lawrence
(Supervised Analytic Writing, Yale Law School 2009) (unpublished paper) (on file with author).
354. See Graham Hughes, The Crime of Incest, 55 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 322, 330
(1964) (proposing that the criminal incest statutes ought to punish men that have sexual intercourse
with a biological daughter or granddaughter, stepdaughter, or adopted daughter who is less than
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more targeted child-abuse or aggravated-incest statutes, rather than general
incest prohibitions that are obviously overbroad in relation to this problem.
The justification for these targeted statutes is that the adult offender has taken
"unconscionable advantage of his or her relationship to the victim, arising out of
kinship or duty of protection or supervision."35 This justification does not
necessarily apply in cases where the romantic couple consists of adult relatives,
especially if they are related distantly (as cousins) or by affinity only.
Where related adults are involved in a romantic relationship, some states
impose no criminal penalties but do prohibit the related partners from getting
married. 5 Though the personal stakes are lower, this kind of rule also requires
a serious utilitarian defense. Some categories of incest bars are harder to defend
than others, within the confines of the utilitarian understanding of family law.
For example, bars to marriages between first cousins cannot persuasively be
defended on eugenics-based grounds (specifically, fear of birth defects), 5 and
in most instances cannot plausibly be defended on family-harmony grounds
(that is, protecting the family as a harmonious sexual safe space). 5 Some
step-relatives and relatives by affinity fall in love and would derive great
happiness and fulfillment from marrying-and the eugenics and family-
twenty-one years old); Note, Inbred Obscurity: Improving Incest Laws in the Shadow of the "Sexual
Family, " 119 HARv. L. REv. 2464, 2465 (2006).
355. See, e.g., 720 IL. COMp. STA. 5/12-16 (2010) (declaring that a person is guilty of "aggravated
criminal sexual abuse" if he or she "commits an act of sexual conduct with a victim who was under 18
years of age when the act was committed and the accused was a family member"); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-3603 (2007) (declaring that a person is guilty of "aggravated incest" if he marries a person who is
under eighteen years of age and is the offender's "biological, step or adoptive" "[c]hild, grandchild of
any degree, brother, sister, half-brother, half-sister, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece" or has sexual
intercourse with a person between sixteen and eighteen years old and is the offender's "biological, step
or adoptive" child, grandchild, brother, sister, half-brother, half-sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:78.1 (2004) (similar); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520b-.520c (West 2004)
(declaring that a person is guilty of "criminal sexual conduct" if he engages in sexual intercourse with a
person who is under thirteen years old or a person between the ages of thirteen and sixteen to whom he
is related "by blood or affinity to the fourth degree"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-22A-3, 25-1-6 (2009)
(a person is guilty of "aggravated incest" if he engages in an act of sexual penetration with a person
who is under eighteen years old and the offender is the person's natural parent, adopted parent, current
stepparent, former stepparent, grandchild, sibling, uncle, aunt, niece, nephew, "whole blood" cousin, or
"half-blood" cousin). Some of these statutes sweep broadly enough to capture cohabiting boyfriends,
e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWs §§ 750.520b-.520c (West 2004), and foster parents, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 22-22A-3.1 (2009).
356. David Royce & Anthony A. Waits, The Crime of Incest, 5 N. Ky. L. REv. 191, 195 (1978).
357. Almost every state has a civil statute excluding specific blood or affinitive relationships from
civil marriage and a separate statute criminalizing marriage or sexual intercourse between persons who
are related by blood or affinity. See Pope, supra note 353, at 4 & app. tbl.1. According to Pope, for
thirty states these prohibitions are not coextensive. See id.
358. See Robin Bennett et al., Genetic Counseling and Screening of Consanguineous Couples and
Their Offspring: Recommendations of the National Society of Genetic Counselors, 11 J. GENETIC
COUNSELING 97, 115-16 (2002).
359. See generally MARTIN OTTENHEIMER, FORBIDDEN RELATIvES: THE AMERICAN MYTH OF COUSIN
MARRIAGE (1996) (expressing great skepticism toward state bars to first-cousin marriages and demonstrat-
ing that such bars are highly unusual in industrialized polities outside the United States).
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harmony rationales would be just as weak in many of those cases. 3 " The
eugenics-based rationale is surprisingly weak for barring marriages between
parents and children or between blood siblings, 36 ' but the family-harmony
rationale provides a stronger justification even when both parties to the marriage
are adults.3 62
Some adult couples barred from marriage on grounds of incest have potential
constitutional claims in light of the Supreme Court's privacy and equal protec-
tion jurisprudence, which can be read to insist upon utilitarian justifications for
discriminations against sexual minorities (perhaps not just gay men, lesbians,
and bisexuals).36 3 As this Article illustrates, however, the primary focus for
regulatory reform ought to be state legislatures, not the U.S. Supreme Court.
State legislatures have been constantly revising marriage and incest laws in the
last generation and (so far) largely without the hysteria and political exploitation
that has accompanied the same-sex marriage debate. Some of the reforms are in
the directions outlined above: greater focus on child abuse and exploitation and
less focus on adult relations, " less regulation of distant relationships such as
first cousins365 and relatives by affinity, 366 and creation of new institutions such
as reciprocal-beneficiary institutions that are open to close relatives and afford
unitive rules to those couples.3 67 The utilitarian understanding of family law
provides a robust justification for all of these trends, and scholars ought to
pursue other ramifications through studies that draw more deeply from biology,
sociology, and economics.
The same questions might be asked of adult polyamorous relationships:
360. See Israel v. Allen, 577 P.2d 762, 764 (Colo. 1978) (invalidating a state marriage bar to adult
siblings by adoption, and rejecting family harmony and other state justifications).
361. See Pope, supra note 353, at 15-17 (documenting this trend).
362. On the family-harmony rationale, compare Commonwealth v. Rahim, 805 N.E.2d 13, 18 (Mass.
2004) (declining to apply state incest law to relationships of affinity, particularly when between
consenting adults), with Benton v. State, 461 S.E.2d 202, 203-04 (Ga. 1995) (upholding state incest law
as applied to relations between adults related by affinity, based upon the family-harmony rationale).
363. For scholars making these arguments, see Clare Kasemset, Should Consensual Incest Between
Consanguine Adults Be Restricted?, 2 INTERSECT 83 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence
Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REv. 27, 60-62; Christine
McNiece Metteer, Some "Incest" Is Harmless Incest: Determining the Fundamental Right To Marry of
Adults Related by Affinity Without Resorting to State Incest Statutes, 10 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 262,
265-72 (2000).
364. See Pope, supra note 353, at 10-14 (documenting this trend).
365. According to Pope, supra note 353, at 4 & app. tbl.1, in 2009, twenty-one jurisdictions
permitted first-cousin marriages, twenty-two prohibited first-cousin marriages, and eight permitted first
cousins to marry provided they qualify for an exemption.
366. See Pope, supra note 353, at 21-25 (documenting this trend).
367. See, e.g., RALPH C. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW AND THE EVOLVING FAMILY 82 (2004) (discussing
how reciprocal-beneficiary laws can "actually promote and strengthen traditional family structures,"
give proponents of heterosexual marriage "no cause to object" by limiting such laws to those legally
unable to marry, and include "close blood relatives such as . . . elderly siblings or ... parent and
child"); STEPHEN J. HYLAND, NEW JERSEY DOMESTIC PArNERS: A LEGAL GUIDE 3 (2004-2005) (noting that
Hawaii's Reciprocal Beneficiaries Bill would provide "a limited set of rights to anyone who was legally
unable to marry, including close relatives").
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Should they be criminalized? Probably not, unless there is evidence of coercion
or abuse, especially involving minors. Should romantic triples as well as
couples be allowed to marry? This is a hard question under the utilitarian
perspective. If not marriage, should another institution be created? Indeed, a
separate regime might be necessary, as the marriage, civil union, and reciprocal-
beneficiary defaults assume a two-person union. For a romantic triple, who
would be the default guardian, executor/trix, heir, or decision maker should one
of the partners die or become incapacitated? One idea suggested here is that the
state might follow the example of Colorado's 2009 designated-beneficiary law
and include in the statute or append to the statute, with flexibility for administra-
tors to update, a form of questions and opt-in/opt-out choices for each member
of the union.3"
Consider also that American family law already "recognizes" families with
more than two adults. In particular, children in our country sometimes have
more than two legal parents. A child might have a biological father who lives in
a separate household but has retained his parental rights and responsibilities, a
biological mother who works outside the home, and a caregiving mother who
might be either a second parent by adoption or a de facto parent. 369 Admittedly,
this kind of legal (recognized by a court) or quasi-legal (contained in a contract
that may or may not be enforceable) "polyparenting" is unusual in today's
family law but will probably become a more common phenomenon in the
future. If a child can have three parents, each with legal rights and responsibili-
ties to the child, it is not a great utilitarian policy leap for the law to recognize
legal rights and responsibilities among the three adults as partners. Whether
polyamorous relationships become a major policy issue for family law plural-
ism depends on whether such families will, in the future, proliferate the way
lesbian and gay families have done.370
2. Freedom of Contract: Mandatory Rules Ought To Be Cautiously/Narrowly
Deployed in Our Pluralist Family Law
Mandatory rules in family law have long been inspired by natural law
morality. With the substantial replacement of the natural law baseline with the
utilitarian one, most mandatory rules have been retired or have been replaced
with default-and-override rules or with positive incentives. This has been a
good development, even from a utilitarian perspective that seeks to encourage
368. See supra notes 257-58 and accompanying text.
369. See David D. Meyer, Partners, Care Givers, and the Constitutional Substance of Parenthood,
in WU.soN, RECONCEIVING THE FAMrLY, supra note 218, at 47, 48-55 (describing and criticizing a tentative
movement in the case law, strongly endorsed by the ALI's Principles, toward recognizing more than
two adults as legal "parents" in some jurisdictions).
370. See Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 337 (2004) (arguing that
the law's recognition of new kinds of families depends on the power of the accompanying social
movement; the LGBT rights movement will secure marriage equality, but it is not clear that related
persons or polygamists will generate enough of a social movement to be as broadly successful).
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committed relationships. To begin with, the utilitarian understanding of family
law is skeptical of mandatory rules dictating or forbidding capable adults to
make romantic and relationship choices that meet their needs. If the goal of
family law is to facilitate individual happiness and if individuals and couples
are heterogeneous in their tastes, mandatory rules are usually inappropriate
because they close off choices that will be good for some couples and some
children raised by those couples.371 Because the state is not omniscient, state-
dictated choices will always be inappropriate for many romantic couples-and
because the state is often slow-moving, state-dictated choice will sometimes be
inappropriate for most couples. Tastes are dynamic; hence, state-dictated choices
today will be out of sync with the needs of even more romantic couples ten
years from now. It is for these reasons that state-dictated mandatory rules have
typically been clumsy forms of regulation and have often been disastrously
ill-suited for the needs of romantic couples.
Mandatory rules, especially when expressed in the criminal law, often create
harmful modes of state regulation. When they become disconnected from social
needs or assumptions, mandatory rules might then become useless or even
counterproductive in advancing the instrumental goals attributed to them. If
states, for example, had retained their high barriers to divorce, would mandatory
or strong default rules have guaranteed long-term committed marriages? I doubt
it. There is no hard evidence that mandatory rules at odds with emerging social
mores had any effect on Americans' sexual and family behaviors in the twenti-
eth century-and they often had malign effects, such as creating or prolonging
unhappy marriages, corrupting police forces, and creating opportunities for
blackmail and extortion.
David Boaz and the Cato Institute have pressed the case against mandatory
rules even more strongly, arguing for completely "privatizing" marriage and
leaving romantic relationships entirely to agreements between the romantic
partners.37 2 Relegating relationships to contract law is not a completely deregu-
latory move, as the post-Marvin cohabitation cases illustrate. Even under a
contract model, there is ample room for governmental regulation to give effect
to reliance interests, to protect vulnerable third parties such as children, and to
encourage socially productive conduct through Kahanian nudges rather than
natural law shoves. And few Americans have the foresight or the resources to
371. See Brinig & Nock, supra note 7 (criticizing excessively broad family law rules that do not
meet the needs of particular categories of families and of children); Martha M. Ertman, Private
Ordering Under the ALI Principles: As Natural as Status, in WILSON, RECONCEIVING THE FAMLY, supra
note 218, at 284, 291-300 (defending private ordering as the appropriate baseline for most of our
now-pluralist family law); Elizabeth S. Scott, Domestic Partnerships, Implied Contracts, and Law
Reform, in WILSoN, RECONCEIVING THE FAmx, supra note 218, at 331 (defending a contract-based,
private ordering approach against a rules-based approach to cohabiting relationships).
372. See Boaz, supra note 15; see also Ruth Mitchell, Same-Sex Marriage-And Marriage 2
(Position Paper, Ctr. for Inquiry, Office of Pub. Policy, Nov. 2007), available at http://www.centerfor
inquiry.net/uploads/attachments/same-sex-marriage_1.pdf (arguing that states should recognize all rela-
tionships as civil unions, and private institutions, such as churches, may label them as marriages).
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contract for all the possibilities that can arise in family relationships-which
means that state menus and default rules will inevitably affect people's deci-
sions about interpersonal commitment and family. As Naomi Cahn and June
Carbone have argued, any regime requiring romantic partners to engage in
contracting and strategic planning will have class-based effects, imposing spe-
cial burdens on poor and working-class couples.
Assume, however, that Americans have the capability to enter into freely
consented, extensive contracts that cover all the contingencies (as implausible
an assumption as that is). Three big issues are immediately suggested by any
proposal that the state ought to do nothing more than enforce agreements
entered into by romantic partners. Perhaps the most interesting puzzles are in
answer to this question: What items can be the basis for private contracting?
Obviously, the state has to decide what rules ought to be mandatory. This is an
unexpectedly complex inquiry:
* Should romantic partners be able to contract around third-party rights, such
as their respective duties to support and maintain the children they are
raising? Presumably, the state ought to maintain basic rights for vulnerable
children, but may the partners bargain so that, for example, one spouse
assumes a greater burden of future support obligations in return for relief in
the present?
* Should romantic partners be able to renegotiate override rules? For ex-
ample, if the romantic couple wants to negotiate for a covenant marriage in
a state that offers no-fault divorce, should their agreement bind them, so
that a judge in the marital state will not grant a divorce except upon the
more stringent terms?374
* Can romantic partners consent to particular moral sanctions, or lack thereof?
For example, can the spouses enter into agreements to penalize either
spouse for drug use or other malfeasance, through an adjusted property or
support settlement upon divorce?375 Can a spouse agree at the beginning of
a marriage not to complain if she or he is forced against her or his will into
marital sexual activities? Does the written agreement constitute the kind of
"consent" that negates a rape or sexual assault charge?
373. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 7 (noting that family law rules play out very differently based
on class; marriage, for example, is flourishing among well-to-do couples, leaving poor or working-class
couples with fewer legal supports for their relationships).
374. Compare Massar v. Massar, 652 A.2d 219 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (enforcing a spousal
contract restricting the grounds upon which either spouse could seek a divorce), and Eric Rasmusen &
Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J.
453 (1998) (supporting a spousal right to agree upon a stricter divorce regime than that permissible
under state law), with AM. LAW INsT., supra note 218, § 7.08(1), Reporter's Notes, cmt. a (following the
weight of state court precedent to provide that such contracts would not be enforceable).
375. See In re Marriage of Merhen and Dargan v. Dargan, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 522 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
(holding that spouses could not contract for penalties to either spouse who engaged in "immoral"
conduct, for such agreements were contrary to the policy of California's no-fault divorce law); AM. LAW
INST., supra note 218, § 7.08(2) (similar).
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Thus, for reasons of fundamental (utilitarian) social policy, the state will want to
preserve third-party rights, override protocols, and fundamental liberties through
mandatory rules-or perhaps through super-stringent override rules. For ex-
ample, if the romantic partners want to consent, in advance, to a covenant
marriage in a jurisdiction that does not have a covenant-marriage law, my view
is that legislatures or courts ought to allow them to do so, subject to a stringent
set of override rules: (1) explicit, clearly stated consent is in writing before the
partners marry; (2) a competent attorney or judge swears that the partners are
aware of the ramifications of this decision; and (3) either partner can revoke her
or his consent within six months of the marriage.
This thought experiment suggests the continued role of mandatory rules for
family law's pursuit of its utilitarian goals, especially protection of vulnerable
persons or third-party interests. But the primary regulatory mechanism for our
family law pluralism ought to be override rules, not mandatory rules. Manda-
tory rules have been replaced by default-with-override rules across the board in
family law-from entry into various institutions to the rules governing the
partners' exit from the institution. Override rules may be a superior form of
regulation even in some areas where the state has legitimate concerns about the
parties' decision making. For example, it makes sense for the state to have a
mandatory rule barring fourteen-year-olds from marrying, because such persons
are deemed cognitively unequipped to make this major life decision, but how
about seventeen-year-olds? In that case, the state's judgment might be more
nuanced: if mature third parties, such as parents or a guardian, agree to the
marriage, the seventeen-year-old may wed. Consider another example, closer to
the edge of family law: soften the mandatory rule, followed in many states,
barring adult siblings by marriage from wedding, and adopt an override rule
allowing such marriage if the parents consent.
Issues that are sure to occupy family law in the future will probably be
handled more productively through default-and-override rules than no rules at
all or than mandatory ones. For example, should the progeny of a sperm or egg
donor have access to the identity of her biological parent (or vice versa)? At
present, there is virtually no state regulation, and so the matter is left to private
contracts, which usually assure secrecy.1 6 As Naomi Cahn has argued, private
contracting has left children without access to important information (relevant
to health concerns, for example) and family ties. She suggests that the law
should assure children access to their donor information once they reach
eighteen years old.377 Hence, she would change the default from "no access" to
"access," at the behest of the progeny. As she concedes, the new default raises
376. Cahn, supra note 37, at 390-94 (demonstrating that there is virtually no state regulation of the
relation of sperm or egg donors to offspring, and so the matter is left to private contracting).
377. See id. at 413-16.
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privacy and other concerns-concerns that I suggest might be met by retaining
the old default (no access) but creating an override process where the donor's
views can be considered by a decision maker if the donor objects.
The broader point here is that override rules are all about process-and
process is a mechanism for ameliorating colliding substantive concerns. (This is
yet another reason why mandatory rules are out of favor: they tend to be
all-or-nothing substantive decisions that do a poor job of accommodating
genuinely troubling substantive clashes.) In the new world of family law
pluralism, good procedures are not only the mechanism by which couples can
make intelligent, utility-maximizing choices, but can also be a mechanism for
working through situations when different persons have conflicting interests.
3. Democratic Deliberation: The Menu of Relationship Regimes Should Be
Clarified and Codified
Under the utilitarian understanding of family law, a menu of different legal
regimes for romantic relationships ought to be better than the marriage-
monopoly regime. Marriage is not a good idea for everyone, and two of the
consensus goals of family law-efficient decision making and protection of
vulnerable persons-are goals that are not limited to couples who are commit-
ted to lifetime partnerships. Essential to the utilitarian understanding is the
democratic notion that the happiness of every person is relevant to the law, and
this feature demands the pluralist family law that our culture has accepted. Even
a traditionalist approach to family law cannot ignore this reality.
The menu of legal regimes for romantic couples that various states now offer,
however, is unsatisfactory, because it is so unsystematic. Regimes have been
created willy-nilly, as ad hoc compromises like civil unions and domestic
partnerships or as piecemeal Christmas trees like the cohabitation regime. The
ad hoc approach is bad from any perspective, because there has usually been no
systematic examination of the effects of new regimes on the proper goals of a
pluralist family law. For the best example, cohabitation regimes have emerged
as a result of uncoordinated judicial, legislative, and executive decisions, with-
out any public deliberation about the following key issues:
* Coherence: Does our patchwork of default and override rules constitute a
regulatory regime? In some states, the answer is yes. In most states, the
patchwork is so unsystematic that the answer remains unclear.
* Notice: Is this regime one that cohabiting couples are aware of? Rarely do
couples know much about the regime; lack of notice to the citizenry is
intolerable for a pluralistic family law.
* Rationality: Is the regime optimal under the balance of utilitarian goals the
polity has agreed upon? Because the cohabitation regime is a hodgepodge
of state judicial decisions, state domestic-abuse and other independent
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statutes, federal safety-net laws, and administrative practices, there is not a
single jurisdiction where the cohabitation regime has been publicly deliber-
ated. Are the cohabitation rules fair to both of the romantic partners and
children they might be raising? Are the rules too much like marriage rules
from a progressive point of view? Do they create a competitive alternative
that undermines marriage from a traditionalist point of view?
These are questions that need to be considered-and deliberated in a public
process that also considers how many items the state menu ought to offer
romantic partners and how the different regulatory regimes relate to one an-
other.
Importantly, this deliberative process ought to occur in state legislatures,
preferably assisted by the kind of regulatory-reform commissions that spear-
headed criminal law as well as divorce law reform in the 1960s and 1970s.
Different state legislatures will come up with a different mix of regimes on their
menus-and that can be a good thing, for the various states can experiment with
different regimes, and we can all learn from this family law pluralism. Table 2
below provides an array of choices for legislators. The terminology is less
important than the driving concept of the table: the greater the mutual commit-
ment of the couple, the more rules, rights, duties, and benefits the state ensures
within the regime.
Table 2. Menu of Regimes and Their Rules, January 2012
Support/
Support/ Property-
Responsibility Employment Unitive Division Formal Family
for Children Benefits Rules Rules Divorce Bonus
Domestic X X
Partners
Reciprocal X (X) X
Beneficiaries
Cohabiting X (X) X X
Partners
Persons Joined X X X X X
in Civil
Unions
Married X X X X X
Persons





The vocabulary and concepts in this Article help clarify for lawmakers
precisely what public law decisions need to be made and what policy consider-
ations are relevant. First, the political culture needs to think about the mix of
family law goals it wants to pursue. Most jurisdictions probably favor some mix
of the three traditional goals, namely, encouragement of committed relation-
ships, protection of vulnerable persons such as children, and facilitation of
efficient decision making. The questions for policymakers are these: Which
goal, if any, deserves priority? How aggressive should the state be in pursuing
any of these goals? Which mix of regimes on the menu would best serve the
state's goals for family law?
The key regulatory question is whether the state wants to encourage commit-
ted relationships by favoring marriage (or covenant marriage). Indeed, as to this
issue, traditionalists who valorize committed relationships have been doing
useful and persuasive work, for they are producing evidence to support the
proposition that both individual and societal utility are served by a citizenry
who marry and have children. Building upon the many books and articles
showing that marriage is correlated with (and arguably a cause of) greater
happiness, wealth, and good health, recent studies are deploying more sophisti-
cated methodologies to suggest utilitarian advantages for cultures where marriage-
for-life is the norm. Thus, Margaret Brinig contrasts African Americans, who
live in a country where most adults still marry, and Quebecers, who live in a
country where most adults cohabit but do not marry. Professor Brinig finds that
the latter population, notwithstanding material advantages and a more tolerant
culture, are more suicidal and much less happy than the former population.7
Professor Brinig's study has the virtue of comparing two "minority" groups
under experimental conditions (that is, they were embedded in cultures that took
dramatically different postures toward giving state priority for marriage) and
producing significant and surprising conclusions.
Although causal relationships have not been conclusively established by
Professor Brinig or other researchers, the weight of the available evidence
suggests not only that the state should not abandon civil marriage as an
institution, but also that the state should be encouraging civil marriage and
giving it regulatory priority. Progressives, who tend to be more skeptical of
marriage-preferring policies, have not refuted this mounting evidence with
studies supporting their point of view-and until they do they cannot expect
policymakers to reject the marriage-preferring arguments made by conservative
utilitarians.
378. See Margaret F. Brinig, Two Treatments of Pluralism: Canada and the United States (2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
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Second, lawmakers need to consider how the different regimes interact with
the different goals. If society wants to encourage committed relationships, it
probably ought to offer civil marriage as a prominent option. That is only the
first of many questions policymakers ought to consider, however. Should the
regulatory regime be one called "marriage"? The presumptive answer to that
question is "yes" because of the overlapping reinforcements of committed
marriages, namely, encouragement by social and family pressures, by religious
sanction and support, and by state encouragement and subsidy.
In that event, the question becomes, What regulatory structure should mar-
riage entail? Civil marriage today entails much less commitment than civil
"marriage" did in 1911. Should the state encourage more commitment? If so,
how? Through state incentives? Through harder default rules, especially for
divorce (or divorce when there are children)? Through stronger child and
spousal support rules and better enforcement?
These are politically difficult choices for legislatures to make; indeed, even
the bluest of states is loathe to take back some of the liberty conferred upon
married partners by the no-fault divorce revolution. Should the state then
consider "multi-tiered marriage," namely, a menu offering marriage with no-
fault divorce and covenant marriage that is harder to exit and even marriage
regimes governed by religious tribunals rather than state courts?379 If the state
opts for covenant marriage, what incentives would induce more couples to
choose that higher level of commitment that the state considers optimal from a
utilitarian perspective?
Progressive critics of marriage favor less state emphasis on marriage regimes
in the family law menu. To the extent progressives believe that the state
over-rewards commitment, they need to make a stronger utilitarian case for
their position, given the mounting evidence supporting the utilitarian case for
marriage. As a complementary strategy, progressives ought to be emphasizing
the positive features of their platform, namely, the importance of state facilita-
tion of a broader array of relationships through expanded safety-net benefits and
through decision-making rules. Consider the list of relationships compiled by
Beyond Marriage:380
* Senior citizens living together, serving as each other's caregivers, partners,
and/or constructed families
* Adult children living with and caring for their parents
379. See Joel A. Nichols, Multi-Tiered Marriage: Ideas and Influences from New York and Louisiana
to the International Community, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 135 (2007).
380. Beyond Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 311 (quoting list on website).
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* Grandparents and other family members raising their children's (and/or a
relative's) children
* Committed, loving households in which there is more than one conjugal
partner
* Blended families
* Single parent households
* Extended families (especially in particular immigrant populations) living
under one roof, whose members care for one another
* Queer couples who decide to jointly create and raise a child with another
queer person or couple, in two households
* Close friends and siblings who live together in long-term, committed,
non-conjugal relationships, serving as each other's primary support and
caregivers
* Care-giving and partnership relationships that have been developed to
provide support systems to those living with HIV/AIDS
Even a conservative family law ought to be attentive to some, perhaps most, of
these relationships and ought to facilitate and even encourage them. In a
comprehensive consideration of a state's family law menu, these nonconjugal
relationships establish a compelling case for every state to add a reciprocal- or
designated-beneficiary law to its family code. The Colorado statute is of particu-
lar interest, for it allows the designated beneficiaries to opt in or opt out of a
detailed list of rights and duties, so as to tailor the state's menu of rights to fit
the needs of the beneficiaries.
The critical battleground between traditionalists, strongly emphasizing the
(utilitarian) value of commitment and marriage, versus progressives, emphasiz-
ing other goals for family law, ought not be the gay marriage debate, but instead
ought to focus on the precise role that a cohabitation regime should play in the
family law menu of relationship options. Should cohabitation be recognized as a
formal regime, with specific boundaries (defining "cohabitation," for example)
and a well-considered array of state default-with-override rules and benefits?
There is a trade-off between a cohabitation regime and marriage: many couples
who would otherwise marry will cohabit instead.38 1 Family law scholars,
381. For attacks on the ALI's Principles for their endorsement of domestic partnerships and a
contract-based approach to family law as inconsistent with the state's traditional preference for
marriage-for-life, see, e.g., Jane Adolphe, The Principles and Canada's "Beyond Conjugality" Report:
The Move Towards Abolition of State Marriage Laws, in WILSON, REcONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note
218, at 351; Lynn D. Wardle, Beyond Fault and No-Fault in the Reform of Marital Dissolution Law, in
WILSON, RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 218, at 9.
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however, have provided us with little illumination as to whether most, or any,
cohabiters would be happier or better off if they had married. And no illumina-
tion whatsoever as to whether a relationship population sorted between spouses
and cohabiters would enjoy an overall higher level of happiness.38 2 So this issue
remains a mystery under the utilitarian framework.
A related topic of deep interest and no answers is this one: What default and
override rules should the state impose upon cohabitation? If, as appears likely,
the political culture allows cohabitation without marriage but favors committed
relationships, it might impose more commitment-confirming default rules upon
cohabitation, such as a rule that after "x" years of cohabitation a couple is
presumed to share property and income and that a breakup imposes income and
property-sharing obligations on the partners."' By imposing alimony and prop-
erty-division rules upon cohabiting couples, the state makes cohabitation more
like marriage and thereby encourages committed relationships on two fronts:
among cohabiting couples, who have presumptive obligations, and among
married couples, who would have the same sorts of obligations as cohabitants
(so why not get married?). Yet this approach is beset with criticisms from all
sides. On the one hand, making cohabitation more like marriage is probably
inconsistent with the expectations of cohabiting couples; rather than an ordinary
default rule, this is more like a "penalty default," where the law sets an
unreasonable default in order to press the parties to negotiate their own solution
(a result highly unlikely in this setting, however).38 4 On the other hand, treating
cohabitation "like" marriage weakens both regimes: couples who would benefit
from marriage are drawn into cohabitation, to the detriment of them or their
children, whereas couples who do not want and would not benefit from the
commitments entailed in marriage find themselves saddled with unwanted, and
385
perhaps unnecessary, obligations.
382. That is, many couples would be unhappy if they were married, perhaps because they do not
"want" a lasting relationship or because they fear the expense and terror of divorce more than other
couples. And those not-designed-for-marriage couples "know" this about themselves with a reasonable
level of accuracy and so sort themselves out from married couples. In short, there is an optimal level of
marriage in the United States, surely much higher than zero percent of all romantic couples, but far less
than one-hundred percent either. What that level is, and even how it could be determined, are matters
beyond the agenda of current family law scholarship.
383. This is the posture of the ALI's Principles, Chapter 6 of which would impose property-division
and support defaults upon cohabiting couples (which the ALI deems to be "domestic partners") that are
drawn from the rules for married couples.
384. See Margaret F. Brinig, Domestic Partnership and Default Rules, in WILSON, RECONCEIVING THE
FAMLY, supra note 218, at 269 (making this criticism of the ALI's Principles and drawing from Ayres
and Gertner's theory of penalty defaults).
385. Marsha Garrison, Marriage Matters: What's Wrong with the ALI's Domestic Partnership
Proposal, in WILSON, RECONCEIVING THE FAity, supra note 218, at 305 (assailing the ALI's domestic-
partnership/cohabitation property-division and support rules on a variety of grounds, but particularly
because they conflate cohabitation and marriage, which serve radically different social purposes).
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In my view, cohabitation regimes ought not mimic marriage, contrary to the
ALI's Principles and the views of many scholars. Probably, the better approach
would be to codify the practices followed in most states, namely, protecting
reasonable reliance interests and explicit contracts between cohabiting parties,
providing special protections against domestic violence, and strongly enforcing
child support obligations. Because these ideas have not been subject to empiri-
cal testing, they ought to remain preliminary-and subject to the traditionalist
objection that they draw too many couples away from marriage.
Third, if the political culture considers protection of vulnerable persons to be
an important goal of a pluralist family law, as our culture surely does, it needs to
figure out what regimes best serve that goal and how the state should encourage
such regimes. This consideration is widely believed to be the trump card for
traditionalists' promarriage policy views. There is strong evidence that Ameri-
can children benefit from being reared by parents who remain together and that
American marriages are significantly more robust than cohabiting relation-
ships. 6 This evidence lends increasingly powerful support to traditionalist
views that marriage should be central to family law, that covenant marriage
seems like an attractive option (especially as I have formulated it, as tied to
benefits based upon the presence of children in the household), and that
cohabitation and other competing institutions should not be encouraged.
Progressives such as Professor Polikoff, however, make the equally cogent
point that a pluralist family law ought to focus more on children's needs than it
does currently. Thousands of deserving children would benefit from legal rules
such as second-parent adoption, parents recognized at birth, and other innova-
tive legal mechanisms (all originating in the District of Columbia) that enable
such children to enjoy the care of two parents with legal responsibilities toward
those children. Because it (like cohabitation) is ad hoc and unpredictable, de
facto parenthood is no substitute from a regime that is clearly articulated, under
the law, for all concerned.
Table 3, below, summarizes the historical; descriptive; and forward-looking,
prescriptive themes of this Article.
386. See Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, Legal Status and Effects on Children, 5 U. ST.
THOMAs L.J. 548, 550 (2008) (arguing that not only do children reared within a stable marriage do





Table 3. Evolving American Family Law
Changes in the
Last Century, Directions for New
Family Law, 1911 1911-2011 Millennium, 2012
Marriage monopoly Cohabitation, Expansion of menu:
civil union, other multitiered
new regimes marriage and
created caregiving
Restrictive purity End of racial Accommodation for
rules for marriage exclusions; incestuous and
Entry Rules erosion of polyamorous
disability-based families?
rules
Marriage limited to New regimes to Marriage equality
different-sex accommodate for LGBT persons
couples same-sex
couples
Mandatory rules Default rules Decriminalization
enforcing replace of adultery and
monogamous mandatory rules much adult incest
marriage for sex outside
marriage
Relationship Mandatory rules of Default rules for Default support
Rules support and sexual support and rules extended to
availability sexual consent nonmarital regimes
State More state More state
noninterference in regulation of regulation of
marriage's internal internal affairs of internal affairs of
affairs marriage cohabitation etc.
Divorce only for No-fault divorce: Choice of more
fault (such as easier exit from stringent override
adultery) marriage rule for divorce
Mandatory rules Antenuptial Greater scrutiny of
governing support agreements antenuptial
Exit Rules and property enforced as to agreements?
division most issues
Marriage monopoly New regimes More state
(such as protection for
cohabitation) vulnerable persons
with easier exits in nonmarital
relationships
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